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In the past physical walls and fences surrounding territorial space, 
towns and villages were viewed by ancient nations from a defensive 
perspective, as a fortification to defend their territorial sovereignty and 
a rampart to protect themselves from the outside attacks. Dramatic 
changes in both military doctrine and technology in the last century led 
to a decline in the strategic and tactic importance of borders as a line 
of defense. Although one of the key aspects of the traditional notion of 
sovereignty was the right for states to control exclusively the movement 
of people across territorial boundaries and to expel undesirable aliens 
and immigrants, nowadays this authority has come into question 
not only because of increased globalization, but also because of great 
intellectual efforts to re-theorize the notion of the nation-state and its 
components, including the concepts of sovereignty and national borders.
The means and systems used in border control developed 
throughout history have depended on the evolution of the military 
and security industries. In recent decades, border-control systems have 
developed dramatically along with a rapid growth of both authorized 
and unauthorized cross-border activities, including the flow of people, 
goods, ideas, drug, weapons, capital and information. This increase in 
physical-border barriers contradicts the trend for some globalist and 
trans-national perspectives that envisage a “Borderless World”, “A 
World without Sovereignty”, “The End of Geography”, “The End of the 
Nation-State” and so on.
Although the construction of border barriers has confirmed security 
concerns and strengthened the position of sovereign states as realists 
have emphasized, transnational non-state actors — the primary group 
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these walls and fences were erected to exclude — have seriously 
questioned state-centered theories. The gap between theory and practice 
has widened enormously after 9/11, when transnational non-state actors, 
or what Peter Andreas has termed “clandestine transnational actors”,1 
became not only the main rival of nation states but also a major threat 
to security, whereas interstate wars have declined steadily since the 
beginning of the third millennium.
At the same time, globalists have announced that the territorial 
border is going to become progressively blurred and eroded due to the 
combined pressures of the growing presence of transnational non-state 
actors and the interactions between globalization and information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), a sphere often theorized in terms of 
virtualization of trans-border and trans-national flows. James Rosenau 
has argued that this shift in perception occurring in the post-Cold War 
era is “diminishing the competence and effectiveness of states and 
rendering their borders more porous and less meaningful”.2 In a similar 
vein, Kenichi Ohmae, in his well-known book The Borderless World, 
confidently announced that “while everyone living on this earth is to 
one degree or another already living in an interlinked economy, at the 
same time, we all continue moving further toward the reality of a world 
without border”.3 In contrast, Saskia Sassen notes that, despite a growing 
consensus among developed countries to facilitate the flow of goods, 
information, and capital, when it comes to regulating the movement 
of people, “the national state claims its old splendor in asserting its 
sovereign right to control its borders”.4 Although globalization has 
diminished the traditional military and economic functions of borders, 
1  Peter Andreas defines “clandestine transnational actors” (CTAs) “as non-state 
actors who operate across national borders in violation of state laws and who 
attempt to evade law enforcement efforts”. Peter Andreas, “Redrawing the Line: 
Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century”, International Security, Vol. 28, 
No. 2 (2003), p. 78.
2  James N. Rosenau, “New Dimensions of Security: The Interaction of Globalizing 
the Localizing Dynamics”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1994), p. 258.
3  Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy. 
New York: Harper Business, 1999, p. xiv.
4  Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 59.
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it has also created more border-policing work for nation-states5 which 
now spend millions of dollars annually to fortify their national borders.
Anna Feigenbaum identified what she called “globalized fences” by 
four commonalities: first, they serve transnational security functions, 
particularly in the post-9/11 era, when transnational actors are perceived 
to have become the greatest threat to the nation-state. Second, they are 
contracted through multinational companies. Third, they are built with 
materials imported from different nations. Finally, they integrate ‘virtual’ 
and physical technologies. Advanced digital and virtual technologies 
work in conjunction with human patrols, communications devices and 
physical barriers.6
The growth of the walls has taken different paths in the post-World 
War II period.7 Only nineteen walls and barriers were built between 
1945 and 1991, and seven walls were added between 1991 and 2001 to 
the thirteen that survived the Cold War. The erection of border walls 
pauses briefly after the Cold War, but the post-9/11 period has seen the 
return of the wall as a political object and instrument.8 Twenty-eight 
walls have been erected or planned in the post-9/11 period.
Modern international barriers are defined according to their specific 
contexts and functions which are reflected in their various designations: 
security, military, defensive or anti-terror wall; fence or barrier and so on. 
Opponents of such walled borders adopt their own terminology which 
reflects how they perceive these barriers. Separation, shame, apartheid, 
or political/ideological walls are widely used to criticize fencing policies.
These barriers reflect the economic disparity between countries in 
many levels. Firstly, building states are significantly richer than target 
5  Peter Andreas, “Redrawing the Line”, p. 84.
6  Anna Feigenbaum, “Concrete Needs no Metaphor: Globalized Fences as Sites of 
Political Struggle”, Ephemera, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2010), pp. 121–23.
7  Élisabeth Vallet and Charles-Philippe David, “Introduction. Du retour des murs 
frontaliers en relations internationales”, Études internationales, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2012), 
pp. 5–25 ; Élisabeth Vallet, “Toujours plus de murs dans un monde sans frontières”, 
Le Devoir (26 October 2009), http://www.ledevoir.com/international/actualites-
internationales/273594/toujours-plus-de-murs-dans-un-monde-sans-frontieres; 
Vallet and David “The (Re)Building of the Wall in International Relations”, Journal 
of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2012), pp. 111–19.
8  Ibid., p. 113.
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states.9 Secondly, some border barriers (U.S.-Mexico barrier and Spanish 
fences in northern Morocco) embody what is called the “frontier of 
poverty”10 or “The Great Wall of Capital”11 that dramatically separate 
the global rich from the rest of the world. Thirdly, a large number of 
these border barriers were built to prevent irregular immigration from 
lesser-developed countries. On the two sides of the wall, there is always 
a significant potential imbalance of power, as well as asymmetric 
confidence.12 Walls are never built against an equivalent power. When 
the targeted country is considered reliable, the fortification of the 
common border is adopted bilaterally. For example, the government 
of the United States collaborates extensively with Canada to control its 
northern border, while it imposes a border fence with Mexico.13
The current border barriers can be sorted geographically. Asia, as the 
most fenced continent, contains almost twenty border barriers: India-
Pakistan; India-Bangladesh; India-Myanmar; Pakistan-Afghanistan; 
Myanmar-Bangladesh; Iran-Pakistan; Iran-Afghanistan; Kazakhstan-
Uzbekistan; China-North Korea; Malaysia-Thailand; Uzbekistan-
Afghanistan; Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan; Uzbekistan-Kirgizstan; Brunei-
eastern Malaysia (Limbang); South Korea-North Korea. In the Middle 
East, Israel has fenced off its entire de facto border with Palestinians and 
Arab countries adjacent to Palestine. In the Gulf, because of security 
and immigration reasons, most of the countries of the region, especially 
Saudi Arabia, have tried to fortify their borders: Israel-West Bank; Israel-
Gaza Strip; Israel-Egypt; Israel-Jordan; Israel-Lebanon; Israel-Syria; 
Turkey-Syria, Egypt-Gaza Strip; Saudi Arabia-Yemen; Saudi Arabia-
Iraq; Saudi Arabia-Oman; Saudi Arabia-Qatar; Saudi Arabia-United 
Arab Emirates; United Arab Emirates-Oman; Jordan-Iraq; Kuwait-Iraq. 
9  Ron Hassner and Jason Wittenberg, “Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified 
Boundaries and Are They Likely to Work?”, Paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada (3–6 September 
2009).
10  Roland Freudenstein, “Rio Odra, Rio Buh: Poland, Germany, and the Borders 
of Twenty-First-Century Europe”, in The Wall Around the West: State Borders and 
Immigration Controls in North America and Europe, Peter Andreas and Timothy 
Snyder (Eds.). Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, p. 174.
11  Mike Davis, “The Great Wall of Capital”, in Border Culture. Ilan Stavans (Ed.). Santa 
Barbara: Greenwood, 2009, p. 27.
12  Évelyne Ritaine, “La barrière et le checkpoint: Mise en politique de l’asymétrie”, 
Cultures & Conflits, No. 73 (2009), p. 21.
13  Ibid., p. 20.
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In Africa, there are more than eight border barriers: Morocco wall in 
Western Sahara; Spain-Morocco (Ceuta); Spain-Morocco (Melilla); South 
Africa-Mozambique; South Africa-Zimbabwe; Zimbabwe-Zambia, 
Botswana-Zimbabwe; Mozambique-Zambia. Europe, because of the 
advanced regional integration process, has not witnessed a growth in 
border walls after the end of the Cold War. Instead, separating walls 
in Europe have been dismantled (e.g., the Berlin wall and the Belfast 
wall). Today, there are only a few physical border barriers in Europe: 
Greek-Turkish Cyprus; Russia (Abkhazia)-Georgia; Gibraltar-Spain; 
Hungary-Serbia; Hungary-Croatia, although some new ones have been 
built in recent times in response to the refugee ‘crisis’. In North America, 
because of irregular immigration flows, the United States fenced off 
its borders with Mexico and Canada. Latin America is almost free of 
physical-border barriers except for those erected by the U.S. between 
Guantanamo and Cuba.
The growth in border barriers all over the world has created a huge 
security business. Private companies account for the bulk of this growing 
market. The major armament and defense companies are at the heart of 
the border-security market, but firms specializing in communications, 
surveillance, information technology or biometrics also take a significant 
part in this new multi-billion-dollar market.14 Israeli companies are the 
most famous in this area. Since 2002, exports of Israeli technology in 
border security services increased by 22 percent each year, and there 
are about 450 Israeli companies specializing in securing territory.15 
The major international companies that claim the lion share of this 
market include Boeing (American multinational aerospace and defense 
corporation), Elbit Systems (Israeli defense electronics manufacturers 
and integrators), Magal Security Systems (Israeli company operating 
in more than 75 countries worldwide), Amper (Spanish multinational 
group), Indra Sistemas (Spanish information technology and defense 
company) and EADS Group (European Aeronautic Defense and Space 
Company).
14  Julien Saada, “L’économie du mur: Un marché en pleine expansion”, Le Devoir (27 
October 2009), http://www.ledevoir.com/international/actualites-internationales/ 
271687/l-economie-du-mur-un-marche-en-pleine-expansion
15  Ibid.
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Even if their primary objective is to secure the border, physical barriers 
are seen by some targeted countries as a unilateral attempt to demarcate 
common borders, especially when it comes to occupied or disputed 
territories that can be turned to de facto boundaries (e.g., the Israeli 
barriers, the fences of Ceuta and Melilla, the Indian fence in Kashmir, 
the India-Bangladesh border and the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border). 
So, although in some cases it can be argued that the reinforcement of a 
nation-state’s borders is based on security requirements, recent history 
has demonstrated that states hide their real goals behind security issues. 
Since almost all border barriers are erected by unilateral decision — 
with few exceptions (e.g., the U.S.-Canada border and the Malaysia-
Thailand Border), they are always disputed, even when they are built 
on a national boundary or on private property.16 Targeted countries 
always emphasize that border-security policies should be bilateral and 
a result of cooperation.
This book consists of five chapters. The first, “Israel and the Fencing 
Policy”, examines aspects of various separation barriers built by Israel 
since its inception in 1948 and evaluates their effectiveness in order to 
show whether such a policy makes Israel more secure.
The second chapter, “Border Fencing in India”, provides an overview 
of the complicated characteristics of India’s borders with adjacent 
countries and deals with the Indian strategy of fencing borders with 
some of its neighbors. Despite the diversity of India’s border-fencing 
projects, security concerns are the top priority of the border-control 
systems.
The third chapter, “The Fences of Ceuta and Melilla”, investigates the 
controversial aspects of Ceuta and Melilla’s fences as the EU southern 
border and highlights the changing roles of the two enclaves’ fences. 
The barriers of Ceuta and Melilla provide a fitting model to examine 
the gap between governments’ stated purposes and hidden objectives.
The fourth chapter, “The U.S.-Mexico Border Wall”, analyzes the 
relationship between the U.S. immigration policy and border-control 
systems at a time when militarizing and fencing of the southern 
border remain the cornerstone of the U.S. strategy to keep unwanted 
immigrants out of its territory.
16  Évelyne Ritaine, “La barrière et le checkpoint: Mise en politique de l’asymétrie”, p. 21.
 7Introduction
The last chapter, “The Wall of Western Sahara”, focuses on the 
military wall built by Morocco in Western Sahara. The chapter presents 
the status and prospects of the Sahara sand wall (or “berm”), as well 
as a glance at the Western Sahara issue. Although the Sahara wall 
was built, at first, in a specific context and for a specific military goal, 
today it embodies the lingering disputes arising from a long-term and 
ongoing conflict — the Western Sahara issue that continues to threaten 
the stability of the Maghreb region.

1. Israel and the Fencing Policy1
Since its inception in 1948, Israel has established barriers of varying 
structures and effectiveness between populations of Jewish Israelis 
and their Arab neighbors. This policy has been a constant element of 
Israel’s security doctrine, rooted in Zionist thought from its beginning.2 
Writing of Palestine, the father of modern political Zionism, Theodor 
Herzl remarked in his book The Jewish State,3 that “we should there 
form a portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of 
civilization as opposed to barbarism”.4 Uri Avnery, an Israeli peace 
activist and journalist, argues that, more than a hundred years later, 
Ariel Sharon’s wall expresses exactly the same outlook; separating its 
“civilization” from “others”.5 The idea of building a separation wall in 
Palestine dates back to 1923, when Ze’ev Jabotinsky, one of the most 
influential Zionist leaders and the ideological father of today’s Likud 
Party, published two essays entitled “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab 
1  This chapter is drawn, with permission from the publisher, from: “Israel and the 
Fencing Policy: A Barrier on Every Seam Line”, research paper, Arab Center for 
Research and Policy Studies (June 2015), http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/
get/847a306c-a229-44e4-9bc2-ad4ca6c4ffd6.pdf
2  See, for example, Uri Avnery’s critical articles on Israeli separation walls.
3  Der Judenstaat (Leipzig and Vienna: M. Breitenstein’s Verlags-Buchhandlung, 
1896). English translation: The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the 
Jewish Question, 6th ed. (New York: Maccabean Publishing Co., 1904). The title is 
also translated in English as The State of the Jews.
4  Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State, p. 28.
5  Uri Avnery, “First of All — the Wall must Fall”, Gush Shalom (30 August 2003).
© 2017 Said Saddiki, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0121.02
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World”6 and “The Ethics of the Iron Wall”7 in which he defended the 
idea of establishing a metaphorical and, in many ways, physical “iron 
wall” between the populations, declaring that “Settlement can only 
develop under the protection of a force that is not dependent on the 
local population, behind an iron wall which they will be powerless to 
break down…”8 At the time, Jabotinsky’s “iron wall” doctrine was not 
adopted by the Zionist movement. Instead, it adopted the solution of 
expelling and displacing native Arab Palestinians.
Though each modern Israeli barrier has been built in its own specific 
context, the goals of each project of separation overlap and, in fact, form 
part of a policy of Israeli walls and fences derived from a single Zionist 
philosophy. This has translated into a state with perpetual security 
concerns, a lasting occupation, and the annexation of more Palestinian 
lands. Regardless of international resolutions recognizing the existence 
of the “Jewish state” within the so-called 1949 Armistice lines, the way 
and the context in which Israel was created and expanded has left it 
in an abnormal and hostile situation. Even if most Arab countries 
recognize, if implicitly, the State of Israel, their peoples have never 
accepted a normalization of relations with the “Jewish State” as an 
embodiment of principles that include a continuation of practices that 
are fundamentally separating “civilization” from its “others”. Being at 
the center of the state’s foundation and its current hostile predicament, 
the separation barrier policy can be said to reflect in many ways the 
constant fear in which Israel lives.
This chapter analyzes multiple aspects of Israel’s policy of separation, 
and evaluates the effectiveness of its contemporary methods in order 
to determine whether or not such a policy makes Israel more secure. 
It begins by identifying three categories of barriers based on their 
geographical location: separation barriers in the occupied Palestinian 
territories (barriers separating Israelis from Palestinians and barriers 
6  It was originally published in Russian in Rassvyet [Berlin] (4 November 1923), 
and later translated and published in English in The Jewish Herald [South Africa] 
(November 26, 1937).
7  Originally published in Russian in Rassvyet [Paris] (11 November 1923), and later 
translated and published in English in The Jewish Standard [London] (5 September 
1941).
8  Ze’ev Jabotinsky, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, cited by Yosef Gorny, 
Zionism and the Arabs: A Study of Ideology, Translated by Chaya Galai (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 166.
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separating Palestinians from each other), barriers as de facto borders 
between Israel and Arab countries and Israeli military barriers in other 
occupied Arab territories (e.g., in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and the Syrian 
Golan Heights).
Separation Barriers in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories: Dispersion of Population and 
Annexation of Territory
Israel has made the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) a zone of 
separation barriers by surrounding itself by fortified walls and fences 
on every boundary line. Barriers that separate Palestinians from each 
other — mainly the West Bank wall — are the most painful not only 
because they are seen as major Israeli land-grabs but also because they 
affect vital aspects of Palestinian lives, especially for those who live in 
areas adjacent to the barriers.
The West Bank Separation Wall
In 1995, then-prime minister Yitzhak Rabin proposed building a 
separation wall9 along the entire length of the West Bank including east 
Jerusalem, but the project was not pursued for fear of the reaction of Jewish 
settlers who saw the idea as a retreat from the project of absorbing the 
West Bank into a “Greater Israel”. In March 1996, the Israeli government 
decided to establish checkpoints along the de facto borders of the West 
Bank, similar to the Erez checkpoint that controls the movement of 
people in and out of the Gaza Strip. In November 2000, the government 
of Ehud Barak approved a plan to establish a “barrier to prevent the 
passage of motor vehicles” from the northwest end of the West Bank 
to the Latrun area in the center. On 18 July 2001, the Israeli Ministerial 
Committee for Security Matters approved the recommendations of a 
steering committee established the previous month by then-Prime 
9  Different terms are used to denote the Israeli separation wall in the West Bank. Israeli 
officials and journalists generally use two terms “separation fence” and “security 
fence” while Palestinians use mainly “apartheid wall” or “racial separation wall” 
(in Arabic, jidar al-fasl al-unsuri). The International Court of Justice, in its advisory 
opinion, used the term “separation wall”, which I adopt in this chapter.
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Minister Ariel Sharon, to adopt a series of measures aimed at preventing 
Palestinians from infiltrating into Israel across what became known as 
the “seam area”. In April 2002, after a surge in attacks by Palestinian 
groups, the Israeli cabinet decided to construct a long barrier composed 
of fences and walls in three areas of the West Bank deemed to be the most 
vulnerable to penetration by armed Palestinians: the Umm El-Fahm 
region and the villages divided between Israel and the area (Baka and 
Barta’a), the Qalqilya-Tulkarm region and the Greater Jerusalem region. 
In June 2002, the Israeli government began building the separation wall. 
On 20 February 2005, after several amendments made over the previous 
three years, the Israeli government published a new map marking the 
Wall’s route throughout the West Bank.10
The construction of the separation wall is linked by Samer Alatout to 
the third phase of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza which 
started in 1967. Alatout has shown how each period of occupation 
was guided by a distinct government own regime: the 1967–1994 
period, marked by its initial occupation and subsequent establishment 
of intensive control over territory and population; the 1994–2002 
period, when Israeli authorities adopted a new policy of cantonization 
through intensive use of roadblocks, checkpoints and bypass roads; 
and the current phase, which started in 2002, when the construction 
of the separation wall began.11 These three phases, however, are not 
disconnected but rather overlap each other. For example, elements of 
the two earlier phases — such as occupation, control and cantonization 
— form an integral part of the latest phase of the Israeli separation policy. 
10  This brief chronology of the construction of the West Bank wall is based on the 
Yehezkel Lein’s article “Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result of 
Israel’s Separation Barrier”, position paper, Trans. Zvi Shulman, B’Tselem (March 
2003), https://www.btselem.org/download/200304_behind_the_barrier_eng.pdf. 
See also United Nations, “Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier”, A report 
to the Humanitarian Emergency Policy Group (HEPG), compiled by the United 
Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in the occupied 
Palestinian territory, No. 6 (2006), https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/1
FE4606B31BC49748525713900575924
11  Samer Alatout, “Walls as Technologies of Government: The Double Construction 
of Geographies of Peace and Conflict in Israeli Politics, 2002-Present”, Annals of 
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While the construction of the separation wall in the West Bank obviously 
reflected a new phase of the Israeli policy towards the oPt, it, in addition 
to the annexation of some parts of West Bank territory to Israel, this new 
policy resulted in a unilateral separation of Israel from other Palestinian 
occupied lands.
Map and Structure of the West Bank Separation Wall
Close to 90 percent of the total route of the wall is inside the West Bank,12 
chewing up the land to the East of the Green Line — the pre-1967 border 
between Israel and what was then a Jordanian-administered West Bank. 
Effectively, the separation wall does not only separate Palestinians from 
Israel but separates Palestinians from their land, hence Palestinians’ 
contention that one of the major goals in erecting the West Bank wall is 
to annex more Palestinian lands to nearby Israeli settlements, and, thus, 
to Israel. The total length of the separation wall extends approximately 
750 kilometers, more than twice the length of the 320 kilometer-long 
Green Line (1949 Armistice Line),13 since it zigzags into the West Bank 
up to 22 kilometers at points to ensure settlements fall on its western 
edge. The wall has an average width of 60–80 meters, which includes a 
system of barbed wire, ditches, large trace paths and tank-patrol lanes 
on each side, as well as additional buffer zones/no-go areas of varying 
depths.14
The separation wall is a fully integrated military system of walls, 
fences (including electronic and barbed-wire fences), barriers, trenches, 
sensors, watchtowers, sandy routes, concrete slabs up to 8 metres 
high, thermal imaging, video cameras, aerial drones and other security 
measures. Amos Yaron, former director of Israel’s Ministry of Defense, 
described the West Bank separation wall as “the largest project ever 
12  Amnesty International, “Israel and the Occupied Territories: The Place of the 
Fence/Wall in International Law”, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
MDE15/016/2004/en/
13  The 1949 Armistice lines (known also as the Green Line) refer to the demarcation 
lines between Israeli forces and those of neighboring Arab Countries, Egypt, 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, which defined by the agreements that put an end to 
the 1984 Arab-Israeli War. These lines served as the de facto border of Israel until the 
1967 war.
14  Ibid.
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undertaken in Israel”.15 Although the structure of the separation wall 
takes various physical forms, it can be summarized in the following 
points:
• Barbed wire, to obstruct access.
• A trench 4 meters wide and 5 meters deep, dug behind the 
barbed wires.
• A paved road 12 meters wide, which is a military road for 
surveillance and reconnaissance.
• A sand road 4 meters wide located right behind the military 
road, to trace infiltrators. This road is combed twice daily, in 
the morning and evening.
• The separation wall is situated right on the sand road. It is 
a 1-meter cement wall and right directly over it there is a 
3-meter electronic fence, where alarms, surveillance cameras, 
lights, and other security apparatus are placed.
• After the wall, there is a sand road, a paved road, a trench, and 
barbed wire, mirroring the ones located on the other side of 
the wall.16
The construction of the separation wall in the West Bank is estimated 
to cost somewhere between NIS 10 million (USD 2.8 million) to NIS 
15 million (USD 4.3 million) per kilometer.17 Extra costs and those 
associated with 24-hour human and electronic surveillance put the total 
cost of the 750-kilometer Israeli separation wall somewhere between 
USD 2.1 and USD 3.2 billion.
The land area in the West Bank located between the separation wall 
and the Green Line has been designated by the Israeli government as 
15  Felix Frisch, “Israel Plans: Tax to Be Imposed on Palestinians Who Enter Israel”, 
Y-net News (6 March 2003).
16  The information on the barrier’s structure is extracted from a report published 
by the Palestinian National Authority, The State Information Center, “The Israeli 
Racist Separation Wall: Consequences and Violations” (10 October 2003), http://
w3.osaarchivum.org/galeria/the_divide/cpt14files/the_israeli_racist_separation_
wall.doc. This information is consistent with what is reported in the Response of 
the Israeli State Attorney to the High Court of Justice in HCJ 7784/02, Sa’ al ‘Awani 
‘Abd al Hadi et al. v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, sec. 23.
17  Amos Harel, “Cost of Fence could Rise to NIS 15 Million per Kilometer”, Haaretz (8 
April 2004); Felix Frisch, “Israel Plans: Tax to Be Imposed on Palestinians Who Enter 
Israel”.
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a “seam zone” and declared a “closed zone”. According to the Israeli 
military Declaration of Closing an Area No. S/20/03 made on 2 October 
2003, “no person will enter the seam area and no one will remain 
there”. This order, however, does not apply to Israelis or those who 
have the right to immigrate to Israel according to the country’s Law 
of Return.18 The Palestinians who live near the area are allowed to 
remain in their homes and on their lands only if they possess a written 
permit authorizing permanent residence. It is expected that, when the 
separation wall is finished as planned, approximately 65,000 Palestinians 
will require permits to cross the wall into the West Bank where they 
legally reside, and some 270,000 Palestinians living in these areas will be 
trapped in closed military areas between the wall and the Green Line or 
in enclaves encircled by the wall.19 That these confiscated lands in the 
“seam area” include the West Bank’s most valuable agricultural land and 
water resources measuring 73,000 dunums, a vital source of income for 
the Palestinians in the region, is another cause of concern for a failing 
Palestinian economy.
Fig. 1.1 The West Bank separation wall (17 August 2004).  
Photo by Justin McIntosh, CC BY 2.0.20
18  Article 4, Israeli Law of Return.
19  Ibid.
20  Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3A 
Israeli_West_Bank_Barrier.jpg
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Goals of the West Bank Separation Wall
The sole stated purpose of the separation wall, as repeatedly declared 
by the Israeli government, is a temporary structure providing security21 
by preventing, or at least reducing, attacks carried out by Palestinian 
militant groups against Israelis inside the Green Line. The decision to 
build the wall was taken after the outbreak of the Second Palestinian 
Uprising (Al-Aqsa Intifada) on 29 September 2000, when the former 
Likud leader Ariel Sharon, accompanied by thousands of Israeli 
security forces, visited the Haram Ash-Sharif, known to Jews as the 
Temple Mount, in al-Quds (Jerusalem). The Palestinians saw Sharon’s 
visit as a provocation, and a new uprising quickly spread throughout 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. From this point, the Arab-Israeli conflict 
entered a new phase, characterized by the escalation of bombing attacks 
inside Israel. In 2001 and 2002, Palestinian armed groups22 carried out 87 
bombings against Israeli targets, causing 299 fatalities.23
Palestinians reject Israel’s justification of the construction of the wall 
based on a security argument and maintain that the wall was built for 
political reasons: to protect and perpetuate Israel’s occupation, illegal 
colonies and ongoing colonization of the Palestinian land. Even if the 
decision to build the separation wall in 2000 was made in the context 
of a wave of attacks inside Israel, large numbers of the Palestinian 
attackers who carried out these operations passed through Israeli 
military checkpoints not through the porous border between Israel and 
the oPt.24 The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) argues that if 
Israel truly wanted to protect its citizens, it should “do one or both of the 
following: withdraw completely from all of the territories it occupied 
21  See, for example, the Israeli Government decision of 23 July 2001 cited in the 
website of Israel Seam Zone Authority.
22  These attacks were carried out in particular by those affiliated with Hamas, 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Fatah, and Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP).
23  Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi, “Human Capital and the Productivity of 
Suicide Bombers”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2007), p. 226.
24  Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, “Securing the Wall from International Law: 
An Initial Response to the Israeli State Attorney”, position paper, Palestinian Centre 
for Human Rights (2005).
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in 1967 or place additional security on its internationally-recognized 
border, rather than in the occupied Palestinian territories”.25
In addition to the wall that annexed between 10 to 15 percent of the 
West Bank, the Israeli settlements, in this part of the oPt, are also a land 
grab and contravene international law.26 As of 2004, some 54 Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank and 12 in East Jerusalem were located on 
Palestinian land that is being cut off from the rest of the West Bank by 
the wall and being de facto annexed to Israel. In total, more than 320,000 
Israeli settlers, some 80 percent of the settlers living in the oPt, will be 
living on the western side of the wall and will thus enjoy more direct 
territorial contiguity with Israel.27 In contrast, around 67 Palestinian 
villages are separated from Palestinian communities, including their 
means of livelihood and access to government services. Some 210,000 
are barred in isolated enclaves, in severe violation of their rights under 
international law.28 Through the construction of its separation wall, 
then, Israel is drawing a new de facto map and unilaterally redefining 
its borders.
Some argue that if it was only about a temporary security measure, 
Israel could construct a barbed-wire fence that would perform the 
same function and could easily be dismantled or destroyed, instead of 
a steel-reinforced concrete wall. Indeed, its cost and route both seem to 
disprove claims that it is a temporary structure.
Effects of the West Bank Separation Wall
The Social Impact
According to international law, Israel, as an occupying power, is obliged 
to respect the fundamental rights of the occupied Palestinian population 
at all times and to administer the Palestinian territory without making 
changes which could have far-reaching effects on the population or 
25  PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, “Bad Fences Make Bad Neighbors”, The 
Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2002).
26  Amnesty International, “Israel and the Occupied Territories: The issue of Settlements 
must be Addressed according to International Law” (8 September 2003).
27  Amnesty International, “Israel and the Occupied Territories”, p. 4.
28  Yehezkel Lein, “Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations As a Result of Israel’s 
Separation Barrier”, position paper, Trans. Zvi Shulman, B’Tselem (April 2003), pp. 4–9.
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territory. The separation wall undoubtedly has a high human cost, one 
that is increasing still further the suffering of the Palestinian people. Since 
the construction of the wall began in 2002, human rights organizations 
have documented the immediate human impact of the wall. Reported 
effects, which present serious violations of both international human 
rights and international humanitarian law, affect various aspects of 
the Palestinians’ economic and social activities, including restrictions 
on movement, as well as the destruction and seizure of land. Amnesty 
International, for example, has repeatedly asserted that the wall 
cannot be considered a necessary or proportionate security measure 
and does not benefit the local Palestinian population. On the contrary, 
it is regarded as an act of collective punishment, which is forbidden 
by international humanitarian law (Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, and the restrictions allowed by Article 64 of the same 
Convention). Moreover, the wall has severely negative consequences 
for hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, including unprecedented, 
disproportionate and discriminatory restrictions on their movements 
within the oPt, as well as other violations of their fundamental rights, 
including the right to work, to food, to medical care, to education and 
to an adequate standard of living.29
Thousands of Palestinians living inside the Green Line and near 
the separation wall find themselves separated not only from their 
agricultural lands but also from their nearby communities.
A report issued by the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in June 2007 summarized the significant 
humanitarian and social effects of the separation wall on Palestinian life 
in the following findings:
• Palestinians from the West Bank require permits to visit the 
six specialist hospitals inside Jerusalem. The resulting time 
and difficulty this entails has meant an up to 50% drop in the 
number of patients visiting these hospitals.
• Entire families have been divided by the wall. Husbands and 
wives are separated from each other, their children and other 
relatives.
29  Amnesty International, “Israel and the Occupied Territories: The Place of the Fence/
Wall in International Law” (19 February 2004), p. 6
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• Palestinian Muslims and Christians can no longer freely 
visit religious sites in Jerusalem. Permits are needed and are 
increasingly difficult to obtain.
Fig. 1.2 A checkpoint in the West Bank Separation Wall, near Abu Dis 
(18 August 2004). Photo by Justin McIntosh, CC BY 2.0.30
School and university students struggle each day through checkpoints 
to reach institutions that are located on the other side of the wall. Entire 
communities, such as the 15,000 people in the villages of the Bir Nabala 
enclave, are totally surrounded by the wall. The only way in or out is 
through a tunnel to Ramallah which passes under the motorway that is 
restricted for Israeli use only.31
30  Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3A 
Checkpoint_near_Abu_Dis.jpg
31  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 
“Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities”, 
Report No. 7 (June 2007), p. 4, https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/1FE4
606B31BC49748525713900575924
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The Economic Effects
When construction of the wall began, studies by humanitarian 
organizations expected its immediate economic effects to include “a) 
the destruction of agricultural land and assets and water resources; b) 
inaccessibility to agricultural land and assets; c) added limitations on 
the mobility of people and goods, and therefore higher transactions 
costs; and d) uncertainty about the future and a consequent dampening 
of investment in economic activities including agriculture”.32 This was 
indeed the case. The Palestinian governorates adjacent to the separation 
wall; especially in Jenin, Tulkarm and Qalqiliya; are the most directly 
affected by its construction. The economic impact of the wall on these 
regions recorded immediately after its construction has been substantial, 
due principally to restrictions on farming and the inaccessibility of land 
by its owners. These areas, once known as the breadbasket of Palestine, 
are home to 37 percent of all the agricultural land in the West Bank.
Movement restrictions have proved fatal for many whose livelihoods 
are made in agriculture, and increased unemployment rates are seen 
in areas close to the wall.33 Furthermore, it is very difficult for many 
Palestinians to obtain a permit to enter the seam area. Even if some 
Palestinian farmers can get a permit to enter, they are not guaranteed 
regular access to their land for several reasons, including:
• Restrictions on the period of time a farmer can be in the closed 
areas.
• The Israeli army’s control of the gates is so erratic that this is 
as much a problem as the permit regime itself.
• Agricultural gates are open three times a day, generally for 20 
minutes to an hour.
• Following a security incident, the gates can be closed for 
several days or more.
32  The Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Aid 
Coordination Committee (LACC), “The Impact of Israel’s Separation Barrier on 
Affected West Bank Communities” (4 May 2003), p. 11.
33  United Nations, “Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier”, No. 6, p. 8, https://
unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/1FE4606B31BC49748525713900575924
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• Tractors and other farm vehicles are frequently not permitted 
to cross the gate. Farmers must either walk or use a donkey to 
reach their land and bring out produce.
• Each permit is valid for a particular gate. Some farmers have 
the wrong gate numbers on their permits, leaving access for 
the farmer reliant on a soldier’s discretion.34
In addition to the effects of the wall on agricultural activity, cutting 
off Palestinian communities from their primary income streams both 
within the West Bank and Israel has deepened the isolation of the regions 
adjacent to the wall. For, while the wall separates Palestinians from their 
farmland and water sources and impedes their movement of produce 
to market in other areas of the West Bank, it also makes it difficult for 
tens of thousands of Palestinians to access work in Israel, mainly as day 
laborers on farms or construction sites, a primary source of income for 
many. The danger is that serious economic and social effects of the wall 
will likely push some Palestinians to move, a form of indirect forced 
displacement and ethnic cleansing.
It is worth mentioning that the construction of the wall does 
not only affect Palestinians living in the oPt but also thousands of 
Palestinians living in the Green Line near the separation wall. They also 
find themselves cut off from their agricultural lands and their nearby 
compatriots both in the West Bank and across the Green Line.
The Environmental Cost
Vital environmental resources in the “seam area/buffer zone” of the 
separation wall are destroyed by the wall. The effects of the confiscation 
of water wells, the demolition of homes and greenhouses and the 
uprooting of hundreds of thousands of trees and crops are devastating. 
Palestinians argue that Israel, through the wall and its associated regime, 
will dominate all the strategic sites of fresh water in the region, especially 
in Jenin, Qalqilya and Tulkarm. The Palestinian Authority has accused 
Israel of planning to gain control over the most important Palestinian 
34  Ibid., p. 9.
22 World of Walls
water resources when it set out the route of the wall.35 Palestinians 
therefore fear that the situation will further weaken the Palestinian 
position in any future negotiations over water.36
The Effect on Jerusalem
Jerusalem, which remains the thorniest issue when it comes to the 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, will be deeply affected by the 
construction of the separation wall by isolating the Holy City from its 
environs and the West Bank. The largest part of East Jerusalem will be 
swallowed and absorbed by the separation wall into Israel.37 Palestinians 
assert that one of the hidden goals of separating east Jerusalem from the 
West Bank is to control the movement of Palestinians to and from the 
city, thereby forcing Palestinians living there to move eastwards and 
out of the Palestinian capital. This would cause a dramatic change in 
the demographic balance of Jerusalem in favor of its Jewish population. 
This is part of a documented program of Judaizing the city that began 
in the 1970s, according to a number of studies. They assert that Israel 
has worked to uproot Palestinians in the Holy City and to separate 
Jerusalem from its geographical and historical connections.
The International Legal Status of the West Bank Separation Wall
On 8 December 2003, the UN General Assembly requested an 
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the 
legal consequences of the construction of the Israeli separation wall, 
considering the rules and principles of international law, including the 
fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and 
General Assembly resolutions. On 9 July 2004, the ICJ issued its advisory 
35  Palestinian National Authority and PWA, The Israeli Apartheid Separation Wall 
“To Control The Palestinian Water Resources”, prepared by the PWA in cooperation 
with Sustainable Management of the West Bank and Gaza Aquifer (5 February 
2003), p. 2.
36  Palestinian National Authority, State Information Center, “The Israeli Racist 
Separation Wall”, http://w3.osaarchivum.org/galeria/the_divide/cpt14files/the_
israeli_racist_separation_wall.doc
37  Peter Lagerquist, “Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine after Israel’s 
‘Separation Wall’”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2004), p. 15.
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opinion on the matter, stating that the construction of the wall and its 
associated regime could well become permanent, notwithstanding the 
formal characterization of the wall by Israel, in which case it would be 
tantamount to a de facto annexation (para. 121).38
The court rejected Israel’s security argument since the route of the 
wall and its associated regime gravely infringe a number of rights 
of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the 
infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military 
need or by the requirements of national security or public order (para. 
137). The court also called on Israel to comply with its obligation to 
respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and 
its obligations under international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law (para. 149). The advisory opinion of the ICJ included 
five main findings (para. 163):
1. The construction of the wall is contrary to international law.
2. Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of 
international law; to cease forthwith the works of construction 
of the wall, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein 
situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all 
legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto.
3. Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage 
caused by the construction of the wall.
4. All States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal 
situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not 
to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created 
by such construction; all States parties to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War of 12 August 1949, have, in addition the obligation, 
while respecting the United Nations Charter and international 
law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international 
humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.
38  Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 9 July 2004, 
http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,414ad9a719.html
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5. The United Nations should consider what further action is 
required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from 
the construction of the wall and the associated regime.
These findings were adopted almost unanimously by the fifteen 
participating judges of the ICJ. Two exceptions were Judge Buergenthal, 
who voted against the five findings, and Judge Kooijmans, who voted 
for the advisory opinion except the fourth finding. Given the complexity 
of the case and the huge levels of Israeli lobbying that came ahead of the 
decision, this remarkable consensus on the legal consequences of the 
separation wall gives these findings a significant and enduring place in 
the jurisprudence of the ICJ.39
Gaza Fences
Gaza has been under Israeli military occupation since the Six-Day 
War in 1967, even though UN Resolution 242, passed on 22 November 
1967 in the aftermath of the war, called for Israel to withdraw “from 
territories occupied in the recent conflict”, including Gaza. Israel 
declared the Gaza Strip a closed military zone — a declaration that 
was in place until 2005 — which meant that Palestinians in Gaza had 
to obtain permission from Israel whenever they wanted to travel out 
of the closed zone. Despite Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza 
in 2005 and the transfer of the management of the Gaza-Egypt border 
crossing at Rafah to the European Union Border Assistance Mission 
(EUBAM), Israel continued to exercise remote control of the crossing 
via closed-circuit cameras until 2007. This followed Hamas’ landslide 
victory in the Palestinian parliamentary election of 2006 and the 
subsequent struggle for control between Hamas and Fatah, which saw 
Hamas take over the Gaza Strip in 2007. Israel’s blockade of the Gaza 
Strip was part of the state’s reaction to a loss of control of the enclave, 
but the blockade has only been possible with the acquiescence of 
Egypt and its leaders.
39  Richard A. Falk, “Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on Israel’s Security 
Wall”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 99, No. 1 (2005), p. 43
 251. Israel and the Fencing Policy
In October 1994, after a string of attacks carried by Palestinian 
militant groups in the coastal city of Tel Aviv, Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin called for the construction of a fence around the Gaza 
Strip. The aim was both to separate Israelis from Palestinians and to cut 
off Gaza’s Palestinian residents from the rest of the world. Rabin based 
his proposal on a philosophy of separation rooted in Zionist thought by 
stating, “We have to decide on separation as a philosophy. There has 
to be a clear border. Without a border demarcating the lines, whoever 
wants to swallow 1.8 million Arabs will just bring greater support for 
Hamas”.40 Israel has built two metal barriers around the Gaza Strip, one 
between Israel and Gaza and the other along the border of Gaza with 
Egypt. The structure, constructed in 1994–1996, is 51 kilometers long 
and made mostly of barbed wire and corrugated sheet metal. At the 
beginning of 2000, al-Aqsa Intifada, Palestinian activists dismantled 
much of the barrier, which was rebuilt by the Israeli military between 
December 2000 and June 2001, with the addition of observation 
posts, each of which enabled soldiers to monitor an area of roughly 6 
kilometers round-the-clock.41 When Israel found that the direct military 
occupation of the Gaza Strip was more costly than anticipated, it decided 
to withdraw from the Strip and maintain complete control from outside 
its borders, ultimately turning Gaza into an extended prison.
On the other side, and further separating Gaza from its environs, a 
fence was constructed along Gaza’s land border with Egypt in 2004–
2005 by Israel. This came in parallel with the “unilateral withdrawal” 
of settlers from Gaza and the end of internal Israeli control. Israel still 
exercises almost complete control over Gaza’s land borders, territorial 
waters and airspace and prevents significant contact between the 
population there and the outside world. The Israeli fence between 
Gaza and Egypt is 11 kilometers (6.8 miles) long and 7–9 meters (about 
20–30 feet) high, with several openings that allow the Israeli army to 
move through it under special circumstances. Because Palestinians 
built underground tunnels in order to smuggle items such as food 
40  David Makovsky, “How to Build a Fence”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2 (2004), p. 
52.
41  Doron Almog, “Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank”, Jerusalem 
Issue Brief, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 12 (2004).
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and weapons from Egypt, the Israeli army equipped the fence with 
sophisticated technology and sensors that can detect such tunnels and 
aid in their destruction.42 Tunnels in Rafah on the Gaza-Egypt border 
manage to evade total Israeli control, despite the army’s attempts to 
destroy them by aerial bombardment.
The Israeli fence along Gaza’s perimeter has three main crossings 
through which Palestinians and their goods can enter and leave the 
territory: Beit Hanoun (Erez) in the north, for those going to and from 
Israel, imposes stringent restrictions on the movement of Palestinians; 
al-Montar (Karni) crossing to the east, which handles cargo and has 
been closed since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada; and the Rafah 
crossing to the south, on the Egyptian border, which was monitored 
by the Israel Airports Authority until Israel withdrew from Gaza on 11 
September 2005 as part of Israel’s unilateral disengagement plan. It was 
subsequently managed by the EUBAM until Hamas took over the Gaza 
Strip in 2007.
Evidence of the ineffectiveness of the separation fences to stop 
attacks emanating from Gaza can perhaps best be seen in the constant 
wars waged by Israel on the Strip. Despite the separation fences, 
regular military invasions, aerial bombings, targeted assassinations 
and land confiscations continue to be carried out.43 From 2006, three 
large-scale attacks have been waged on Gaza, the second of which, in 
December 2008-January 2009, killed approximately 1,417 Palestinians. 
The construction of the fence along the perimeter of the Gaza Strip 
has also not stopped attacks by Palestinian militant groups, since the 
organizations have adopted new means to fight Israel that include the 
use of surface-to-surface missiles and rockets that can reach Israeli cities 
on the other side of the barrier.
The barrier has failed to ensure Israeli security, has undermined 
Palestinian territorial integrity and caused harm to the civilian 
population there.
42  Hanan Greenberg, “Army Building New Gaza Barrier”, Y-net News (4 April 2005), 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3072620,00.html
43  Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, “Securing the Wall from International Law: 
An Initial Response to the Israeli State Attorney”, position paper (April 2005).
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De Facto Borders: Similar Purposes in Different Contexts
Lebanon-Israel Border Fences
During the British Mandate for Palestine, double and triple barbed-wire 
fences along the Palestine-Lebanon border were constructed between 
May and June 1938 in an attempt to seal off the border against incursions 
from the north of Palestine. The barrier was dismantled during the 
1936–1939 Arab uprisings in Palestine. At the same time, the British 
Mandatory authorities erected a new barbed wire called Tergart’s Wall 
on the northern border of Palestine to prevent Arab militants from Syria 
and Lebanon from joining the 1936–1939 revolt. Tergart’s Wall was 
abandoned and dismantled during World War II.
With the end of the British Mandate (after the establishment of 
the State of Israel), the Israeli government built new fences running 
the length of the Palestine-Lebanon border. In 1976, the government 
adopted a security policy toward southern Lebanon called “the Good 
Fence”, aimed at providing some services to southern Lebanese people, 
especially the Maronites, including passage into Israel for work, access 
to medical treatment, Israeli goods, relief support, water and food 
supplies44 and even military assistance and training for “those seeking 
to defend their community”.45 This policy was intended to support the 
South Lebanon Army (Maronite Militia) in its battle against the PLO 
during the Lebanese civil war which broke out in 1976. The “Good 
Fence” policy ceased to exist with the sudden withdrawal of Israeli 
troops from southern Lebanon in 2000.
In the 1970s, Israel built a fence without respecting the exact lines 
of the border inherited from the Mandate period.46 After the 1983–1984 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from most of Lebanon except for the 
“security zone” in the south, Israel built a sophisticated defense complex 
along the border, consisting of electrified fences, anti-personnel 
44  Augustus Richard Norton and Jillian Schwedler, “(In) security Zones in South 
Lebanon”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1993), p. 63.
45  Clive H. Schofield, “Elusive Security: The Military and Political Geography of 
South Lebanon”, GeoJournal, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1993), p. 155.
46  Joseph Algazy, “Soiled Hands, spoiled Lands”, Haaretz (24 December 1999) cited in 
Julie Trottier, “A Wall, Water and Power: the Israeli ‘Separation Fence”, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2007), p. 108.
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minefields, patrol roads and barbed-wire obstacles.47 In March 1985, 
after a truck bombing in southern Lebanon killed 12 Israeli soldiers, 
Israel extended and moved the border fence to the northwest. The 
modern fence on the Israel-Lebanon border is considered the backbone 
of Israel’s passive defense on its northern border. The fence consists 
of barbed wire; movement sensors and infra-red, radio, television and 
electronic monitors at strategic points that can locate any intrusion 
within 500 meters; routine road patrols along the security road and fine 
sand that allows the detection of footprints.48 Though equipped with the 
latest technology ostensibly making infiltration nearly impossible, the 
fence failed to prevent Hezbollah fighters from penetrating into Israel 
on 12 July 2006. They killed five soldiers and took two of the bodies 
back north into Lebanon. The event led to the outbreak of a 34-day war 
between Israel and Hezbollah. Even during periods of relative calm, the 
de facto Israeli-Lebanon border remains a battlefield.
Egypt’s Underground Wall
In early December 2009, Egypt started, under the pretext of national 
security, to construct an underground steel wall that extended down 35 
meters (115ft) for approximately 12 kilometers along its border with the 
Gaza Strip. The stated aim of the wall was to block Palestinian tunnels, 
which have been in operation since at least 1982. The tunnels were 
built during that year’s peace treaty by Palestinian families who had 
been divided between Israeli-occupied Gaza and Egyptian-controlled 
Rafah. The underground tunnels linked Gaza and Egypt as a means of 
communication amongst extended family members.49
The underground obstruction to these tunnels is made of steel sheets 
and sensors and is connected to pipes that can collapse tunnels dug 
47  David Eshel, “The Israel-Lebanon Border Enigma”, IBRU Boundary and Security 
Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2000–2001), p. 80.
48  See, for example, Al J. Venter, “Israel Last Line of Defense”, Jane’s International 
Defense Review, Vol. 29 No. 11 (1996), p. 61; David Eshel, “Counter-guerrilla Warfare 
in South Lebanon”, Marine Corps Gazette, No. 1 (1997), p. 42; Julie Trottier, “A Wall, 
Water and Power: The Israeli ‘Separation Fence’”, Review of International Studies, p. 
108.
49  Jeremy Sharp, “The Egypt-Gaza Border and its Effect on Israeli-Egyptian Relations”, 
Congressional Research Service, Report No. RL34346 (1 February 2008), http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34346.pdf
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into the sandy earth by saturating the ground along the border with 
pumped-in seawater.50 NGOs warned of an environmental disaster if the 
seawater pumped under the barrier leaked into the only underground 
freshwater wells available to the local population for drinking and 
agriculture purposes. The wall makes tunnel digging even more 
dangerous than it already was.
It has been widely reported that the underground wall was built 
in response to U.S. and Israeli pressure to close the tunnels, including 
Washington’s threat to cut military aid to Egypt over concern about 
arms smuggling through these passageways. The Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2008, signed into law on 26 December 2007, 
would have withheld USD 100 million in Foreign Military Financing 
from Egypt until then the U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, 
reported that Cairo had taken concrete steps to detect and destroy the 
smuggling tunnels leading from Egypt to Gaza.51 The U.S. military 
designed the wall and gave significant technical and financial assistance 
to the Egyptian government for its construction. In 2008, as a response 
to pressure from the U.S., Egypt agreed to spend USD 23 million in 
U.S. military aid on robots and other advanced technology to detect 
smuggling tunnels and accepted an American offer to send experts 
from the Army Corps of Engineers to train Egyptian border guards in 
the technology.52
However, smuggling across the Egypt-Gaza border does not pose a 
threat to Egyptian national security. Rather, it alleviates the suffering 
of the Palestinian population caused by the Israeli-imposed blockade. 
Egypt’s underground wall does not protect Egypt; rather it enables 
Cairo to protect its own interests, which means protecting the interests 
of the United States and, through them, of Israel. The wall strangles the 
only lifeline available to the Palestinians in Gaza. This has resulted in a 
humanitarian disaster.
50  Ursula Lindsey, “Egypt’s Wall”, Middle East Research and Information Project (1 
February 2010), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero020110
51  Carol Migdalovitz, “Israel: Background and Relations with the United States”, 
Congressional Research Service (2 April 2009), p. 19; Tally Helfont, “Egypt’s Wall 
with Gaza & the Emergence of a New Middle East Alignment”, ORBIS, Vol. 54, No. 
3 (2010), p. 434.
52  Ellen Knickmeyer, “Egypt to Bolster Gaza Border” Washington Post (7 January 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/06/AR2008 
010602055.html
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Many human rights organizations have strongly condemned the 
construction of the underground wall, labeling it a collective punishment 
and therefore an offense under international humanitarian law. The 
UK-based Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR) considers 
the barrier’s presence to be a crime against humanity, noting that the 
wall aims to tighten the noose around the people of Gaza, to break their 
will and impose agendas which are hostile to the Palestinians’ rights 
to freedom and self-determination.53 Although any state has the right 
to build and to protect its national security, international law restricts 
this right to avoid damage to neighboring countries. Therefore, Egypt, 
because of its status as the only gateway on the other side of Gaza, is 
required under international law to cease the construction of the barrier 
and to dismantle what is already built, as well as to open the Rafah 
crossing to save the Gaza population from what amounts to an Israeli 
blockade.
Sinai Fence
In 2010, following the smuggling of tens of thousands of African 
migrants mainly from Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea across the Sinai 
Peninsula and into Israel, the Israeli government prepared plans for the 
construction of a border fence along its Sinai border with Egypt. The 
aim was to prevent the entry of African “infiltrators” (the stigmatizing 
term used by Israelis) and arms smugglers into Israeli territory. Such a 
fence would “secure Israel’s Jewish and democratic character” because 
it would stunt the growth of the non-Jewish population that could 
undermine its “Jewish character” and its Zionist dream.
The Israeli Ministry of Defense initially declared that by the end of 
2011 the fence would cover the 240 kilometer-long porous border with 
Egypt.54 The main section of the fence was completed in early 2013,55 
53  Arab Organization for Human Rights in the UK (AOHR), “Special Report. Egyptian 
Government Infected by Mad Israeli Wall Disease” (30 December 2009), https://
www.middleeastmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/other_reports/the-
arab-organisation-of-human-rights-in-the-uk-egypt-wall.pdf
54  Ben Hartman, “First Permanent Section of Sinai Border Fence Completed”, The 
Jerusalem Post (2 June 2011), http://www.jpost.com/Defense/First-permanent- 
section-of-Sinai-border-fence-completed
55  Joshua Mitnick, “Israel Finishes Most of Fence on Sinai Border”, The Wall Street 
Journal (2 January 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324374004
578217720772159626.html
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and, once fully complete, the entire fence is expected to have cost about 
NIS 1.5 billion (USD 395 million).56 It is constructed of barbed wire and 
will include high-tech surveillance cameras and radar equipment that 
will alert the military to intruders.
Even if infiltration of the border by African migrants has dropped 
significantly since the construction of the fence began in November 
2010, as Israeli officials have stated,57 the system will likely increase the 
number of those migrants who die trying to cross into Israel through 
more remote desert areas in the Sinai Peninsula.
Jordan-Israel Border Fence
Until 1994, Jordan’s recognized border with Israel was based on the 
armistice line58 agreed to in April 1949 by Israel and what was then 
Transjordan, following negotiations facilitated by the UN.59 Today, the 
international boundary between Israel and Jordan is delimited by the 
Peace Treaty signed between the two sides in 1994, based on principles 
contained in UN Security Council resolutions 242 of 1967 and 338 of 
1973, making Jordan the second Arab country after Egypt to normalize 
relations with Israel. The Treaty delineated the international border 
between Israel and Jordan with reference to the boundary defined 
under the British Mandate (Article 3).
Although the Israeli-Jordan border remains the least turbulent of 
Israel’s frontiers, it is marked by a barbed-wire fence separating the two 
56  Barak Ravid, “Israel to Build NIS 1.5b Fence Along Egypt Border”, Haaretz (1 
October 2010), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-to-build-nis-1 -5b-fence-along-egypt- 
border-1.261141
57  See for example: Harriet Sherwood, “Israeli border fence halts migrant flood 
from Egypt”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 January 2013, http://www.smh.
com.au/world/israeli-border-fence-halts-migrant-flood-from-egypt-20130101-
2c44j.html; Harriet Sherwood, “Israeli fence construction cuts off migration 
from Egypt”, The Guardian, 31 December 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2012/dec/31/israeli-fence-cuts-migration-egypt; Miriam Valverde, “Border 
fence in Israel cut illegal immigration by 99 percent”, 13 February 2017, Politifact, 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/feb/13/ron-johnson/
border-fence-israel-cut-illegal-immigration-99-per/
58  The 1949 Armistice Agreements are a set of agreements signed in the year 1949 
between Israel and its immediate neighbors, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria.
59  Colonel Mazen Qojas, “Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and 
Options”, Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Papers/8 (March 1999), p. 20, 
http://www.sandia.gov/cooperative-monitoring-center/_assets/documents/
sand98-05058.pdf
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countries from the Dead Sea to the Red Sea. Israel has not fenced its 
entire 238-kilometer boundary with Jordan, however, since the segment 
along the shore of the Dead Sea is not fenced. Much of the remaining 
border, though, is lined by a patrol road with fences on either side.60 
Some segments of the fence were taken down following the 1994 treaty.
In March 2011, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he 
had instructed the military to begin planning the construction of a new 
fence along the border with Jordan. Israel gives great importance to the 
project because, according to Netanyahu, once the fence with Egypt is 
erected, smugglers and infiltrators will look for alternative routes to 
enter Israel from the east.61 These plans are an indication of a perpetual 
panic and fear. Threats and insecurity simmer in a region whose people 
have never trusted Israel and its policies.
Israeli Military Barriers in the Occupied Arab Territories
Bar-Lev Line: The End of a Myth
After capturing the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt in the 1967 Six-Day War, 
Israel built a sand barrier, called the Bar-Lev Line, along the eastern 
bank of the Suez Canal covering a distance of 170 kilometers. Israel 
sought to achieve three key goals through the Bar-Lev Line: first, to 
maintain the military gains and geo-strategic position resulting from 
the 1967 war; second, to prevent any major Egyptian attack across 
the canal by erecting a sand wall that made the canal impassable by 
amphibious vehicles (without destroying the barrier); and third, to 
monitor Egyptian military activities on the western bank of the canal.
The Bar-Lev line, which Moshe Dayan, former Israeli Minister of 
Defense, once referred to as “one of the best anti-tank ditches in the 
world”,62 was in fact a complete military system. It was composed of 31 
60  Clyde R. Mark, “Israel’s Security Fences, Separating Israel from the Palestinians”, 
CRS Report for Congress (1 August 2003), CRS-2, https://digital.library.unt.edu/
ark:/67531/metacrs7718/m1/1/high_res_d/RS21564_2003Aug01.pdf
61  Herb Keinon, “P.M. Sets Summer as Completion Date for Egypt Fence”, 
Jerusalem Post (15 March 2011), http://www.jpost.com/Defense/PM-sets-summer- 
2012-as-completion-date-for-Egypt-fence
62  Cited by George W. Gawrych, “The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of 
Decisive”, Leavenworth Papers, No. 21 [U.S. Army Center of Military History, 
Washington] (1996); p. 16.
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complex, multi-level strongholds that were each fortified with several 
reinforced-concrete bunkers that provided all round firing positions.63 
Each fortress was staffed by more than 50 soldiers who were armed 
with anti-tank weapons, mortars, tanks and heavy machine guns.64 
The sand wall was also equipped with wire entanglements and mine 
fields surrounded each fortification point that extended to a depth 
of 800 meters. Some points were equipped with napalm tanks giving 
the ability to cover the canal locally with fuel which would produce 
a sheet of flames one meter in height and raise the temperature of the 
water to boiling point.65 The construction of the Bar-Lev Line, excluding 
maintenance expenses, cost nearly USD 300 million.
The major dilemma faced by the Egyptian forces, when they decided 
to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula, was how to destroy the Bar-Lev Line. 
In 1971, a young Egyptian engineer officer suggested a simple yet 
ingenious solution: open gaps in the sand wall by using water pumps. 
The Egyptian Corps of Engineers combined special British and German 
pumps and improved them so as to effect gaps in the wall in a three-
to-five hour period. During the October 1973 war,66 Egyptian forces 
surprised Israeli forces by making sixty huge gaps in the sand wall and 
overrunning the Bar-Lev Line. Instead of controlling Egyptian forces 
and preventing them from crossing the Suez Canal, the wall prevented 
Israeli forces from seeing the Egyptian attack.67 Most military analysts 
agree that the surprise attack launched by Egypt using innovative 
warfare tactics and Israel’s miscalculation regarding the effectiveness 
of the sand wall were the key elements that allowed Egyptian forces 
to destroy the Bar-Lev Line, which had been invincible barrier in the 
Israeli imagination.
63  Riad Ashkar, “The Syrian and Egyptian Campaigns”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 
Vol. 3, No. 2 (1974), p. 20.
64  Ibid., p. 58
65  H. El-Badri, T. El-Magdoub and M. Dia El-Din Zohdy, The Ramadan War (Dunn 
Loring: T. N. Dupuy Associates, Inc., 1973), p. 7.
66  The October War, also known by Arabs as the Ramadan War and by Israeli as the 
Yom Kippur War, launched by Egypt and Syria against Israel on 6 October 1973 to 
recover Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights, which had been captured and occupied 
by Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War.
67  For more information about how Egyptians destroyed the bar-Lev Line see: George 
W. Gawrych, “The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive” (1996); Sa’ad 
Din Shazli, “How the Egyptians Crossed the Canal”, interview with Lt. General 
Shazli, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1974), pp. 163–68.
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Golan Heights Fence
After its occupation of the Golan Heights in 1967, Israel built a military 
barrier along its de facto border with Syria. Intended to separate the Golan 
from the rest of Syria, an impenetrable fence enhanced by minefields 
was finally completed in 1975.68 In addition to its military goals, Israel 
planned to use the barrier to increase its presence in the Golan Heights 
by establishing its first settlement in the region as part of the occupation. 
When Palestinian and Syrian protesters broke through the barrier and 
crossed the cease-fire line on the 2011 day of commemoration of the 
Nakba,69 as a symbolic return to their homeland, the Israeli reaction was 
violent; soldiers shot at the protesters, killing 35.
After this, Israel planned to construct a new barbed-wire fence 
east of the village of Majd al-Shams to prevent Palestinian and 
Syrian protesters from crossing the cease-fire line in the future. The 
resulting fence is 8 meters high, and 4 kilometers long on the side of 
Majd al-Shams and extends to Quneitra. According to Israeli officials, 
the Israeli military has deployed new mine fields along the de facto 
border with Syria since many had failed during incidents that took 
place on days commemorating Nakba and Naksa (previous wars with 
the Arab countries).70 Syria accused Israel of harming the residents 
of Majd al-Shams and taking over their lands in order to build a 
“racist separation fence” separating the Syrian-Druze population of 
the Golan Heights from their Syrian motherland.71 In addition, the 
Syrian government claimed that Israel tried to create new political and 
security facts on the ground in order to affect future negotiation on the 
future of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.72
68  Tayseer Mara’i and Usama R. Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights”, 
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1992), p. 81.
69  Nakba means “catastrophe” in Arabic. It refers to the destruction of Palestinian 
society and the creation of Israel in 1948 when ten thousand Palestinians were 
killed and 750,000 were forced into exile.
70  See letter of Syria’s ambassador to the United Nations, Bashar Ja’afari, to UN 
Secretary-General and the permanent members of the UN Security Council on 8 
August 2011. Cited in Barak Ravid, “Syria Calls on UN to Thwart Israel’s ‘Separation 
Fence’ on Golan Heights”, Haaretz (15 August 2011).
71  Ibid.
72  Ibid.
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The construction of the fence was regarded at that time as a pro-
active move by Israel ahead of an anticipated UN vote on Palestinian 
statehood in October 2011. It would prevent futher storming of the 
cease-fire line by Palestinian and Syrian demonstrators. During the 
Syrian uprising that began in mid-March 2011, Israel repaired some 
parts of the Golan fences.
Conclusion
The separation-barrier strategy has been a key element in the 
construction of the Israeli state. The fencing and heavy militarization of 
Israel’s boundaries and the creation of security and buffer zones with 
Arab nations; whether in Gaza, the West Bank, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria 
or Jordan; are intended to perpetuate occupation and to control “the 
other side”. This is all in order to guarantee the security of a “Jewish 
state” and to protect its “Jewish character”. It also seeks the annexation 
of more Palestinian land, thereby defining unilaterally the borders of a 
future Palestinian State, continuing the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians 
from the oPt and diminishing the possibility of the creation of an 
independent and sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza 
by interrupting its territorial contiguity.
Despite the enormous efforts and the huge amounts of money 
spent on constructing these separation barriers, Israel has not achieved 
security. Israel is still living in a region whose peoples, whether in 
Palestine or neighboring countries, reject its existence and have shown 
over time that they cannot coexist or normalize their relations with the 
“Jewish state”. In fact, the policy of separation not only surrounds and 
disperses Palestinians; it also places Israel itself in a cage of its own 
making.

2. Border Fencing in India1
Current national borders in South Asia are distinguished by two 
particular features: first, topographic diversity and, second, the 
arbitrariness by which European colonial powers delineated South-
Asian boundaries and imposed their notions of the territorial state. The 
same applies to the Post-Soviet states in central Asia where borders 
have been demarcated unilaterally or artificially without considering 
preexisting ethnic, religious, linguistic, geographical, or economic 
conditions. As a result of these artificially created boundaries that 
engendered many territorial disputes and left large areas porous for a 
variety of irregular and illegal cross-border activities, the countries of 
the region have resorted to the construction of different types of barriers 
along their national borders in an attempt to resolve these problems. 
To fight cross-border security problems and unauthorized immigration 
largely resulting from the manner in which nation-state has been built 
in the region, some Asian governments, especially in South, Central 
and Southeast Asia, have built barriers along their national border as a 
simple solution to a complex problem.
In recent decades, Asian countries have seen a huge increase in 
cross-border drug trafficking. This is primarily due to the widespread 
production of drugs in the region. For example, Afghanistan has been 
for a long time the world’s largest producer of opium, and it is set 
to remain so for the foreseeable future because of the collapse of any 
1  This chapter is drawn, with permission from the publisher, from: “Border Fencing 
India: Between Colonial Legacy and Changing Security Challenges”, International 
Journal of Arts & Sciences, Vol. 7, No. 5 (2016), pp. 111–24.
© 2017 Said Saddiki, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0121.03
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state institutions that might impede production. Some of the region’s 
countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, are major transit routes for drug 
smuggling.
In addition to security aspects, the fencing of borders also stems from 
political reasons closely related to the way in which these international 
borders were drawn. Since many of these borders were not defined by 
natural landmarks, they are often easy to cross and, since they were 
artificially put in place and not based on a sense of cultural identity, 
their legitimacy is often disputed. Hence, due to border disagreements 
between Asian countries, fencing can also be seen as a unilateral effort 
to quite literally concretize these borders as de facto demarcation lines. 
On the other hand, some of the erected fences revive long-standing 
territorial disputes, especially in the Indian subcontinent.
Asian countries can be divided into two groups regarding the 
reasons and purposes informing the construction of land demarcations: 
barrier-building countries (India, Iran, Uzbekistan, China, Malaysia and 
Thailand) and targeted countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Myanmar, North Korea and Kyrgyzstan). If Pakistan carries out the 
project of fencing its border with Afghanistan, Pakistan will be at the 
same time a barrier-building and a targeted country.
Like all boundaries in South Asia, India’s boundaries are also man-
made2 and, as they do not clearly reflect the ethnic and geographical 
realities on the ground, they have led to a number of political and 
territorial disputes with neighboring countries.
India has 15,106 kilometers of land borders and a coastline of about 
7,516 kilometers. Only 5 out of 29 Indian states have no international 
border or coastal line. Those long borders are shared with seven 
countries — China, Pakistan, Bhutan, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Nepal and 
Bangladesh. Such extensive and porous borders run through different 
kinds of terrain, including mountains, hills, plains, valleys, forest, desert 
and swamp, and are sometimes difficult to monitor, especially at a time 
when territorial disputes and security troubles still plague parts of the 
Indian borderline.
The situation of India’s boundaries is made more complex by the 
fact that its maritime boundaries are shared with seven countries 
2  Pushpita Das (Ed.), India’s Border Management: Select Documents, p. 1.
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— Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar and 
Bangladesh. With the exception of Pakistan and Bangladesh, India has 
ratified all its maritime borders with adjoining countries in bilateral 
agreements.
I divide this chapter into two main sections: the first discusses the 
complex situation of India’s borderline, and the second deals with the 
country’s strategy of fencing borders with some its neighbors.
Indian Borders between Colonial Legacy and 
Complex Cultural Makeup
Indian borders can be divided into three categories according to their 
vulnerability and the manner in which they have been drawn. History, 
culture and religion played a significant role in defining Indian 
borderlines: the first category generated from the separation movements 
because of cultural and religious reasons like Indo-Bangladesh and 
Indo-Pakistan borders. Some important parts of those borders are 
still disputed. The second, exemplified by the Indo-Chinese boundary, 
resulted from reciprocal invasions and reflect regional competition 
for influence and power. The third category is inherited from the 
colonial period and includes the Indian borders with Myanmar, Bhutan 
and Nepal. The latter borderline, which was established by bilateral 
agreement, remains peaceful to this day.
India-Bangladesh and India-Pakistan Borders: Territorial 
Disputes and Cultural Misunderstandings
India-Bangladesh Border
The 4,096.7 kilometers long Indo-Bangladesh border is the longest land 
borderline that India shares with any of its neighbors. In spite of the efforts 
made in the last four decades, since the secession of East Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh) in 1971, to demarcate the entire Indo-Bangladesh border, 
6.5 kilometers remain disputed. In June 2015, the governments of the 
two countries exchanged instruments of ratification to make operational 
the 1974 Land Boundary Agreement, which was unanimously passed 
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by the Indian parliament on May 7, 2015, marking a high point in the 
history of India-Bangladesh relations. The main issues had included 
the vague demarcation of the border and the arbitrary division of the 
land which resulted in Bangladesh being surrounded by India on three 
sides (east, north and west). The border enclaves resulting from this 
partition had been a significant obstacle in strengthening bilateral 
relations and a long-standing cause of the escalating tension between 
the two neighbors until the problem of these enclaves was settled in 
2015.3 More importantly, the artificial delineation of the border had 
severely affected the traditional life of the local population who found 
themselves cut off from their relatives, traditional markets, agricultural 
land, medical facilities, etc.
The India-Bangladesh border is not the result of geographical or 
historical realities, but rather it reflects political and religious concerns. 
The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 divided the population 
according to their religion. The secession of Pakistan — both east and 
west — was meant to create a state with a majority Muslim population, 
a goal that hasn’t been fully achieved because of the ethnic and religious 
communities overlapping the border and existing inside the new states. 
According to the 2011 Census of India, Muslims constitute 14.2 percent of 
India’s population with about 172 million adherents,4 whereas Hindus 
makes up about 8.2 percent of the Bengladeshi population according to 
the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.5
The Indo-Bangladesh border is generally marked by three different 
topographies: flat/plain, riverine, and hilly/jungle with virtually no 
3  On 6 June 2015, the two countries signed a historical agreement to exchange those 
enclaves and allow people living in border enclaves to choose whether to reside 
in India or Bangladesh. There existed 51 Bangladeshi enclaves in Indian Territory 
and around 111 Indian enclaves inside Bangladesh. In 1974, the two countries 
signed a Land and Boundary Agreement in New Delhi to demarcate the border 
and prevent border conflicts. According to the agreement, these enclaves were to be 
exchanged except for Berubari, Angarpota and Dahagram. See Harun Ur. Rashid, 
Indo-Bangladesh Relations: An Insider’s View. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 
2002, p. 119.
4  Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India, Ministry of Home 
Affairs, Government of India, “2011 Census Data”, http://www.censusindia.gov.
in/2011-Common/CensusData2011.html
5  “Population and Housing Census 2011: Socio-economic and Demographic Report”, 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Statistics and Informatics Division (SID), 
Ministry of Planning, National Series, Vol. 4 (December 2012), http://203.112.218.66/
WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/BBS/Socio_Economic.pdf
 412. Border Fencing in India
natural boundaries between the two countries.6 This configuration, 
coupled with the porosity and length of the boundary, facilitates the 
irregular movement of people across the border, especially from 
Bangladesh, which is the main source of illegal immigrants in India. The 
type of settlements peppering the border represents a further challenge 
for India’s border surveillance as the boundary cuts through several 
heavily populated villages and even bisects some houses.7 Indians 
and Bangladeshis live side by side along the borderline separating 
the two countries and imposed. The high permeability of the India-
Bangladesh border results in a diverse immigration flow mostly from 
Bangladesh to India, comprising unauthorized immigrants, refugees, 
and people displaced by climate. Each year, many Bangladeshis cross 
into India seeking employment and improved living standards, fleeing 
harsh environmental conditions, or escaping political and religious 
persecution, a situation which poses major challenges to the Indian 
government.
India-Pakistan Border
Similar to its boundary with Bangladesh, India shares a 3,325-kilometer 
border with Pakistan that runs through a diverse terrain which also 
facilitates illegal cross-border movement and smuggling activities in 
villages adjacent to the border.8 Mahmud A. Durrani, an academic and 
retired Pakistan Major General, distinguishes between four categories 
of the Pakistan-India border:9 the first is the international border, 
also known as the “Radcliffe line”, which is about 2,200 kilometers 
long and was officially recognized by the two countries in August 
1947. This line defines the border between the Pakistani and Indian 
provinces of Punjab in the north and the Sir Creek in the south. The 
6  N. S. Jamwal, “Border Management: Dilemma of Guarding the India-Bangladesh 
Border”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2004), p. 8.
7  Ibid., p. 9.
8  Pushpita Das (Ed.), India’s Border Management: Select Documents, p. 11.
9  Mahmud Ali Durrani, “Enhancing Security through a Cooperative Border 
Monitoring Experiment: A Proposal for India and Pakistan”, Cooperative 
Monitoring Center, Occasional Paper 21 (July 2001), p. 26. See also the following 
Pushpita Das book who distinguishes between three different categories of Indo-
Pak border. Pushpita Das (Ed.), India’s Border Management: Select Documents, pp. 
10–11.
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second type, the Working Boundary which is recognized by India as 
an international border, comprises the 200 kilometer-long borderline 
between the old Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan’s 
Punjab. The third boundary, the Line of Control (LoC) or the Ceasefire 
Line (CFL), is about 767 kilometers long and divides the former 
princely state of Kashmir into two areas — the Pakistan-controlled 
and the Indian-controlled regions. The fourth type of borderline, the 
Line of Contact (Holding), is about 95 kilometers long and represents 
the line of contact between the Indian and Pakistani troops fighting 
along the Siachen glacier.10
The border between India and Pakistan is the most sensitive of India’s 
borders because of the dispute over Kashmir11 which started with its 
annexation by India in 1947. Since then the region has fuelled a bitter 
dispute between the two countries. In 1954, upon India’s announcement 
that its accession of the region was final, the Ceasfire Line (CFL) 
established in 1949 that cuts through Kashmir, became the de facto 
border between the two states.12 Since then, India has tried a number 
of measures to consolidate this annexation, including erecting fences 
to fortify the borderline with Pakistan. Yet, this area still represents the 
most militarily active border in India, having been the site of three wars 
and one near war.
Since the partition of the sub-continent in 1947, the instability on the 
India-Pakistan border has soured relations between the two countries 
and fuelled a relentless conflict over the Kashmir region. As both India 
and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons and thus have the military 
capability to wipe each other out, the Indian subcontinent is one of 
the most unstable regions in the world and the dispute over Kashmir 
poses a constant threat of sparking an armed conflict between the two 
countries.
10  Mahmud Ali Durrani, “Enhancing Security through a Cooperative Border 
Monitoring Experiment: A Proposal for India and Pakistan”.
11  Rick “Ozzie” Nelson (dir.), “Border Security in a Time of Transformation: Two 
International Case Studies—Poland and India”, A Report of the CSIS Homeland 
Security & Counterterrorism Program, Europe Program, and South Asia Program 
(July 2010), http://csis.org/files/publication/100709_Nelson_BorderSecurity_web.pdf
12  Rajat Ganguly, “India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute”, working paper, Asian 
Studies Institute (1998), p. 3.
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India-China Border: A Fault Line between Two Regional Powers
Although India gained its independence in 1947, it had not shared a 
common boundary with China until 1950 when China annexed Tibet, 
which was seen as a political buffer between the two countries. Since 
then, the entire India-China border, which extends for 3,488 kilometers, 
is still disputed because China has not yet recognized the controversial 
McMahon Line.13 The McMahon Line was drawn in 1914 to delineate 
the boundary Between Tibet and British India. It is recognized by India 
as the international border, whereas China rejects this demarcation line 
and claims the eastern Himalayas which is administered by India. This 
territorial dispute between India and China escalated in the 1950s and 
resulted in the 1962 war between the two countries, which ended with 
a new status quo border known as Line of Actual Control (LAC) that 
separates India from China-Tibet. As the LAC has never been delimited 
and due to increasing mistrust of China after the 1962 conflict, India 
moved towards closer relations with the U.S. and armed itself with 
nuclear weapons.
Because of the lack of people and goods flowing across the Chinese-
Indian boundary, the management of this disputed border does not 
pose serious challenges to the two countries. Therefore, the erection 
of a fence along this border may not be on the table. Moreover, the 
Himalayan Mountains are natural barriers preventing significant cross-
border interaction in the region.
India and China have had little political interaction throughout 
most of their history despite their geographical proximity. The tensions 
between the two nations have increased because of the dispute over 
the Tibet border region and escalated owing to their competing 
strategies and ambitions in South Asia. Given the strategic importance 
of the region, the two neighboring giants are expected to be in constant 
competition for regional leadership. Moreover, rising demand from 
the two countries for natural resources and energy due to their rapid 
industrialization and economic growth over the last two decades leads 
them further into competition, especially in Africa where Chinese and 
Indian companies are both investing more and more. The challenge is 
13  Pushpita Das (Ed.), India’s Border Management: Select Documents, p. 40.
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that the two countries are competing for the same resources and on the 
same battlefields. On the other hand, India and China have common 
interests in the management of international economic and financial 
systems. As reflected in the creation of the BRICS group, they have 
shown themselves to be willing to mitigate their disagreements and 
combine efforts with other developing countries.
India-Myanmar, India-Nepal and India-Bhutan Borders: 
Quiet and Stable
India-Myanmar Border
India and Myanmar share a 1,640-kilometer land border and a long 
maritime border in the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal. The two 
borders were delimited and demarcated by two bilateral agreements: 
the land-boundary agreement signed on 10 March 1967 and ratified 
shortly thereafter and the maritime-boundary agreement of 1982. The 
India-Myanmar border, like other international Indian sub-continental 
frontiers, is characterized by high porosity. Additionally, the India-
Myanmar border topography varies from low mountains in the south 
to high ridges and peaks in the north, adjacent to the Himalaya. As a 
result, unlike the India-Bangladesh borderland, the region is one of low 
population density.14
As Pushpita Das points out, the India-Myanmar border is highly 
vulnerable due to a number of factors. First, the boundary has not yet been 
concretized on the ground as lines separating two sovereign countries. 
Second, the border traverses a region in which numerous insurgencies 
operate. Thirdly, the India-Myanmar border has a unique arrangement 
in a place called the Free Movement Regime, which permits the tribes 
residing along the border to travel 16 kilometers across the boundary 
without visa restrictions. This place becomes a safe haven for different 
illegal activities like drug smuggling, human trafficking, infiltration 
14  U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Burma-India 
Boundary”, International Boundary Study, No. 80 (15 May 1968), p. 2.
 452. Border Fencing in India
and cross-border movements of insurgents. Finally, there is inadequate 
management of this border by India.15
Indo-Nepal Border
The Nepal-India boundary, which runs along the west, south and east 
of Nepal, is 1,580 kilometers long and dates back to the Anglo-Nepal 
War of 1814–1876. The Nepal-India border has been open since 1950 
when the two neighboring countries signed the Nepal-India Peace and 
Friendship Treaty.16 The unrestricted movement of people across this 
border over the centuries has enhanced social and cultural ties and 
expanded economic and political interdependence between the two 
countries’ people,17 who share many commonalities. Although there are 
many border disputes which have not yet been resolved, the special 
relationship between the two countries is not seriously affected, and the 
movement of their people is allowed throughout the borderline.
Indo-Bhutan Border
Although the demarcation process of the 669-kilometer long India-
Bhutan border took from 1961 to 2006 to establish, it is now one of 
the two most stable of India’s borders (the other being its border with 
Nepal). With the exception of a small part along the tri-junction with 
China, the entire India-Bhutan border is now officially demarcated.18 
Bhutan is surrounded by China and India. Since its border with China 
is still closed because disputed territory and the absence of diplomatic 
relations,19 India remains the only route for Bhutan to access the 
outside world.
15  Pushpita Das, „India-Myanmar Border Problems: Fencing Not the Only Solution”, 
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (15 November 2013), http://www.idsa.
in/idsacomments/IndiaMyanmarBorderProblems_pdas_151113.html
16  Vidya Bir Singh Kansakar, “Nepal-India Open Border: Prospects, Problems and 
Challenges”, Institute of Foreign Affairs [Kathmandu, Nepal] (2001), http://www.fes.
de/aktuell/focus_interkulturelles/focus_1/documents/19.pdf
17  Pushpita Das (Ed.), India’s Border Management: Select Documents, p. 6.
18  Ibid., p. 8.
19  Bhutan is the only one of China’s 14 neighbors with which it doesn’t have diplomatic 
relations.
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The Fencing of the Indian Borders:  
One Policy and Different Contexts
The common denominator that characterizes India’s border barriers is 
their material composition. Almost all of these barriers are made up 
of barbed-wire fence. Compared to most other cases, including Israeli 
barriers, the U.S.-Mexico border fence and fences of Ceuta and Melilla, 
the Indian border barriers are, in general, low tech and low cost.
Despite a diversity of goals targeted by the Indian border-fencing 
policy, security concerns are the top priority for its border-control 
systems. Security concerns encompass a wide range of illegal infiltration, 
including insurgency activities, terrorism, drug trafficking and 
organized crime. Preventing unauthorized crossings, especially those 
by undocumented immigrants, is the second most important purpose 
of the Indian border-fencing policy. The porosity of its borders and the 
existence of some border tribes within more than one adjacent country 
make India’s border control extremely challenging. Additionally, 
disputes over border demarcation have complicated the construction 
of fences in some instances. The effect of territorial disputes on the 
construction of border fences are clearly seen on India’s border with 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, where political concerns remain the key 
determinant of India’s border-fencing policy.
It is difficult to classify India’s border barriers into specific groups 
with similar characteristics because they were built within such different 
contexts and with differing goals. Of the large number of cases I have 
studied, few have much in common so each shall be addressed separately.
Fencing of the Indo-Bangladesh Border
The idea of fencing off the Indo-Bangladesh boundary dates back to the 
1960s when some politicians in the Assam region proposed erecting a 
fence along its length in order to isolate the population of East Pakistan 
(now Bangladesh).20 This plan was to be executed in conjunction with a 
20  Jolin Joseph and Vishnu Narendran, “Neither Here nor There: An Overview of 
South-South Migration from both ends of the Bangladesh-India Migration Corridor”, 
working paper No. 569, Migration Literature Review, No. 1 (October 2013), p. 20.
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campaign launched by the Government of Assam to deport Bangladeshis 
settled in the region.21
Although some Islamic groups have used its porous eastern border 
with Bangladesh in recent years to enter India and carry out bombings, 
security is a minor factor in defining its fencing policy along the border 
with Bangladesh. Other factors, particularly the unauthorized flow 
of immigration, were a greater concern. Consequently, India took the 
decision in 1986 to fence off the entire Indo-Bangladesh border,22 which 
became the central component of India’s “border management strategy” 
— a collection of policies and practices aimed at “hardening” the border 
and enclosing Indian territory on its eastern periphery.23 In 1989, the 
Government of India initiated the first phase of building its border with 
Bangladesh, resulting in the erection of about 854 kilometers of fencing, 
almost 20 percent of the border.24 In 2000, India sanctioned phase two, 
which targeted the fencing of a further 2,430 kilometers. By 31 January 
2005, 1,275 kilometers — about half — had been completed.25 In addition 
to fencing, India has also constructed a series of roads along its border 
with Bangladesh to facilitate the monitoring of operations. So far, roads 
stretching approximately 2,866 kilometers have been completed as part of 
phase one26 and about 2,800 kilometers of border roads and 24 kilometers 
of bridges are expected to be built under phase two in the states of West 
21  Sanjoy Hazarika, Rites of Passage: Border Crossings, Imagined Homelands, India’s 
East and Bangladesh. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000, p. 117.
22  Sreeradha Datta, “Security of India’s Northeast: External Linkages”, Strategic 
Analysis, Vol. 24, No. 8 (2000), p. 1503.
23  Duncan McDuie-Ra, “Tribals, Migrants and Insurgents: Security and Insecurity 
along the India-Bangladesh Border”, Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 
(2012), p. 165.
24  Rizwana Shamshad, “Politics and Origin of the Indian-Bangladesh Border 
Fence”, paper presented to the 17th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies 
Association of Australia, Melbourne (1–3 July 2008), p. 9; Pushpita Das. “The 
India-Bangladesh Border: A Problem Area for Tomorrow”, working paper, 
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India (8 December 
2006), http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/TheIndiaBangladeshBorder 
AProblemAreaforTomorrow_PDas_081206
25  N. S. Jamwal, “Border Management: Dilemma of Guarding the India-Bangladesh 
Border”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2004), p. 22; see also Pushpita Das, “The 
India-Bangladesh Border: A Problem Area for Tomorrow” (8 December 2006).
26  Ibid.
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Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.27 The Indian Ministry 
of Home Affairs has admitted that most of the fence constructed in the 
first phase in West Bengal, Assam, and Meghalaya has been damaged 
due to adverse climatic conditions, notably by repeated submergence.28 
Accordingly, the government of India has sanctioned a third phase of 
construction that would replace 861 kilometers of fencing originally 
built in phase one;29 532 kilometers of fencing has been replaced so far. 
The scheduled completion date for the entire project was March 2010,30 
however, the India-Bangladesh border had not yet been entirely fenced 
off. The project has not been fully realized because of land-acquisition 
issues, public reactions, and inclement weather conditions. In 2014, the 
Indian Ministry of Home Affairs revised its deadline to complete fencing 
along the India-Bangladesh border by March 2012.31
Fig. 2.1 Indo-Bangladesh Barrier (29 December 2007).  
Photo by Nicolas Merky, CC BY-SA 3.0.32
27  Willem van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia. 
London: Anthem Press, 2005, p. 237.
28  Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2007–2008, p. 30, http://
www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/annualreport_2007-08.
htm




31  “Fenced Border by 2014, Says Delhi”, The Telegraph (29 April 2013), http://www.
telegraphindia.com/1130429/jsp/northeast/story_16839610.jsp#.UzdHlYXuiRo
32  Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AIndo-
Bangladeshi_Barrier.JPG
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While some of the disputes on the interpretation and implementation 
of India-Bangladesh boundary have been solved, many still exist.33 
Although the Indian government considers the fence as a “protective 
device” to prevent the influx of illegal migrants across the border, the 
Bangladeshi government has strongly rejected this justification. It cites 
the India-Bangladesh Agreement of 1975 which clearly prohibits the 
construction of any “defensive structure” of any kind or the deployment 
of any permanent or temporary border-security forces by either country 
in their respective territories within 150 yards of the border.34 Moreover, 
the Bangladeshi government claimed that the fences intruded into 
Bangladeshi territory at several points and constituted an attempt to 
appropriate its territory.35
In order to mitigate disputes between the two countries arising 
from the fencing project, they signed a series of agreements in 2011 
aimed at reaching a common vision about the management of their 
border. First, in March 2011, they agreed to disallow the Border 
Security Force to use lethal weapons. Then, both sides signed the 
Coordinated Border Management Plan in July 2011 and the Protocol 
to the Agreement Concerning the Demarcation of Land Boundary in 
September 2011. Such accords are expected to transform the India-
Bangladesh border from a border-management nightmare to a zone of 
peace and prosperity.36
Mehrotra-Khanna (2005) identified some major reasons that have 
rendered the India-Bangladesh border management ineffective, 
citing the incoherence of security personnel system, the fragility and 
inefficiency of different forces in charge of border control and the 
porosity of the frontier. She concluded that these difficulties have 
kept the borders vulnerable and have, in turn, facilitated problems of 
33  N. S. Jamwal, “Border Management: Dilemma of Guarding the India- Bangladesh 
Border”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2004), p. 5.
34  Hiranmay Karlekar, Bangladesh: The Next Afghanistan? New Delhi: Sage Publication, 
2005, p. 88. See also N. S. Jamwal “Border Management: Dilemma of Guarding the 
India- Bangladesh Border”, p. 30.
35  V.K. Vinayaraj, “India as a Threat: Bangladesh Perceptions”, South Asian Survey, 
Vol. 16, No. 1 (2009), p. 107.
36  Pushpita Das, “The India-Bangladesh Border: A Problem Area for Tomorrow” (8 
December 2006).
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illegal infiltration, smuggling and trafficking.37 So, although fencing 
has undoubtedly made infiltration more difficult, it cannot end it.38 
Smugglers and undocumented migrants have invented new ways to 
bypass the border security systems, including cutting the barbed wire. 
Additionally, the two countries share almost 200 kilometers of river 
border, mostly in Dhubri district of Assam and southern West Bengal, 
which is impossible to fence off.
In relation to the demographic composition and distribution on the 
India-Bangladesh borderland, fencing the border cannot be effective in 
checking infiltration and stopping unauthorized cross-border activities 
while each country has many enclaves and adverse possessions inside 
the other. This situation is expected to end after the 1974 Land Boundary 
Agreement (LBA) was finally ratified by both India and Bangladesh in 
June 2015. The governments of the two countries sealed the ratification 
pact to operationalize the LBA and exchange the enclaves.
The arbitrary and artificial nature of the Indo-Bangladesh border 
has been reflected in India’s security control and fencing strategy along 
this boundary. The erection of fencing has stopped or been delayed 
in the areas of 450 villages located within 150 yards of the border. 
Here, the construction of defensive structures or the deployment of 
security fences has been precluded by the 1975 Indo-Bangladesh border 
agreement.39 Additionally, no fewer than 200 border villages oppose 
the fence. In some border areas, like Hilli in the Malda district of West 
Bengal, a row of houses have their front doors in India and their rear 
doors opening into Bangladesh.40 The barbed-wire fence not only affects 
the social and economic life of the population and makes them refugees 
in their motherland but perpetuates the arbitrary nature of the border 
delineation.
37  Mansi Mehrotra-Khanna, “Security Challenges to India-Bangladesh Relations”, 
working paper, Center for Land Warfare Studies (2010), p. 24.
38  Praveen Swami, “Failed Threats and Flawed Fences: India’s Military Responses to 
Pakistan’s Proxy War”, India Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2004), p. 166.
39  Chandra Moni Bhattarai, “India-Bangladesh Border Fencing and Community 
Responses”, conference paper, Annual International Studies Convention 2013 
[Delhi, India] (10–12 December 2013).
40  Chandra Moni Bhattarai, “India-Bangladesh Border Fencing and Community 
Responses”, conference paper, Annual International Studies Convention 2013 
(10–12 December 2013).
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Fencing the India-Pakistan Border
Erecting fences and installing floodlight systems are the main projects 
carried out by the Indian government to secure its border with Pakistan 
from infiltration and other illegal cross-border activities. Pakistan has 
always objected to India’s fence constructed along the border of Jammu 
and Kashmir, claiming that the barrier violates the United Nations 
Charter and the ceasefire agreement and alters the status of the region 
which Pakistan considers disputed territory.
Construction of the fences began in the late 1980s in the state of 
Punjab when India faced an armed Sikh separatist uprising, and 
weapons were being smuggled from Pakistan.41 In 1994, India pushed 
ahead with the construction of fences along the border of Jammu and 
Kashmir. The building process was stopped because of relentless 
Pakistani fire but resumed again along the international border in 
Jammu in early 2001.42 As of November 2009, of the 2,044 kilometers 
identified for fencing along the India-Pakistan border, 1,916 kilometers 
had been completed, 1,862 kilometers had been floodlit and 148 
kilometers of planned floodlighting remains to be completed.43 Besides 
these methods of boundary control, the government of India began in 
2007 to deploy more specialized technologies on all its international 
borders, including in Kashmir. It has implemented night-vision devices, 
hand-held thermal imagers, battlefield-surveillance radars, direction 
finders, unattended ground sensors, high-powered telescopes and 
more.44 According to some media resources, the fence consists of three 
layers and is about 3.5 meters high.45
41  Rama Lakshmi, “India’s Border Fence Extended to Kashmir Country Aims to Stop 
Pakistani Infiltration”, The Washington Post (30 July 2003), http://antigenocide.org/
images/India-30-Jul-03-India_s_Border_Fence_Extended_to_Kashmir.pdf
42  Sudha Ramachandran, “India: No sitting on the Fence”, Asia Times Online (3 
December 2003), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EL03Df05.html
43  Ravinder Singh, “Fencing and Floodlighting for Better Vigil along Borders”, The 
Indian Post Daily News (10 February 2010), http://www.theindiapost.com/articles/
fencing-and-floodlighting-for-better-vigil-along-borders/
44  Government of India, Annual Report 2007–2008 of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs. 
New Delhi: Government of India (2008), p. 31, http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/
mha/files/pdf/ar0708-Eng.pdf
45  Binoo Joshi, “India-Pakistan Border Fence affecting Wildlife”, Indo-Asian News 
Service (6 February 2008), http://twocircles.net/node/78400
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In addition, landmines are laid along the fence as it runs from flat 
plains through mountainous forests.46
Fig. 2.2 India-Pakistan border at night (23 September 2015).  
NASA Earth Observatory, public domain.47
The two countries seem to take opposite approaches to the Line of 
Control in Jammu and Kashmir. India tries to maintain the status quo 
and impose the LoC as the legal international border by erecting fences 
and installing advanced sensors along the Line. Pakistan, meanwhile, 
tries to change this situation and prevent India from formalizing the 
LoC through both diplomatic means and proxy war. Fenced borders 
between the countries, however, will not be effective without Pakistan 
being persuaded to collaborate with India in a joint strategy to control 
their common boundary. The fenced border remains a temporary 
solution unless the issue of Kashmir itself is resolved.
Recently, the Indian government concluded, after discovered a 
400-meter-long tunnel running from Pakistan into India on 28 July 2012, 
that its expensive security border system, including fencing, unattended 
ground sensors, and other gadgets, has not worked as planned and is 
46  Ibid.
47  Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:India-
Pakistan_Border_at_Night.jpg
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not sufficient to monitor the country’s porous border. Accordingly, the 
Indian Home Ministry plans to build advanced structures to manage 
the country’s more than 15,000-kilometer border with China, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar. The new system will use satellite 
technology and will cost more than USD 2 billion in subsequent years 
to manage the border.
Detecting the infiltration of Kashmiri dissidents and preventing 
them from carrying out attacks, whether in India or Jammu and 
Kashmir, remains the main reason for the building of the security fence 
along India’s de facto border with Pakistan. So, military and security 
objectives are the major determining factor in fencing and militarizing 
the India-Pakistan border. Other stated goals, such as the prevention of 
undocumented immigration and drug trafficking, are negligible.
It is worth mentioning that a decline of cross-border infiltration in 
Jammu and Kashmir has been noted since 2004. This is the result of 
not only the fencing but of political rapprochement between India and 
Pakistan in the last decade. Rampant corruption in border crossing and 
“innovative methods” used by those who cross the Indo-Pakistani border 
are likely to sustain illegal cross-border activities.48 The porosity of the 
Line of Control  and its diverse geographical terrains and dense forests 
in some areas limit the effectiveness of the fence. Furthermore, fences 
cannot be erected in the high mountains in which the two neighbors 
could deploy some measures of cooperative monitoring.
Fencing the Myanmar-India Border
In 2003, India and Myanmar carried out a detailed survey of fencing 
along the international border for militancy and drug trafficking.49 By 
the end of 2006, a 400-kilometer border with Myanmar was already 
fenced and was being extended in height. In addition, a stretch of 14 
kilometers near the international boundary at the border town of Moreh 
was identified for fencing.50 Due to recent increases in militant activities, 
48  D. Suba Chandran and P.G. Rajamohan, “Soft, Porous or Rigid? Towards Stable 
Borders in South Asia”, South Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2007), p. 125.
49  “India, Burma to Fence the Border”, Mizzima News (17 May 2003), http://www.
burmalibrary.org/TinKyi/archives/2003-05/msg00018.html
50  C. S. Kuppuswamy, “Indo-Myanmar Relations—A Review”, working paper No. 
2043, South Asia Analysis Group (November 2006).
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the Government of India has decided to fence the area between BP No. 
79 and 81 along the Indo-Myanma Border.51 The last section of the fence 
has drastically affected the traditional life of many villages located 
along the Myanmar border and is likely to cause serious disturbance to 
migratory habits of wild animals and upset their breeding cycles.52
India was primarily motivated to fence a large part of its border with 
Myanmar in order to stop irregular immigration and human trafficking 
and to disrupt the flourishing narcotic trade. The United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has found that Myanmar is the second 
largest country for the cultivation of opium poppies (17 percent of 
global cultivation).53 India has traditionally been an important consumer 
of opium,54 the majority of which originates in Myanmar.55 The latter 
ranks fourth of the countries in East and South-East Asia that are most 
frequently cited as a source of methamphetamine.56
According to some Indian officials,57 one of the main goals aimed 
at by fencing the India-Myanmar border (especially in Manipur 
province, a state in north-eastern India) is to check the free movement of 
separatist rebels and new recruits to their base camps in the no-man’s-
land between the two countries. Dissident movements and organized 
crime groups finance their activities by smuggling drugs into India in 
exchange for arms and ammunition and also to pay for the training of 
their cadres in camps run by other outfits.58 The UNODC reported in 
51  Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2009–2010, p. 42, http://mha.nic.in/
sites/upload_files/mha/files/pdf/AR(E)0910.pdf
52  “Border Fencing upsets Village Life in Moreh”, The Sangai Express (9 May 2011), 
http://e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=3..100511.may11
53  UNODC, World Drug Report 2010. Vienna: United Nations Publication, 2010, p. 137, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_
lo-res.pdf
54  UNODC, “A Century of International Drug Control”, 2008, p. 15, cited in UNODC, 
World Drug Report 2010, p. 40, https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/
World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf
55  UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, p. 41, https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/
WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf
56  Ibid., p. 114.
57  See for example the statement of the Indian Major General C. A. Krishanan, Inspector 
General of Assam Rifles (South India) in Iboyaima Laithangbam, “Fencing along 
Manipur-Myanmar Border progressing”, The Hindu (8 September 2010), http://
www.thehindu.com/news/national/article619798.ece
58  L. Kanchan, “Negotiating Insurgencies”, Faultlines (11 April 2002), http://www.
satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume11/Article7.htm; Pradip Saikia, 
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2010 that the processing and trafficking of opiates constitute significant 
sources of income for insurgents in some opium-producing countries 
such as Myanmar.59
Besides fencing the border, India has tried to cooperate with 
Myanmar in managing border-related issues, including countering 
insurgency, policing narcotics smuggling, reducing irregular 
immigration, sharing intelligence and organizing training for anti-
narcotics officials.60 It is noteworthy that cross-border drug trafficking 
in this region is not unidirectional (from Myanmar to India), rather 
it has grown to move in both directions. Heroin and synthetic drugs 
come from Myanmar to India, while chemicals like acetic anhydride 
and ephedrine, essential from converting raw opium into heroin, are 
transported from India.61 Fences are useless and ineffective in reducing 
illegal cross-border activities here, mainly because of the India’s long, 
porous and topographically hostile border with Myanmar and because 
of corruption among agencies responsible for border control and law 
enforcement.62
Conclusion
It is clear that the fortification and militarization of the Indian borders 
through the building of fences and related security measures has 
largely failed to achieve the desired outcomes. For that reason, the 
Indian government continues to pump money into the reform of 
existing systems or the adoption of new ones. Specific geographical 
characteristics of the Indian borders and the rampant corruption in 
“North-East India as a Factor in India’s Diplomatic Engagement with Myanmar: 
Issues and Challenges”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 6 (2009), p. 881.
59  UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, p. 34, https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/
WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf
60  Thin Thin Aung and Soe Myint, “India-Burma Relations”, Challenges to 
Democratization in Burma. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, 2001, pp. 87–96.
61  Langpoklakpam Suraj Singh, “Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Greater Perspective 
of India’s Look East Policy: Implications on Manipur”, in Look East Policy & India’s 
North East: Polemics and Perspectives. Thingnam Kishan Singh (Ed.). New Delhi: 
Concept, 2008, p. 166; Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 
1948. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 29.
62  L. S. Singh, “Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Greater Perspective of India’s Look 
East Policy: Implications on Manipur”, p. 166.
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the border-patrol forces make fencing and physically managing the 
border in this region extremely difficult. Additionally, fencing the 
bilateral boundaries is complicated by disputes over the demarcation 
of the border. Some countries view the fencing policy led by India as a 
unilateral demarcation aimed at imposing de facto borders.
Although the security challenges facing India have been driven its 
policy of border fortification, an impetus also exists to reinforce regional 
cross-border cooperation. Regional economic integration can be a 
solution for both territorial disputes and unauthorized cross-border 
movements. Such integration can blur political aspects of South Asia’s 
borders and transform them into spheres of economic and cultural 
interaction, especially in borderlands where local people have shared 
culture, heritage and resources. In other words, border-fencing strategies 
and related security measures will continue to be ineffective solutions 
against complicated and multifaceted problems such as undocumented 
migration and other illegal cross-border activities if a comprehensive 
policy is not put in place that takes into account the interests and rights 
of all parties.
3. The Fences of Ceuta and Melilla1
The fences of Ceuta and Melilla provide a model by which it is possible 
to study the extent to which governments’ stated purposes and hidden 
objectives align in the establishment of territorial boundaries. The 
Spanish government uses the challenge of irregular immigration as an 
argument for reinforcing the fences of the two enclaves even though 
reports insist that the number of irregular immigrants crossing to Spain 
via these two towns or elsewhere has increased since the construction 
of the fences in the early 1990s. This suggests that the more border-
surveillance measures are intensified, the more clandestine ways of 
crossing international borders will be found.
Ceuta and Melilla reflect a long history of interactions between 
Morocco and Spain. These relations have fluctuated between coexistence 
and confrontation according to changing regional circumstances and 
the balance of power in the Mediterranean region. A Spanish presence 
in North Africa can be traced to the era dominated by an intensive 
struggle between Christians and Muslims for territorial control not only 
in the Iberian Peninsula in the whole of the Western Mediterranean 
region. The Spanish term “Reconquista” refers to this long period 
between 718 to 1492 that ended with what Islamic history calls the “fall 
of al-Andalus”. However, the ambitions of the “Reconquista” wars 
were not limited to the reclamation of the Iberian Peninsula only, but 
included the expansion of Christian control into Northwest Africa.
1  This chapter is drawn, with permission from the publisher, from my article, “Les 
clôtures de Ceuta et de Melilla: Une frontière européenne multidimensionnelle”, 
Études internationales, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2012), pp. 49–65.
© 2017 Said Saddiki, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0121.04
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Ceuta and Melilla are two of the most important Spanish-controlled 
enclaves in Northern Morocco following the end of “Reconquista”. 
Melilla was the first to fall under Spanish rule in 1497, and Ceuta, which 
had been seized by Portugal in 1415, was transferred to Spain under 
the Treaty of Lisbon in 1668. Ceuta and Melilla, like all medieval cities, 
were surrounded by high and thick stone walls to protect and defend 
them from invaders and all kinds of external attacks. Both towns had 
been longstanding epicenters for the conflict between Mediterranean 
powers. As a principal defensive strategy of the old-world order, the 
ancient walls had not been a disputed issue between Morocco and 
Spain. Building new fences and extending or renovating the existing 
ones on the border of the two enclaves today, however, has provoked 
political and juridical differences to emerge between the two countries.
Apart from Ceuta and Melilla, Spain controls a few small islands2 
that are considered by Morocco for historical and geographical reasons 
to be integral parts of its territory.
The year 1986 was a turning point in the history of the two towns 
and other islands controlled by Spain in Northern Morocco. As part 
of Spain’s entry into the European Economic Community (later, the 
European Union), they also became EU territories.
A remarkable development occurred in these territories in 1993 when, 
under the pretext of preventing irregular immigration, these enclaves’ 
perimeters began to be marked by fences. As these initial fences were 
relatively easy to cross, the construction of a more secure system was 
begun in autumn 1995.3 From that time, the Spanish government has 
continued to reinforce the fences physically and through the use of 
advanced technologies, like infrared cameras.
In 2005, the Spanish government built a third fence next to the two 
deteriorated ones already in place, in order to completely seal the border 
from penetration apart from at designated checkpoints. The European 
Union contributed financially to the project, introducing a new dynamic. 
2  Morocco’s rocky islands still under Spain’s control, or in a status quo, are: the 
Chafarine Islands (las Islas Chafarinas), Badis Peninsula (Peñón de Vélez de la 
Gomera), Nekor Island (Peñón de Alhucemas), and the Parsley Island (known also 
as la Isla Perejil, Tura or Laela).
3  Stefan Alscher, “Knocking at the Doors of ‘Fortress Europe’: Immigration and 
Border Control in Southern Spain and Eastern Poland”, working paper No. 126, 
Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany (November 2005), p. 10.
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It gave £200 million for the construction of the razor-wire border fence 
around Ceuta, and it assumed 75 percent of the costs of the first project 
from 1995 to 2000.
Fig. 3.1 Map of Ceuta and Melilla in Northern Morocco, three 
screenshots from Google Maps. © 2017 Google, all rights reserved.4
The current situation of the two towns’ fences, according to a report 
made by the European Commission in October 2005, is as follows:
The external land border of Melilla is characterized by an approximately 
10.5-kilometer double-border fence divided into three sectors. The outer 
fence has a height of 3.5 metres; the inner fence reaches 6 metres in some 
places. Both fences are equipped with barbed wire in order to prevent 
irregular immigrants from climbing the fence. The installed surveillance 
system consists of 106 fixed cameras for video surveillance and an 
additional microphone cable as well as infrared surveillance.5
4 Map data © 2017 Google.
5  European Commission. “Technical Mission to Morocco. Visit to Ceuta and Melilla 
on Illegal Immigration”, Mission Report (October 7–11, 2005), p. 70, http://www.
migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/rapport-ceuta-melilla-2.pdf
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Fig. 3.2 Fence of Melilla (28 February 2009).  
Photo by Miguel González Novo, CC BY-SA 2.0.6
Fig. 3.3. Fence of Ceuta (15 June 2012).  
Photo by Mario Sánchez Bueno, CC BY-SA 2.0.7
6  Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3A 
Garita_de_vigilancia_en_la_frontera_de_Melilla.jpg
7  Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3A 
Ceuta_border_fence.jpg
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At the external land border of Ceuta (a 7.8 kilometer-long, double-
border fence, divided into three sectors) 316 policemen and 626 Guardia 
Civil officers are currently deployed. Except for 37 installed movable 
cameras along this border line, the technical equipment used for border 
surveillance is the same as in Melilla. In addition, helicopters are used 
for surveillance of the external border after the recent massive attacks.8
Pursuing a strategy of separating Spanish-controlled enclaves 
in North Africa from Moroccan territory, the Spanish government 
allocated in the beginning of 2009 an important budget to renovate and 
strengthen razor-wire fences surrounding Ceuta and Melilla.
In addition to these to two physical fences, the digital surveillance of 
irregular immigration is now a central part of the Spanish government’s 
policy. The Integrated System of External Surveillance (SIVE)9 is one 
of the largest surveillance systems in Europe aimed at monitoring the 
Spanish maritime areas targeted by irregular immigrants. The SIVE was 
first applied in 1999 around the strait of Gibraltar, where the majority of 
irregular immigrants were arriving at that time. The Spanish government 
has subsequently extended the SIVE to the east and to the west to cover 
respectively the whole of Cadiz province in 2004, the entire Andalusia coast 
in 2005, and, finally, the Canary Islands. The SIVE has been implemented 
through the gradual addition of border-control and -management 
technologies, including long-distance radar systems, advanced sensors 
that can detect heartbeats from a distance, thermal cameras, night vision 
cameras, infrared optics, helicopters and patrol boats.
Spain’s virtual fence, similarly to the American one, required 
a large budget funded partly by the EU. For the period 1999 to 2004, 
the SIVE was allocated 150 million euros, which translated into about 
1,800 euros per immigrant intercepted during the five-year period in 
question.10 This elevated cost was justified by the necessity to adapt to 
the standards demanded by the EU.11 Despite the high financial and 
logistical costs, Spain’s virtual-fence system has not achieved significant 
results in preventing irregular immigrants from risking their lives by 
8  Ibid.
9  Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior.
10  Jørgen Carling, “Migration Control and Migrant Fatalities at the Spanish-African 
Borders”, International Migration Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2007), p. 325.
11  As the former Spain’s Minister of the Interior, Jaime Mayor Oreja, stated in a 
comment on the program.
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sailing across the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean on rickety 
boats from remote western African beaches in Senegal and Mauritania. 
Jørgen Carling argued that the development of SIVE has not only led 
smugglers to adopt new routes but has also resulted in technical and 
organizational changes on the part of the smugglers.12 Carling explained 
this conclusion, based on some previous studies, on four points: First, 
smugglers have developed new boats purpose-built for smuggling, 
rather than relying on fishing boats. Second, in order to increase their 
profit, smugglers double the number of passengers on each journey 
through the use of larger pateras and rubber boats (zodiacs). Third, they 
organize collective journeys to include a group of pateras which spread 
out when they approach the coast. This makes it difficult for the Guardia 
Civil to intercept all the boats that have been detected by the SIVE. 
Fourth, the SIVE program makes the journey of immigrants, especially 
those who lack nautical skills, more dangerous, while the smugglers 
run no additional risk of arrest by Spanish authorities.13 Additionally, in 
reaction to sophisticated virtual-control systems applied in the western 
Mediterranean and in the Atlantic Ocean, immigrants try to reach 
European soil from eastern Maghrebi coasts (from Algeria, Tunisia, 
and Libya) especially via the Italian islands of Lampedusa, Pantelleria, 
Linosa and mainland Sicily. Moreover, it must be stressed that irregular 
immigrants who enter Spain, as well as other host countries, by sea are 
heavily outweighed by immigrants entering via other channels.
This chapter, first, demonstrates controversial aspects of the Ceuta 
and Melilla fences as a southern border of the EU. Second, it highlights 
the changing roles of the two enclaves’ fences.
Fences of Ceuta and Melilla:  
A Controversial EU Border
Fencing the borders of Ceuta and Melilla has stimulated many 
complicated and unresolved questions between Spain and Morocco. 
The seriousness of these questions lies in their transitivity and 
interdependence because they do not stop at the Moroccan-Spanish 
12  Jørgen Carling, “Migration Control and Migrant Fatalities at the Spanish-African 
Borders”, p. 327.
13  Ibid., p. 327.
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border, but rather they extend beyond bilateral relations between the 
two countries.
A Fault Line between Two Different Spheres
The fences of Ceuta and Melilla are not just a land border between 
two neighboring countries, but they are built upon “a complex 
amalgamation of clashes and alliances”14 representing a “multi-faceted 
fault line” between Spain and Morocco. The two countries represent an 
ex-colonizer and an ex-colonized, respectively, two peoples (Spaniards 
and Moroccans), two nations (Westerns and Arabs), two religions 
(Christianity and Islam), two continents (Europe and Africa), and two 
regions (Western Europe and Arab Maghreb). Indeed, the fences around 
the two enclaves, as the first European walls that were built after the 
destruction of the Berlin wall, are “a stark and literal reminder of the 
cultural, political and economic barriers that remain to be overcome 
between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbors”.15 However, these 
frontiers are not necessarily similar to Huntington’s fault lines16 of war 
and conflict. On the contrary, the Mediterranean has been for a long 
time a sphere of coexistence and interaction.
Concerning the cultural aspect of this border between Spain and 
Morocco, it is noteworthy that the beginning of the twenty-first century 
has witnessed an increase in cultural misunderstandings, especially 
between the Muslim and Western worlds. There are many factors that 
contribute to the current cultural tensions between the two worlds: 
immigration, terrorism, foreign policy of some western countries 
toward the Muslim World (Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan…), the meaning 
of freedom of speech and media especially in the West (e.g., the cartoon 
crisis), restraints and restrictions on the religious freedom in the two 
14  Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo, “The Spanish-Moroccan Border Complex: Processes of 
Geopolitical, Functional and Symbolic Rebordering”, Political Geography, Vol. 27, 
No. 3 (2008), p. 303.
15  Peter Gold, Europe or Africa?: A Contemporary Study of the Spanish North African 
Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Liverpool: Liverpool University press, 2000, p. 144.
16  Samuel Huntington argued in his famous book The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) that the modern 
conflicts take place between two or more identity groups (usually religious or 
ethnic) from different civilizations. He alleged civilizational fault lines replaced the 
political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War.
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worlds (e.g., the prohibition and obstruction of the exercise of some 
religious rites and aspects like the headscarf). These misunderstandings 
have become sometimes crucial and critical, reflecting the vulnerability 
of the relationship between the two worlds.
In fact, some scholars, politicians and activists in the two nations 
focus on these tensions to show only one side of the coin. For example, 
Samuel Huntington’s thesis of the “Clash of Civilizations” argued that 
that cultural factors are and would continue to be the fundamental 
source of current and future conflicts. According to Huntington, 
“differences among civilizations are not only real, they are basic. 
Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, 
culture, tradition and most importantly, religion”.17 Huntington 
concluded pessimistically that “the Clash of Civilizations will dominate 
global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle 
lines of the future”.18 According to José Maria Aznar, the former Spanish 
Prime Minister, the clash between the two nations began in the eighth 
century. Aznar said, in a lecture delivered at Georgetown University on 
21 September 2004, that Spain’s long battle against terrorism started as 
early as 711, when Muslims, led by Tariq Ibn Ziyad, invaded Spain. He 
further argued that the terrorist acts which struck Madrid on 11 March 
2004, did not begin with the Iraqi crisis but with the fall of al-Andalus.19 
Such an arbitrary and biased version of history ignores the greatest part 
of peaceful and cooperative relations that had been in the region for 
more than 12 centuries.
Despite the long Spanish occupation of Ceuta and Melilla, the 
Spanish position regarding the two enclaves is still marked by doubt 
and suspicion. It anticipates a potential Islamic threat that will come 
either from inside of the two towns — reflecting the expressions of 
rejection of the occupation voiced by the Muslim population — or from 
Morocco, which has neither officially nor popularly recognized the 
Spanishness of the enclaves.
17  Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 
(1993), p. 25.
18  Ibid.
19  Mohamed Larbi Messari, “The Vivid Memories of Al-Andalus in the Discourse on 
Dialogue among Civilisations”, http://www.isesco.org.ma/english/publications/
Human%20Civilizations/p32.php
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The demographics of the two cities has not carried significance until 
the beginning of twenty-first century. While the number of Muslims is 
increasing faster than other groups, the Spanish community is gradually 
decreasing because of relocation to the peninsula and a low birth rate. 
This shifting population explains some of the anxiety Spanish authors 
express about the growth of the number of Muslims not only in Ceuta 
and Melilla but in the whole of Spain. For instance, Herrero de Miñón, 
who is one of the fathers of the Spanish Constitution,20 argued in favor 
of immigration policies that filter applicants for their “linguistic and 
cultural affinity”, with the underlying purpose of excluding Moroccans 
and favoring Latin-Americans, Romanians and Slavs. The point seems 
to be that these immigrants do not threaten the notion of Spanishness as 
much as Moroccanization does.21
Despite this pessimistic view, most people all over the world remain 
optimistic about the relationships between civilizations and cultures, 
emphasizing the common denominators of nations that would enhance 
mutual understanding and trust. The thesis of “Dialogue among 
Civilizations”, as the alternative paradigm, has been proposed by a 
large number of the world’s intelligentsia. It states that the diversity of 
the world’s cultures and religions are natural and inherent and that they 
are elements that contribute to the wealth of our planet.22
The two enclaves have always been open to other Moroccan 
neighboring cities and areas. Many people of Northern Morocco 
speak Spanish fluently because of the different kinds of contact with 
Spaniards. Some of them can be considered as “frontier workers”: they 
work in the enclaves, especially in commerce and construction, but 
retain their habitual residence in adjacent Moroccan provinces to which 
they normally return every day or at least once a week. So, the fences 
enclose Ceuta and Melilla and increase their isolation from neighboring 
inhabitants.
There are many factors that suggest Moroccan-Spanish cultural 
relations are flourishing. Common historical heritage, geographical 
20  Miguel Herrero y Rodriguez de Miñón is considered to be one of the seven fathers 
of the Spanish Constitution (1978).
21  Jaume Castan Pinos, “Identity Challenges affecting the Spanish Enclaves of Ceuta 
and Melilla”, Nordlit, No. 24 (2009), pp. 76–77.
22  Said Saddiki, “El Papel de la Diplomacia Cultural en las Relaciones Internacionales”, 
Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, No. 88 (December 2009), p. 115.
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proximity and social and economic interactions are important factors 
for the promotion of cultural relations between the two countries. 
Disregarding long-lasting disputes, including the current situation and 
the future of the two enclaves, Spain has been for some time the second 
most important economic partner of Morocco, after France.
Ceuta and Melilla: An Unresolved Issue
The dispute between Morocco and Spain over Spanish-controlled 
territories in North Africa began at the sunset of the fifteenth century 
and the beginning of sixteenth century when Spain and Portugal 
occupied some Moroccan ports. Although Melilla has been under 
Spanish sovereignty since 1497 and Ceuta since 1668, Moroccans 
have never recognized Spanish sovereignty over these enclaves and 
other rocky islands, and always considered them as integral parts of 
Moroccan territory.
Since obtaining its independence in 1956, Morocco has never 
ceased to call for the restoration of all Spanish-controlled territories 
in Northern Morocco. In its first document submitted to the United 
Nations as a member of this organization, Morocco provided a list of 
unresolved territorial disputes with Spain, including the two enclaves. 
The Moroccan government has taken every occasion to reiterate their 
position. On 27 January 1975, the Permanent Mission of Morocco to 
the UN submitted a memorandum (A/AC-109–475) to the Special 
Committee on Decolonization requesting that all territories controlled 
by Spain in Northern Morocco be placed on the UN list of non-self-
governing territories.
Morocco bases its request for recovering Spanish-controlled 
territories in Northern Morocco on historical, geographical, juridical 
and geopolitical grounds. With regard to historical reasons, Morocco 
is one of the existing oldest monarchies in the world, and it had ruled 
without dispute its coasts and ports located at Western North Africa, 
including Ceuta and Melilla. Before the coming of the Europeans, Ceuta 
and Melilla had never been terra nullius (“no-man’s land”); rather, they 
were two important Islamic cities in North Africa since the arrival of 
Islam to the region. For example, in the fifteenth century, Ceuta had 
over a thousand mosques, 62 libraries, 43 educational institutions and 
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1 university.23 With the Arrival of Moulay Idriss I in Morocco and the 
establishment of the first Islamic state in Western North Africa in 788, all 
Moroccan dynasties have exercised sovereignty over the enclaves and 
all Moroccan Mediterranean coasts.
Morocco also justifies its demands by invoking the principle of 
territorial integrity and decolonization laid down in the Charter of the 
UN. It is worth mentioning that Morocco underwent colonialism under 
multiple countries during the period of European colonial expansion, 
and it had been divided into several colonies; for that reason, Moroccans 
consider the existence of Spain in North African as a “museum of 
colonialism”.
Morocco linked the future of Ceuta and Melilla to that of Gibraltar 
for a certain period of the 1960s and 1970s. This approach was known 
in Morocco as “Hassan II’s doctrine”, which means that the resolution 
of the issue of Spanish-controlled areas in Northern Morocco should 
not be dissociated from the settlement of the Gibraltar question.24The 
Spanish government indicated to King Hassan II in the 1960s that there 
was a prospect of ceding the two enclaves to Morocco once Gibraltar 
was returned to Spain.25 Hassan II declared on 25 November 1975, that 
“sometime in the future, England will logically restore Gibraltar to Spain. 
If the English restore Gibraltar to Spain, the later should restore Ceuta 
and Melilla to us”.26 However, in the mid-1980s, Morocco decided to 
separate the future of Ceuta and Melilla from the question of Gibraltar. 
In 1987, King Hassan II stated, “My attitude towards Ceuta and Melilla 
is that this is a question of an anachronistic situation which cannot 
be compared to that of Gibraltar, given that Gibraltar is in Europe. 
23  R. Rezette, The Spanish Enclaves in Morocco. Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1976, 
p. 27. Cited in Gerry O’Reilly, Ceuta and the Spanish Sovereign Territories: Spanish 
and Moroccan Claims. Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit [Dept. of 
Geography, University of Durham], 1994, p. 2.
24  Mohamed Larbi Messari, “The Current Context of a Moroccan Claim to Ceuta and 
Melilla”, Dafatir Siyassiya, No. 107 (December 2009) [in Arabic].
25  Robert Swann, “Gibraltar: The Cheerful Mongrel”, New Society, Vol. 5, No. 127 
(4 March 1965), p. 7. Cited by Robert Aldrich and John Connell, The Last Colonies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 226.
26  Maroc-Soir (26 November 1975), cited by Raobert Rézette, The Spanish Enclaves in 
Morocco. Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1976, p. 146.
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Gibraltar is under the control of a European power, allied through the 
EC and NATO to Spain”.27
Morocco does not leave any opportunity to communicate its position 
on the two enclaves and small islands to its interlocutors. This position 
was included in Morocco’s memorandum to the EC when they signed 
the cooperation agreement by stating that this agreement did not mean 
recognition of the situation of Ceuta and Melilla (memorandum of 28 
May 1988). Before that time, the Diplomatic Representation of Morocco 
to the European Communities informed the Secretariat-General of the 
European Commission a similar memorandum regarding the status of 
the enclaves on the occasion of Spain’s accession to the EU.
One of the strongest incidents regarding this issue of a UN 
framework came on 7 September 1988 when Abdellatif Filali, Moroccan 
Foreign Minister at that time, addressed the General Assembly in 
New York. He placed his remarks in the context of the importance of 
stability and security in the Mediterranean and good relations with 
the European Community, stating that “it is imperative to resolve the 
dispute concerning the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and other small 
Mediterranean islands under Spanish occupation, in order to prevent 
this anachronistic situation — a consequence of earlier times — from 
threatening the essential harmony which should prevail over the 
relations between the two countries situated on either sides of the Strait 
of Gibraltar”.28
King Hassan II proposed in January 1987 that a committee of experts 
be set up to discuss the future of Ceuta and Melilla, but, unfortunately, 
Spain’s government did not officially respond and continually refused 
to enter into any negotiation with Morocco about the two towns. On 3 
March 1994, on the 33rd anniversary of Throne Day, Hassan II called 
once again for the establishment of a committee of experts, and he 
reaffirmed Morocco’s inalienable rights to the enclaves. In September 
1997, the former Moroccan Prime Minister, Abdellatif Filali, in his speech 
before the UN General Assembly, underscored the position, referring 
27  Robert Aldrich and John Connell, The Last Colonies, p. 226.
28  El Pais (October 8, 1988) cited in Peter Gold, Europe or Africa?: A Contemporary Study 
of the Spanish North African Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, p. 13
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to the enclaves as “Moroccan towns under Spanish occupation” and 
calling for a solution following the example of Hong Kong and Macau.29
For his part, King Mohammed VI did not hesitate in a speech on 30 
July 2002 to reaffirm explicitly the necessity to enter into dialogue with 
Spain about this critical issue. He also renewed his father’s proposal to 
establish a Moroccan-Spanish joint committee for finding a solution to 
the problem of all areas controlled by Spain in Northern Morocco.
On 6 November 2007, a visit to Ceuta and Melilla by the King of 
Spain, Juan Carlos, threatened relations between Morocco and Spain. 
Morocco strongly condemned this visit, which was viewed by King 
Mohammed VI as having “counter-productive” effects that could “put 
in danger” future relations between the two countries. He said that 
it showed the Spanish government’s “flagrant lack of respect for the 
mission and spirit of the 1991 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” 
between the two neighbouring countries.30
Europeanization of Ceuta and Melilla Fences:  
A Paradox of EU Foreign Policy
On the basis of the Schengen Agreement, the EU “External Border” 
refers to the frontiers between member and non-member states. But 
some analysts state that, according to new European policies concerning 
the externalization of EU Migration Management, common EU borders 
can no longer be considered simply as a geographical issue. Rather, they 
are “located where the management strategy begins”.31 In this sense, 
in recent years, “Africa’s sub-Saharan countries have become EU’s 
southern border”.32 In a strict territorial sense, however, the Ceuta and 
Melilla fences represent the de facto southern frontier of EU.
29  Ibid., p. 25.
30  See the summary of King Mohammed VI’s statement on this event, “S.M. le Roi 
rend publique sa position sur la visite de Juan Carlos aux villes occupées Sebta 




31  Pablo Ceriani et al., “Report on the Situation on the Euro-Mediterranean Borders”, 
Work package 9 [University of Barcelona] (27 April 2009), p. 2.
32  Ibid., p. 3.
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Since the adoption of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 which 
allowed the free movement of EU citizens within member states, the 
control of external European Community borders was no longer a 
matter for each European state to resolve independently but a common 
European problem. Therefore, after joining the European Community 
in 1986, Spain was compelled, according to its European commitments, 
to tighten its border control measures.
As the Spanish government initiated its Action Plan for sub-Saharan 
Africa (2005–2008) — known also as the “Africa Plan” — to control 
immigration influxes, the Europeanization of its immigration policies 
became a key element of its agenda.
Preventing irregular immigration, which remains the principal 
stated purpose for the fences of Ceuta and Melilla, led ultimately to 
the involvement of the EU in financing this project. Spain is always 
backed politically and financially by the EU in its policy concerning 
the imposition of a status quo in North Africa as a part of its “Fortress 
Europe” strategy. During the 1990s, the EU pressed Spain to control 
its borders; nowadays it is Spain that is increasingly urging the EU 
to consider border control as a European issue33 in order to get more 
financial and political support. For example, the cost of the first fencing 
project around Ceuta (1995–2000) totaled EUR 48 million, 75 percent of 
which was financed by the EU.34 Undoubtedly, financing the fences of 
the two enclaves is the key aspect of Europeanization of this question.
One of the major criticisms of this EU global approach to immigration 
is that the management of trans-Mediterranean migration does not 
need unilateral initiatives drawn up by EU and its members, regardless 
of their effectiveness. Instead, it requires a comprehensive solution that 
takes into account the human rights of immigrants, the complexity of 
irregular trans-national migration and the interests and conception of 
transit countries such as Morocco.
On the other hand, the building of fences around the enclaves takes 
place in a paradoxical context. Today, the Mediterranean sphere is being 
pulled in two different directions: one toward more complementarity 
33  Ricard Zapata-Barrero and Nynke De witte, “The Spanish Governance of EU 
Borders: Normative Questions”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2007), p. 89.
34  Stefan Alscher, “Knocking at the Doors of ‘Fortress Europe’: Immigration and 
Border Control in Southern Spain and Eastern Poland”, p. 11.
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and integration and the other toward the delineation tangible and 
intangible boundaries. Concerning the first direction, the Mediterranean 
basin has been for centuries a space of coexistence between the people 
on both sides, acting as a bridge between them regardless their ethnic, 
cultural and religious traditions. On the basis of this vision, EU and 
its Mediterranean partners have begun, since the collapse of the Berlin 
wall in 1989, thinking and talking about many important projects of 
cooperation and partnership between the countries of the two shores. 
This process culminated with the Conference of Barcelona in 1995 that 
brought together EU member states and 10 Mediterranean partners 
(Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian 
Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey).
In the Barcelona Declaration, the Euro-Mediterranean partners 
established the three main objectives of the Partnership:
1. Political and Security Objectives: Definition of a common area 
of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political 
and security dialogue.
2. Economic and Financial Objectives: Construction of a zone 
of shared prosperity through an economic and financial 
partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area.
3. Social, Cultural and Human Objectives: Rapprochement 
between peoples through a social, cultural and human 
partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between 
cultures and exchanges between civil societies.
More than a decade after the Barcelona Declaration, then-French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy launched the Union for the Mediterranean 
initiative which was approved by an international conference that took 
place in Paris on 13 July 13 2008. Leaders from the 27 EU nations and 
their 16 Middle East and North Africa partners participated. Although 
the Union for the Mediterranean intends, according to its founders, 
to reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it is seen by many 
commentators as the failure of the Barcelona Process.
With regard to the relationship between Morocco and the EU, 
Morocco is always considered by Europeans as an important ally, a 
credible interlocutor and an effective intermediary between Arab and 
Western Worlds. Recognizing political and judicial reforms made by 
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Morocco in recent years, the EU granted it an “advanced status” in 
October 2008. Morocco is the first country in the southern Mediterranean 
region to benefit from such “advanced status” in its relations with the 
EU. It raises the status of Morocco to something more than a partner but 
less than a member, and as Taieb Fassi Fihri, former Moroccan Foreign 
Minister, quoting the words of Romano Prodi,35 put it “the new status 
gives Morocco everything except the institutions”.
The question may be asked: to what extent could the Mediterranean 
countries reconcile their national interest in classical notion of 
sovereignty and realpolitik theory with the external pressures imposed 
both by a “globalizing” world and the significant development in 
international human rights law (especially international law pertaining 
to migrant workers and refugees)? Concerning the subject of this 
chapter, another challenge arises from the disputed sovereignty over 
Spanish-controlled territories in Northern Morocco. The enclaves of 
Ceuta and Melilla may be for Morocco, just as Gibraltar is for Spain, 
an ongoing “stone in one’s shoe”.36 Without resolving the situation of 
these territories peacefully and bilaterally, it will be difficult to expect 
a complete success of cooperative projects taking place in the region. 
Rather, it will be always a hindrance to achieving a stable and long-term 
partnership, mainly between Spain and Morocco.
Changing Roles of Ceuta and Melilla Fences
Although the Spanish government has constantly stated that fences of the 
two enclaves aim only to stop irregular immigration, a comprehensive 
view of various aspects of the issue leads us to surmise the existence of 
other objectives behind this policy. Moreover, the stated and hidden 
objectives of this policy are not fixed but, rather, change according to 
regional circumstances, national interests, the balance of power and the 
nature of relations between Morocco and Spain.
35  The former President of the European Commission.
36  The description of the enclaves as a “stone in shoe” is used by Peter Gold in his 
book entitled: A Stone in Spain’s Shoe: The Search for the Solution for the Problem of 
Gibraltar. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1994. See also Evgeny Vinokurov, 
A Theory of Enclaves. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007, p. 3.
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Preventing Irregular Immigration:  
Towards “Fortress Europe”
The fences of the two enclaves can be considered as an externalization 
of the problem of irregular migration. EU member states have initiated 
several projects and initiatives in the last two decades37 that are aimed 
at exporting internal migration and asylum problems to neighboring 
countries and, in particular, to countries geographically closest in order 
to relieve the burden of undesired immigration in Europe.38
Contrary to the integration process and “open door” policy led by 
the Euro-Mediterranean partners in the last two decades, there is an 
exclusive process by which EU member states practice a strict policy of 
“closing the door” towards the movement of people from non-European 
countries. Saskia Sassen eloquently describes this paradox:
Economic globalization denationalizes national economies; in contrast, 
immigration is renationalizing politics. There is a growing consensus in 
the community of states to lift border controls for the flow of capital, 
information, and services, and more broadly, to further globalization. 
But when it comes to immigrants and refugees, whether in North 
America, Western Europe, or Japan, the national state claims all its old 
splendor in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders. On this 
matter, there is also a consensus in the community of states.39
The recent forms of transnational immigration and their consequences 
are seen by many observers as a sign of erosion of the fundamental 
elements of the nation-state. Moreover, all governments, especially in 
Europe and North America, believe that this transnational immigration 
is a direct threat to national sovereignty and socio-economic stability. 
Thus, they have been attempting not simply to control or organize 
37  The so-called “external dimension” of EU immigration and asylum policy was 
not formally embraced by the European Council until October 1999. See Christian 
Boswell, “The ‘External Dimension’ of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy”, 
International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 3 (2003), p. 620.
38  Ounia Doukouré and Helen Oger, “The EC External Migration Policy: The 
Case of the MENA Countries”, research paper 2007/06, European University 
Institute, RSCAS (2007), p. 3, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/7991/
CARIM-RR_2007_06.pdf
39  Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 63.
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immigration flows but instead to stop them by passing strict immigration 
laws and building border walls and fences.
Despite all efforts made by governments to control trans-national 
flows, the number of people crossing international borders every day by 
regular or irregular channels, with the intention to stay temporarily or 
permanently outside their home land, has been rising gradually.40
Today, more people live outside their country of origin than at any 
time in history. According to the UN Population Division 244 million 
were living outside their country of origin in 2015, up from 222 million 
in 2010 and 173 million in 2000. Nearly two thirds of all international 
migrants live in Europe (76 million) or Asia (75 million). North America 
hosted the third largest number of international migrants (54 million), 
followed by Africa (21 million), Latin America and the Caribbean (9 
million) and Oceania (8 million).41
Spain is the seventh largest host country in the world with 6.9 million 
immigrants. It was also ranked seventh among countries in the world with 
the highest remittance-sending rates, with USD 12.6 billion being sent 
in 2010. An important proportion of these remittances were transferred 
to Morocco, as the eighteenth-highest receiver of remittances of the 
world’s countries. In the same period, Morocco received USD 6.4 billion 
from its expatriates all over the world.42 With respect to international 
irregular immigrants, it is impossible to obtain accurate data about them 
because of their clandestine and irregular situation. The International 
Labour Organization estimates, however, that there are roughly 20 to 
30 million unauthorized migrants worldwide, comprising around 10 to 
40  The Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations affirmed in 
its International Migration Report 2015 that “The number of international migrants 
worldwide has continued to grow rapidly over the past fifteen years reaching 
244 million in 2015, up from 222 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000”. The 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, International 




42  Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011—2nd edition. Washington: The World 
Bank, 2010, pp. 1–15, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/ 
10986/23743/9781464803192.pdf
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15 percent of the world’s immigrants.43 Each year, an estimated 2.5 to 4 
million immigrants cross international borders without authorization.44
Since western European countries adopted strict immigration policies, 
Morocco and Spanish-controlled enclaves in North Africa have turned 
into important points of departure of irregular immigration flows into 
European countries on the northern shore of the Mediterranean, namely 
Spain, Italy and France. Needless to say, the fences of Ceuta and Melilla 
were built to prevent Sub-Saharan African immigrants, not Moroccans, 
for two reasons. First, according to the Agreement on the Accession 
of Spain to the EU, inhabitants of Tetouan and Nador, two Moroccan 
provinces adjacent to Ceuta and Melilla, became exempted from visa 
requirements and enabled Moroccans to cross the enclave’s border but 
not to enter mainland Spain. Secondly, Moroccans from outside these 
two provinces can be expelled if they overstay their visa period or enter 
the enclaves illegally under the Agreement of Return signed between 
Morocco and Spain in 1992.
Sub-Saharan African immigrants who intend to use Morocco simply 
as a transit route may find that the “transit country” becomes a “host 
country” if they face difficulties entering Europe, whether by sea or 
through Ceuta and Melilla. For some time, a large number of immigrants 
failing or not venturing to enter Europe have built temporary settlements 
as a “third nation” or a “waiting room” on Moroccan territory near 
Ceuta and Melilla; it is a place where seekers live who cannot reach 
their Eldorado nor can they return to their home countries.
Since 2005, thousands of sub-Saharan-African migrants have tried 
to climb over the fences of Ceuta and Melilla using makeshift ladders. 
Some of them died in these tragic attempts to reach the two enclaves. 
These events have deeply shocked the public and require a collective, 
trans-national approach to tackle. Although these events implicated 
transit countries, especially Maghreb countries, the EU and Spain 
continue to give preference to unilateral and security initiatives based 
on the militarization of EU territorial and maritime borders despite 
43  International Labour Office, Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global 
Economy [International Labour Conference, 92nd Session]. Geneva: International 
Labour Office, 2004.
44  The Global Commission on International Immigration, “Immigration in an 
Interconnected World: New Directions for Action” (October 2005), p. 85.
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repeated demonstrations of their inability to cope with trans-national 
flows of irregular immigrants. Its “calculated” involvement of the 
transit countries as one of the forms of the externalization of borders 
control suggests that the EU intends to make them gendarmes or buffer 
zones.
Morocco as a transit country, finds itself in a crucial situation between 
a rock and a hard place. For the last two decades it has been under EU 
pressure to control its territorial boundaries and stop the flows of sub-
Saharan immigrants who intend to enter to Europe through Moroccan 
coasts or the Ceuta and Melilla enclaves. On the other hand, Morocco 
faces a growing demand from national and international human-rights 
groups to provide more protection to irregular immigrants crossing or 
settling on its territory.
Spanish efforts to build and strengthen fences around Ceuta and 
Melilla have faced great opposition not only from Morocco, since it 
does not recognize Spanish sovereignty over these enclaves, but also 
from some European diplomats and human-rights organizations. The 
significant development in this context is the increasing awareness 
among some European statesmen of the ineffectiveness of such 
separation fences. According to one European diplomat,
Illegal immigration is a growing problem, but we can’t just build a 
wall around the EU. We need to encourage economic development in 
other countries, through both trade and aid, so that people have better 
opportunities in their own countries. At the same time, we have to 
balance firm but fair immigration policies with a compassionate attitude 
to refugees and asylum seekers. It’s a fine line to walk.45
The former European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, 
Franco Frattini, said “Europe cannot become a fortress” and “must 
do all it can to avoid sending this kind of negative message to other 
countries. […] measures like building higher and higher fences will not 
resolve the problem of unwanted immigration.46
45  Christian Science Monitor, August 1998. Cited in Shelagh Furness, “Brave new 
Borderless State: Illegal Immigration and the External Borders of the EU”, IBRU 
Boundary and Security Bulletin (Autumn 2000), p. 100.
46  Tito Drago, “Spain: From the Berlin Wall to Ceuta and Melilla”, Inter Press 
Service (October 5, 2005), http://www.ipsnews.net/2005/10/spain-from 
-the-berlin-wall-to-ceuta-and-melilla/
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The central question in this context is whether the new measures 
adopted by the Spanish government can prevent desperately poor 
people from sub-Saharan Africa from attempting to enter Europe 
through Ceuta and Melilla or through another route, whatever the cost 
may be, even at the risk of their lives. Today, there is unanimity among 
researchers that the only effective solution to irregular immigration is to 
reduce economic crises in developing and underdeveloped countries; to 
support and encourage political reforms in origin countries, especially 
in Africa; and to stop all social disturbances and civil wars that have 
been the main causes of both regular and irregular migration.
To sum up, the militarization of Ceuta and Melilla borders and the 
building of new fences in an attempt to stop or at least reduce the number 
of irregular immigrants remain an impractical solution. Such obstructions 
would simply lead them to cross elsewhere and to find new migratory 
routes to Spain by boats through the Canary Islands, for example, from 
Mauritania or Senegal. Trying to stop this kind of migration is like trying 
to catch water in one’s hands; the more you press on the water the more it 
slips through your fingers. Furthermore, irregular immigrants who reach 
Spain from Ceuta and Melilla are a minority of all immigrants living in 
Spain irregularly, and the majority of these entered legally by ports or 
airports but have overstayed their visas.
A Relative Geopolitical Importance
The geopolitical dimensions of a Spanish presence in North Africa 
are very significant not only for Spain but also for the EU. Since the 
entrance of Spain into the EU, the enclaves’ fences in Northern Morocco 
became the EU’s only borders with an Arab nation. Moreover, Spain is 
the only Mediterranean country that could control the two shores of the 
Mediterranean, because of its presence in North Africa. The EU is aware 
of this unique and strategic position as both an intercontinental bridge 
between Europe and Africa and as a lighthouse to control the whole 
western Mediterranean Sea. This explains why EU members support or 
at least remain silent toward the Spanish occupation of these territories.
This geopolitical importance is less significant to NATO because, 
when Spain joined the organization in 1981, the enclaves were 
explicitly assigned outside the alliance defensive area. NATO members, 
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particularly the U.S., were not willing to defend territories in North 
Africa as such behaviour risked escalation into a wider conflict in the 
Middle East.47 Furthermore, the involvement of NATO in the issue of the 
two enclaves does not make sense, at least in the medium term, because 
of Morocco’s strong ties with influential countries in the NATO alliance, 
namely France and the U.S. Moreover, the cooperation of Morocco 
is crucial for NATO projects in the region. This can be explained, for 
example, by the meeting of the North Atlantic Council being held in 
Rabat on 7 April 2006 and by Morocco’s contribution to “Operation 
Active Endeavour”.48
It is argued that international straits do not concern only their coastal 
states but are vital for the whole of the international community. So, 
it is difficult to imagine that any state in the world would accept that 
one country can control the two shores of the Strait of Gibraltar. This 
will happen when Spain restores the Rock of Gibraltar, without giving 
up the Spanish-controlled territories in North Africa to Morocco. The 
words of Jaime De Pinies, a long-time Spanish diplomat who served as 
president of the UN General Assembly from 1985–1986, spoken in 1990, 
are still valuable today: “On the day we can restore the sovereignty of 
Gibraltar to Spain, it would be hard to imagine that the international 
community will accept that we control the two shores of the Straits”.49 
This notion has often been stressed by Morocco. In this context, King 
Hassan II argued that “the day Spain comes into possession of Gibraltar, 
Morocco will, of necessity, get Ceuta and Melilla. No power can permit 
Spain to possess both keys to the same straits”.50
47  Gerry O’Reilly, Ceuta and the Spanish Sovereign Territories: Spanish and Moroccan 
Claims. Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit [Dept. of Geography, 
University of Durham], 1994, p. 19.
48  Morocco and NATO signed in 22 October 2009 in Naples (Italy) a Tactical 
Memorandum of Understanding (TMOU) for a Moroccan contribution to NATO’s 
anti-terrorism mission (Operation Active Endeavour).
49  Jaime De Pinies, La descolonización del Sáhara: Un Tema sin Concluir. Madrid: Espasa 
Crónica, 1990, p. 55. Cited in Mohamed Larbi Messari, “The Current Context of a 
Moroccan Claim to Ceuta and Melilla” (December 2009).
50  L’Opinion (26 novembre 1975), cited by Robert Rézette, The Spanish Enclaves in 
Morocco. Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1976, p. 146.
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Perpetuating the Current status quo:  
The Long-Term Goal
Spain’s policy of building new fences and reinforcing its existing ones 
occurred in the context of a latent conflict with Morocco over Spanish-
controlled territories in North Africa. Fencing the two enclaves is part 
of a comprehensive strategy which has taken several forms and steps 
aimed at perpetuating the status quo. Granting autonomous status, 
passing immigration laws and organizing visits by the Spanish King 
and ministers are key elements of this strategy.
The granting of autonomous status to Ceuta and Melilla, enacted by 
law on 13 March 1995, was a turning point in the modern history of the 
two enclaves. Since the adoption of this law, Ceuta and Melilla officially 
became autonomous cities within the Spanish juridical framework. 
The granting of autonomy contains a clear message for Morocco to the 
effect that any claim to recover the enclaves would complicate the status 
quo of Spanish occupation. Moreover, this change-of-status involved 
the inhabitants of Ceuta and Melilla as third parties in the dispute, 
which further complicates the question of the two enclaves. Some 
commentators argue that the loosening of ties between the Spanish 
central government and the two towns by the granting of autonomy 
might be regarded as a provocation. By increasing the power of a 
population, it is even more likely to resist incorporation into Morocco 
than it was the authorities based in Madrid.51 This effort coincides 
with the Spanish government’s attempt to change the demographic 
balance between the two communities living in the enclaves by passing 
immigration and citizenship laws that impose strict conditions to obtain 
Spanish citizenship or residence permits.
Legislation, especially immigration and citizenship laws, remains an 
important instrument by which the Spanish government has tried to 
maintain the status quo of the two enclaves. For example, Spain passed 
a new immigration law in 1985 in preparation for its entrance into the 
European Community. According to this law, the majority of Muslims 
living in the enclaves could only apply for Spanish citizenship after ten 
51  Robert Aldrich and John Connell, The Last Colonies, p. 228.
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years of residence. Muslim-born residents in the enclaves were unwilling 
to apply for the necessary identity card because they did not want to be 
classified as “foreigners” in the land where they were born. In addition, 
possession of an identity card meant that they would have to wait ten 
years to apply for citizenship and there would be no guarantee they 
would acquire it. On the other hand, without this document, they would 
be liable for deportation.52 Fear of the growth of the Muslim population 
always dominates the Spanish policy and legislation towards the 
enclaves. It is presumed that such a demographic shift in favor of the 
Muslim community could alter the current demographic situation and 
potentially lead to a silent “re-Moroccanization” of the enclaves.
The unprecedented visit of Spain’s King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia 
to Ceuta and Melilla on 5–6 Novemeber 2007 could be considered as an 
attempt to “formalize” the current status quo. This had been expressed 
by some right-wing Spanish newspapers. For example, El Mundo said in 
an editorial: “the presence of the King will reaffirm Spanish sovereignty 
over the two autonomous territories”.53 As an attempt to reject the de facto 
policy applied by the Spanish government in the two enclaves, Morocco 
denounced this visit and recalled its ambassador to Spain. The danger 
of theses fences is that the EU financial support for their construction 
might be considered as an implicit recognition of their being the de facto 
EU southern border.
Conclusion
It is argued in the previous paragraphs that the fences Ceuta and 
Melilla will continue to influence negatively Morocco’s relations with 
Spain and the EU. Spain’s policy to fence the two enclaves’ borders 
reflects contradictory pressures in the region. While the Mediterranean 
sphere has witnessed an increasing number of cultural and economic 
cooperation projects in the last two decades, new physical and virtual 
walls are being built in the region to achieve “Fortress Europe”.
52  Peter Gold, Europe or Africa?: A Contemporary Study of the Spanish North African 
Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, p. 94.
53  “Diplomatic row over King’s visit to Ceuta, Melilla”, Expatica, 2 November 2007, 
https://www.expatica.com/es/news/Diplomatic-row-over-Kings-visit-to-Ceuta-
Melilla_150251.html
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The challenge facing the region is whether the growing economic 
interdependence and bilateral or multilateral institutional mechanisms 
will prevent any dramatic conflict, or at least a serious crisis, that can 
cause a major setback to the ongoing Euro-Mediterranean integration 
process.
Even if North Africa is not currently a priority within international 
policy agendas, particularly of the U.S., the Strait of Gibraltar will 
continue to be one of the most vital gateways for commercial and 
military vessels. Therefore, regardless of the competition for regional 
influence in the Strait of Gibraltar and any unrest between Morocco and 
Spain that may be fuelled by the continued Spanish occupation of Ceuta 
and Melilla, maintaining the current status quo in the region remains the 
most acceptable option for all international actors concerned.

4. The U.S.-Mexico Border Wall1
The United States has a long history of immigration. It has attracted 
immigrants from all over the world since the first European settlers 
arrived on the American shores, and today has one of the world’s 
highest migration rates. However, it is accurate to say that, from a legal 
point of view, the Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the Treaty of 
Paris of 1783, which accorded to the U.S. recognition as a nation, mark 
the beginning of the country’s immigration history. Immigration flows 
have been a major source of U.S. population growth and have greatly 
enriched its culture and history. The United States remains home to the 
largest number of international migrants in the world. Today, according 
to the U.S. Census Bureau (2010 American Community Survey), there 
are 36.7 million foreign-born persons legally residing in the U.S., making 
up 12 percent of the nation’s population;2 more than half (58 percent) do 
not have American citizenship. Approximately half of them were born 
in Latin America and almost one-third were born in Mexico.
1  Part of this chapter is drawn, with permission from the publisher, from: “Border 
Fences as an Anti-immigration Device: A Comparative View of American and 
Spanish Policies”, in Elisabeth Vallet (Ed.), Borders, Fences and Walls: State of 
Insecurity? Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2014, pp. 175–90. 
2  According to the International Organization of Migration, in 2010 immigrants 
make 13.5 % of the U.S. population; and the net migration rate between 2005 and 
2010 was 3.3 migrant(s)/1000 population. World Migration Report 2010: The Future of 
Migration: Building Capacities for Change. Geneva, Switzerland: IOM, 2010, https://
publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2010_english.pdf
© 2017 Said Saddiki, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0121.05
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Immigration flows to the U.S. are not related to temporary 
circumstances and have never ceased since the first white man set foot 
on North American soil. Statistics from recent decades indicate that 
more than 1.5 million new immigrants settle in the country every year.3
In general, there is convergence in the estimates of the number 
of undocumented migrants in the United States. For example, the 
Department of Homeland Security estimates that the unauthorized 
immigrant population living in the country decreased to 10.8 million in 
January 2009 from 11.6 million in January 2008. Between 2000 and 2009, 
the unauthorized population grew by 27 percent. Of all unauthorized 
immigrants living in the United States in 2009, 63 percent entered before 
2000, and 62 percent were from Mexico.4 A report by the Pew Hispanic 
Center put the estimate at 11.1 million unauthorized immigrants living 
in the country in March 2009, about a million fewer than in 2007.5 
Approximately 80 percent of them are of Hispanic origin. It should 
be noted that Mexico as well as being the major country of origin of 
irregular migration to the U.S. also functions as a transit country for 
illegal migration from Latin America and a point of entry to the U.S.
In 2013, the United States ranked first in the world as an immigration 
host country with 46.1 million immigrants, and the Mexico-U.S. border 
was the largest migration corridor with 13 million users. In the same 
period, the United States was ranked first as a remittance-sending 
country, with USD 56 billion being sent abroad. A large part of this 
remittance was sent to Mexico which ranked, with USD 25.7 billion, as 
the third largest remittance-receiving country.6
3  Cf. especially statistics gathered by the U.S. Census Bureau available at https://
www.census.gov/
4  Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina and Bryan C. Baker, “Estimates of the Unauthorized 
Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2009”, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics (January 2010), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2009.pdf
5  Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows are 
Down Sharply since Mid-Decade”, The Pew Hispanic Center (1 September 2010), p. i.
6  Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016, 3rd edition. Washington: The World 
Bank Group, 2016, pp. 1–5, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/
handle/10986/23743/9781464803192.pdf
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From the “Open Border” Policy to  
Anti-Immigration Legislation
The regulation of immigration in the United States is much older than other 
western immigrant-receiving countries. The regulation of immigration 
to the U.S. dates backs to the end of the eighteenth century, specifically 
to 1798, the year in which three important acts concerning the status of 
aliens in the United States (the Naturalization Acts, the Alien Friends 
Act and the Alien Enemies Act) were adopted. Nearly a century later, 
in 1891, Congress passed the “Immigration Act”, which is considered 
to be the country’s first comprehensive immigration law. Subsequently, 
U.S. lawmakers created a number of acts to regulate the immigration 
influx and to redefine the status of aliens in the country. One of the most 
important legislations on the topic, the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) of 1952, also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, restricted 
immigration into the United States. According to the U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services, the INA collected and codified many existing 
provisions and reorganized the structure of immigration law. The Act has 
been amended many times over the years, but it still represents the basic 
body of legislation on immigration, providing the country with a variety 
of legislative instruments in the field of migration. Until recent decades, 
however, the American government had not seen immigration as a serious 
threat and had paid little attention to the issue. For example, the platform 
of the Republican Party did not even mention immigration control until 
1980, and only four years later did it affirm the country’s right to control 
its borders, expressing concern about illegal immigration.7 This set off a 
flurry of immigration laws in the late 1980s-2000s aimed at preventing 
irregular immigrants from entering the country. The Immigration Reform 
and Control Act (IRCA), adopted by Congress in 1986, increased border 
enforcement and introduced sanctions for knowingly hiring irregular 
aliens. This act marks the beginning of a stringent legislative policy. The 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 
7  Joseph Nevins, “‘Illegal Aliens’ and the Political Geography of Criminalized 
Immigrants”, paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of American 
Geographers [Boston] (8 March1998), cited in Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing 
the US-Mexico Divide. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 86.
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released in 1996 placed further restrictions on irregular and irregular 
immigration by making, for example, access to welfare benefits more 
difficult for legal aliens and by tightening border control by allocating 
USD 12 million for a 14-mile triple fence along the U.S.-Mexico border 
from San Diego eastward.
One of the most important aspects of international immigration 
currently is the link between immigration and security and criminality 
in the national policies of host countries. This aspect has been more 
obvious, especially after 9/11 events, so that illegal immigration 
has been presented as a possible national-security threat. Mathew 
Coleman8 documented two significant recent shifts in U.S. immigration 
policing in conjunction with the border militarization process. Firstly, 
since the mid-1990s, lawmakers have sought to bind immigration 
control to criminal law enforcement so that a criminal conviction can 
be used as grounds for deportation from the U.S. Coleman argued that 
this mode of immigration governance means that immigration law is 
ultimately exempted from judicial review, even as it works largely on 
the basis of criminal law. Secondly, a concerted effort on the part of 
lawmakers and the Bush administration, particularly since 9/11, has 
been made to use local proxy forces — or non-federal delegates — to 
enforce immigration law. Coleman concluded that, taken together, 
the criminalization of immigration law and the enrolment of proxy 
immigration officers at sub-state level constitute a new localized or 
rescaled geopolitics of immigration policing.9 In summary, since the 9/11 
attacks, several legislative measures have been taken to tighten security 
control on the U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada. Furthermore, in 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11, some American politicians called for 
severe restrictions on immigrant admissions to the United States, and 
many “anti-illegal” immigration groups have taken advantage of the 
opportunity to increase their demands.
The U.S. immigration policy entered a new phase after the election 
of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency and marked a sharp break with 
previous policy. The new president has adopted many bills concerning 
illegal immigrants, deportation, security border control and banning 
8  Mathew Coleman, “Immigration Geopolitics beyond the Mexico-US Border”, 
Antipode, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2007), p. 56.
9  Ibid.
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entry from seven majority-Muslim countries: Syria, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, 
Libya, Somalia and Yemen. Trump’s Executive Order 13767 on Border 
Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements of 25 January 
2017 states that irregular immigration presents a clear and present 
danger to the interests of the United States. This new immigration 
policy will likely put almost 11 million people who have lived illegally 
in the U.S. for years or decades at risk of deportation or at least make 
them live in fear and anxiety.
Regardless of the attractive arguments the Trump administration 
uses to justify the new immigration legislations, such as the protection of 
the nation from the foreign terrorists, it will face considerable difficulties 
in implementing them. For example, the first version of the Trump’s 
Executive Order on Immigration has been temporarily blocked by some 
federal judges10 and widely criticized by human-rights advocates and 
the media.
It is clear that, even if the historical context of immigration regulation 
in the U.S. is different from other western countries, the objective of 
its immigration policy is almost the same as all other immigrant-
receiving countries. But there is a significant difference in its capacity 
to absorb new immigrants. The U.S. continues to receive thousands of 
immigrants from all corners of the world each year, while other western 
countries — except for the influx of asylum-seekers from the areas of 
tension, especially Syria — have become fed up with all kinds of new 
immigrants, especially after the financial crisis of recent years.
Construction of the Border Wall:  
A Militarization of Immigration Control
The U.S.-Mexico border fences are legitimate under international law 
since they are built on American territory. Despite critics’ claims to the 
contrary, it is not unlawful for a state to establish fences or walls on its 
own territory to control access to that territory.
Although the federal government funded the construction of fences 
around some southern-border cities (Nogales, San Ysidro and El Paso) 
10  See for example, Mica Rosenberg and Jonathan Stempel, “U.S. Judges Limit Trump 
Immigration Order; Some Officials Ignore Rulings”, Reuters (29 January 2017), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-immigration-courts-idUSKBN15D0XG
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before the 1990s, it started seriously building fences and escalating 
control measures along its borders with Mexico in 1994 under Clinton’s 
administration, as a comprehensive policy. The border south of San 
Diego, which has been identified as an area of high human smuggling 
and drug trafficking, was the first borderland to be fenced. Republican 
representative Duncan Hunter, the former Chairman of the House 
Armed Services Committee, played a significant role in the construction 
of the first security fence (23 kilometers) on the U.S. southern border 
separating San Diego County and Tijuana (Mexico).
Fig. 4.1 U.S.-Mexico border fence at Tijuana (6 February 2017).  
Photo by Tomas Castelazo, CC BY-SA 4.0.11
Since 9/11, irregular immigration has been placed in the same category 
as terrorism and security threats, including drug trafficking and 
organized crime. Thus, border-security and a hard-line policy against 
irregular immigration became key elements of the U.S’.s “war on terror”. 
One of the effects of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. border-control system 
was the creation of the Homeland Security Department (HSD). The 
responsibility for border security transferred from the Department of 
Justice to the Department of HSD, and Immigration and Naturalization 
11  Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3A 
Mexico-US_border_at_Tijuana.jpg
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Service was abolished.12 Shortly after the creation of the Homeland 
Security Department in 2003, the Border Patrol was directed to formulate 
a new “National Border Patrol Strategy” that would better reflect the 
realities of the post 9/11 security landscape. The Border Patrol’s strategy 
comprised five main objectives:
• Establish substantial probability of apprehending terrorists 
and their weapons as they attempt to enter illegally between 
the ports of entry;
• Deter illegal entries through improved enforcement;
• Detect, apprehend, and deter smugglers of humans, drugs, 
and other contraband;
• Leverage “Smart Border” technology to multiply the effect of 
enforcement personnel; and
• Reduce crime in border communities and consequently 
improve the quality of life and economic vitality of targeted 
areas.13
On 26 October 2006, then-President George W. Bush signed into law 
the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109–367), which has been deemed the 
most important law concerning the reinforcement of the border control. 
Bush considered the law to be “an important step toward immigration 
reform” that “will help protect the American people”.14 The Secure 
Fence Act of 2006 aimed to tighten border security by building 700 
miles of double-layered fencing on the U.S.-Mexico border. Further, the 
law authorized more vehicle barriers, checkpoints and lighting to help 
prevent people from entering the country illegally. It also authorized 
the Department of Homeland Security to increase the use of advanced 
technology like cameras, satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles to 
reinforce infrastructure at the border. The main goal of the law was to 
help secure America’s borders against irregular entry, drug trafficking 
and security threats.
12  The Homeland Security Act (Public Law 107–296), passed by Congress and signed 
by the President in November 2002.
13  Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 
“National Border Patrol Strategy” (1 March 2005), p. 2.
14  The White House Archive, “President Bush Signs Secure Fence Act”, 26 October 2006, 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061026.html
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The financial cost of the project has increased year by year. 
Appropriations for the Homeland Security Department for fiscal 
year 2007 provided USD 1.2 billion for the installation of fencing, 
infrastructure and technology along the border; USD 31 million of 
this total was designated for the completion of the San Diego fence.15 
Appropriations for fencing and other border barriers have increased 
markedly since the plan entered into force from USD 6 million in fiscal 
year 2002 to USD 647 million in fiscal year 2007. The fiscal year 2008 
appropriation, according to Customs and Border Protection, included 
USD 196 million for fence construction.16
Fig. 4.2 South side of the United States-Mexico border wall in  
Progreso Lakes, Texas (21 March 2016). Photo by Rebajae, CC BY-SA 3.0.17
In general, the construction of border walls and fences leads to 
diplomatic tensions between neighboring countries because it is 
15  Chad C. Haddal, Yule Kim and Michael John Garcia, Border Security: Barriers along 
the U.S. International Border, RL33659. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service (16 March 2009), p. 37.
16  Ibid., p. 18.
17  Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:United_
States-Mexico-border-wall-Progreso-Lakes-Texas.jpeg
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usually viewed as an unfriendly action by targeted countries. The 
construction of the fence along the U.S.-Mexico border elicited much 
controversy from internal and external parties. Immediately prior to 
the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. and Mexico were on the verge of a historic 
opportunity to rewrite immigration laws and fundamentally alter the 
migratory relationship between the two nations, regularizing the status 
of millions of undocumented immigrant workers living in the United 
States. At that promising moment, the unexpected events of September 
11th occurred, which caused relations between the two countries to 
deteriorate as greater attention, especially from the American side, was 
paid to national-security concerns and regional perspectives.18 Mexico 
opposed the U.S. plan to build more separation fences along the border 
between the two countries, considering them to be in opposition to the 
regional integration process in the NAFTA region. Felipe Calderón, 
then-President of Mexico, stated that
it is deplorable to go ahead with this decision of the wall at the border 
[…]. The wall will not solve any problem. Humanity made a huge 
mistake by building the Berlin Wall and I believe that today the United 
States is committing a grave error in building the wall on our border. It 
is much more useful to solve common problems and foster prosperity in 
both countries.19
Although the events of 9/11 were neither connected to Mexican nationals 
nor committed by attackers entering American territory illegally from 
Mexico, their long-term effects on U.S.-Mexican migration relations and 
the regional integration process will last for decades.
Tension between the two neighboring countries has recently escalated 
because of successive statements by Donald Trump — especially 
during his 2016 election campaign — who promised to build a border 
wall.20 The main point of tension is Trump’s call for Mexico to fund the 
18  Michele Waslin, “The New Meaning of the Border: U.S.-Mexico Migration Since 
9/11”, paper prepared for the conference on “Reforming the Administration of 
Justice in Mexico”, The Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California 
[San Diego] (15–17 May 2003), pp. 10–12, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3dd8w0r6
19  Ken Herman, “Bush: Border Fence not Enough”, Austin American-Statesman, 
27 October 2006, https://www.pressreader.com/usa/austin-american-states
man/20061027/281573761191370
20  It is not actually about a new wall. Rather, Trump’s policy aims at extending the 
barriers that already exist on many parts of the border.
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construction of this wall. Immediately after his inauguration, Donald 
Trump adopted the Executive Order 13767 that aimed at securing the 
southern border of the U.S. “through the immediate construction of a 
physical wall on the southern border”.21
It is estimated that the new wall will cost a great deal of money. 
According to Mitch McConnell, a Republican congressman, the wall 
is expected to cost between USD 12–15 billion. Additionally, the 
maintenance of the wall could cost as much as USD 750 million per 
year.22 Moreover, Trump’s project will likely face significant funding 
challenges and practical difficulties, especially in native American 
reservations.23 It will have serious environmental effects along the 
Rio Grande River where the wall cannot be built in the middle of the 
valley. An electronic-control system is one possible alternative, but such 
virtual-security walls have proven to be ineffective in North America 
and elsewhere.
Virtual Fence: Technology in the Face  
of “Non-traditional Threats”
To adapt to the information age, governments in developed and 
developing countries have made great efforts in recent decades to 
incorporate new information and communication technologies (ICTs) in 
their security policies. Today, border management and administration 
of immigration has become a high-tech area, especially in the “Global 
North”.
The U.S. has not only built a physical fence along its southern borders 
but also adopted a virtual system to control its borderlands. The latter 
21  The White House, “Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration 
Enforcement Improvements”, 25 January 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2017/01/25/executive-order-border-security-and-immigration 
-enforcement-improvements
22  Kate Drew, “This is What Trump’s Border Wall could Cost”, CNBC (26 January 
2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/09/this-is-what-trumps-border-wall-could-
cost-us.html
23  The U.S. Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke admitted that building the border 
wall “is complex in some areas”. See Matthew Daly and Alicia A. Caldwell, 
“Zinke: Border Wall ‘Complex’, Faces Geographic Challenges”, Washington 
Times (29 March 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/29/
zinke-border-wall-complex-faces-geographic-challen/
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system, known as virtual wall or virtual fence, has been significantly 
intensified in the post-9/11 era. It is now a component of policy 
preferred by some countries in Europe and North America in response 
to trans-national security threats. Josiah Heyman distinguishes between 
two meanings of this virtual system — one narrower and one broader. 
The narrower meaning of the virtual wall refers to the use of advanced 
surveillance and computer technologies in border law enforcement 
by utilizing, for example, ground-level radar to detect the movement 
of persons and to define their orientation in the vicinity of the border. 
More broadly, the virtual fence, according to Heyman, points to the 
amassing of police forces, including military and intelligence agencies, 
in the border region.24 Virtual fences in the narrow sense is a first-
generation application of military technology in the border-control 
system which has been shown to be ineffective against smugglers’ and 
irregular immigrants’ intelligent use of developed technology and 
different styles of camouflage. The broader meaning refers to the total 
virtual militarization of the border to detect with high accuracy all kind 
of cross-border infiltrations around the clock and regardless of weather 
conditions.
The search for technological solutions to border control has been 
present in the debate over new immigration laws adopted by the 
U.S. in recent years. The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal 
Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H.R.4437), passed by the House in 
December 2005, and the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 
2006 (S. 2611), passed by the Senate in May 2006, both have provisions 
requiring implementation of new technologies to support border-
control efforts at and between ports of entry, particularly along the 
U.S.-Mexican border.25
The U.S. virtual border fence is largely linked to the “Secure Border 
Initiative” (SBI) launched by the Department of Homeland Security 
in November 2005. Through the SBI, the DHS intended to enhance 
surveillance technologies, increase staffing levels, enforce immigration 
24  Josiah McC. Heyman, “Constructing a Virtual Wall: Race and Citizenship in U.S.-
Mexico Border Policing”, Journal of the Southwest, Vol. 50, No. 3 (2008), p. 305.
25  Rey Koslowski, “Immigration Reforms and Border Security Technologies”, Border 
Battles: The U.S. Immigration Debates. New York: Social Science Research Council 
(2006), http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Koslowski
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laws and improve the physical infrastructure along the U.S. borders 
with Mexico and Canada26 in order to prevent trans-national security 
threats and reduce irregular immigration. A part of SBI, the Secure 
Border Initiative Network (SBInet), is a multibillion dollar program 
initiated in 2006 that involves the acquisition, development, integration, 
deployment, operation and maintenance of surveillance technologies to 
create a virtual fence along the border, as well as command, control, 
communications and intelligence (C3I) technologies to create a picture 
of the border in command centers and vehicles.27 The primary goal of 
SBInet is to strengthen DHS’s ability to control thousands of miles of 
American international frontier.
The U.S. virtual border fence was very costly financially. According to 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office, for fiscal years 2006 through 
2009, the SBI program received about USD 3.6 billion in appropriated 
funds. Of this amount, about USD 2.4 billion has been allocated to 
complete approximately 670 miles of vehicle and pedestrian fencing 
along the roughly 2,000 miles of border between the United States and 
Mexico.28 Adam Comis, the Press Secretary for the House Homeland 
Security Committee, stated that the cost of the entire south-western 
virtual fence project (if it was not stopped) is estimated to be about USD 
6.7 billion by 2014.29
Although the U.S. government spent much money to make a 
technological instead of a physical fence, the SBI did not achieve its 
desired results. For example, many of the sensors proved difficult to 
maintain in a variety of weather conditions, and they cannot differentiate 
animals and humans.30 The ineffectiveness of the U.S. virtual border 
fence program also shows itself in other aspects. Smugglers and 
26  United States Government Accountability Office, “Secure Border Initiative: DHS 
Needs to Strengthen Management and Oversight of Its Prime Contractor”, report 
to Congressional Requesters (October 2010), p. 1.
27  Ibid., p. 1.
28  United States Government Accountability Office, “Secure Border Initiative Fence 
Construction Costs” [Washington, D.C.] (29 January 2009), p. 4, http://www.gao.
gov/products/GAO-09-244R
29  Arthur H. Rotstein, “Officials Ready to Build Virtual Fence Along Border”, USnews 
& World Report (8 May 2009), http://www.usnews.com/science/articles/2009/05/08/
officials-ready-to-build-virtual-fence-along-border
30  Rey Koslowski, “Immigration Reforms and Border Security Technologies”, Border 
Battles: The U.S. Immigration Debates, http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Koslowski
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irregular immigrants developed many ways to circumvent the virtual 
fence along the U.S. international border, especially the one shared with 
Mexico. Sophisticatedly deep and long tunnels have been dug secretly 
under the U.S.-Mexico border and are used for smuggling drugs and 
immigrants. This remains one of the big challenges because if can evade 
control by the virtual-control system.
After the many failures of the U.S. virtual border fence, Homeland 
Security Secretary Janet Napolitano on 11 January 2011 cancelled the 
Secure Border Initiative-network (SBInet) program. Napolitano justified 
the decision on the basis of technical problems suffered by the program, 
cost overruns (USD 1 billion) and schedule delays since its inception in 
2005. At the same time, Napolitano announced a “new border security 
technology plan” that is tailored to the technological needs of each 
border region, including commercially available mobile surveillance 
systems, unmanned aircraft systems, thermal imaging devices and 
tower-based remote video surveillance systems.
Trump’s project, though it aims to erect a concrete wall along the 
entirety of the U.S.-Mexico border, will face geographical and physical 
challenges that will prompt the U.S. government to resort to technology 
as a complementary measure. It will be able to reuse the technological 
surveillance system that has been already been in place along the border. 
So, high-tech fences, at least on some parts of the border, will be among 
the possible options and may significantly reduce the cost of the project.
Conclusion
The U.S.-Mexico border wall marks the fault line between two different 
worlds. Regardless of how many billions of dollars will be spent on 
the further fortification and militarization of the common border, illegal 
cross-border activities will continue so long as there is a huge disparity 
in economic prosperity, political stability and social security between 
the two countries.
Regional integration and advanced partnerships may reduce the 
attractiveness of emigration, but they cannot erase the American dream 
from the mind of millions of Latin Americans who will continue to seek 
new ways to reach the America El Dorado — regularly or irregularly.

5. The Wall of Western Sahara1
All military walls in history were originally built with a protective 
function to keep out invaders. China’s Great Wall, the most famous and 
the longest manmade structure in the world, was built for defensive 
and protective purposes, to safeguard and unify the Chinese territory 
and empire. Also, in ancient civilizations, the high walls surrounding 
old cities were constructed as fortifications to defend the people from 
potential aggressors. However, modern international walls and fences 
are differentiated from each other according to their specific contexts 
and purposes. Some border walls are strictly defensive and military 
fortifications; others are considered to demarcate borders between 
two or more neighboring countries; others act as buffer lines between 
warring parties; and yet others have different roles and functions.
The Western Sahara Wall (also known as Sand Wall, defensive wall 
and Berm), which was built by Morocco in the Western Sahara,2 is one 
of these walls worth studying as a specific case. The Sand Wall was built 
in a specific international and regional context marked by a furious 
conflict between the two blocs during the Cold War over the control of 
some geo-strategic areas, including the Maghreb region.
Researchers interested in the Western Sahara issue consider the battle 
between Algeria and Morocco over its fate as a piece of heritage of the 
Cold War, which had intensified the struggle for regional hegemony. 
1  This chapter is drawn, with permission from the publisher, from: “The Sahara 
Wall: Status and Prospects”, Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2012), pp. 
199–212.
2  I use in this chapter the terms “Sahara” and “Western Sahara” interchangeably.
© 2017 Said Saddiki, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0121.06
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As noted by William Zartman, “by the end of 1984, the Western Saharan 
conflict had lost its specific focus on a piece of land and had become 
a clash of alliance in the Maghreb”.3 In this context, characterized by 
the unconditional support provided by some socialist bloc countries 
(mainly Algeria, Libya and Cuba) to POLISARIO,4 Morocco had no 
choice but to build a defensive wall in order to impose its conditions on 
the battlefield.
The Advisory Opinion rendered on 6 October 1975 by the 
International Court of Justice remains one of the key international 
legal bases to which Morocco refers in its policy towards the Western 
Sahara. This Advisory Opinion acknowledged that there were legal ties 
of allegiance between the Western Sahara territory and the Kingdom 
of Morocco at the time of colonization by Spain. The attachment of 
the population to the central power (Sultans, Princes, Kalifas) during 
Islamic history was based especially on religious and temporal ties of 
the allegiance (beyâa), which was considered as a contract between the 
population and the governor.
It is noteworthy that the notion of sovereignty that had been practiced 
in the Arab and Muslim World differed from “Westphalian sovereignty” 
that emerged in Europe following the end of the Thirty Years’ War 
in 1648. Even if the system of Westphalian sovereignty — based on 
territoriality — has dominated international relations from that time 
forward, it could not be applied retrospectively to earlier nations that 
had known a specific government and administration adapted to their 
cultural, political and social environment.
Arguably, the construction of the Western Sahara Wall is absolutely 
the most important military decision made by Morocco throughout the 
history of this issue because of its significant subsequent results not only 
at a military level but also because it has many considerable political 
and diplomatic consequences.
Moroccan Armed Forces began the construction of the Berm in 1981 
through a series of steps. The project ended in April 1987 after more 
3  William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 70–71.
4  POLISARIO is an acronym for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el 
Hamra and Rio de Oro, founded in Zouerate (Mauritania) on 29 April 1973 with the 
purpose of obtaining independence for Western Sahara.
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than 2,200 kilometers had been built. The berm is made up of six walls 
which were successively built as following periods:
• 1st wall (Aug 1980–Jun 1982): 500 kilometers
• 2nd wall (Dec 1983–Jan 1984): 300 kilometers
• 3rd wall (Apr 1984–May 1984): 320 kilometers
• 4th wall (Dec 1984–Jan 1985): 380 kilometers
• 5th wall (May–Sep 1985): 670 kilometers
• 6th wall (Feb–Apr 1987): 550 kilometers
The berm is supported at regular intervals by observation points, 
support points, artillery support, underground shelters of soldiers 
and radar and electronic sensors systems to detect adversary vehicles. 
Reserve forces have been positioned behind the wall, ready to retaliate 
if attacked.5 By the time the wall was completely erected, the battle 
in the Western Sahara had completely changed in favor of Moroccan 
military strategy.
Since the present and future of the Sahara Wall is tied closely to those 
of Western Sahara itself, before approaching the status and prospects of 
the Sahara Berm it is important to understand its historical origins.
A Glance at the Western Sahara Issue
This section aims to highlight both the historical ties between Morocco 
and the Western Sahara region and the progress of this issue in the 
framework of the United Nations.
The Western Sahara Region’s Historical Ties to Morocco
Throughout history, the Sahara has been the strategic depth of the 
Moroccan State. The rootedness of the Western Sahara in Morocco results 
from uninterrupted continuity of a ruling dynasty, many of whom 
originated from the Sahara. History books overflow with indications 
of the ties between the Sahrawi tribes and the Moroccan state. These 
5  Khadija Mohsen-Finan, “Murs de défense au Sahara occidental”, Études, Vol. 400, 
No. 2004 (January 2004), p. 94.
100 World of Walls
ties reflected the concept of sovereignty as it was practiced during the 
era of Islamic rule and are consistent with the pattern of nomadic life 
in the Sahara, which is characterized by permanent mobility and travel, 
not conducive to the establishment of a fixed administration. Thus, one 
could not adopt the concept of territorial sovereignty — as developed in 
Europe after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 — as a standard by which 
to prove or deny legal ties between Western Sahara and Morocco, since 
these had been developed in a different political, economic and social 
context.
The history of the Sahara confirms that Moroccan sultans and kings 
have exercised various forms of authority associated with internal and 
external sovereignty over this region. With regard to internal sovereignty, 
many historical documents show that the sultan has always practiced 
functions related to legislative, executive and spiritual authorities.
Legislative activities, exercised by the sultan, were not limited only 
to sultani dahirs (decrees), but extended to economic activity through 
the control of trade and production, in particular with regard to fishing 
— the monopoly of which was generally reserved for the sultan’s 
subjects, except in the case of special concessions for foreigners. They 
also extended administration of the ports in order to open and close 
them to foreign trade according to requirements of national policy. The 
sultan’s legislative authority also related to raw materials and fiscal 
matters through the assessment, imposition and collection of taxes and 
duties.6
Moroccan sultans practiced executive authority in the Western 
Sahara region through dahirs, as they did in the legislative field. That 
was the means by which they appointed and dismissed the caids to 
whom they entrusted responsibility for the government of a region, 
on a coast or across a group of tribes. The caids are, according to the 
etymological meaning of the term, military commanders who also have 
administrative functions. The title of caid did not tend to be strictly 
an honorary one, as has been alleged.7 It is a practice in a number of 
countries, in the absence of a centralized authority, to choose persons 
6  ICJ Advisory Opinion of October 16th, 1975, on the Western Sahara, Individual 
Opinion of Fouad Ammoun (Vice-President), p. 84/93, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/
case-related/61/061-19751016-ADV-01-04-EN.pdf
7  Ibid., p. 85/93.
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to govern who have the qualifications which enable them to make their 
authority felt and to carry out necessary tasks.8 Morocco submitted five 
of those dahirs that showed the administrative and political linkage of 
the regions of Western Sahara to Morocco to the ICJ in 1975. It is the 
dahirs in documents 4, 5 and 8 which appoint caids over the Sahara tribes 
of the Tidrareen and Oulad Tidrareen, whose nomadic migration routes 
extend over the whole of Western Sahara, according to Mauritania’s 
maps numbers 2 and 3 and go beyond Cabo Bojador; the dahir in 
document 4 also appoints the caid with authority over the Saharan 
Tekna, whose nomadic migration route extends to the northern part of 
the Sahara, or the Sakiet El Hamra, according to map number 3.9
Many European historians have agreed on the continuous and 
persistent link between the Western Sahara region and Morocco. Fouad 
Ammoun referred to five of those historians — a Frenchman, Vernet; and 
four Spaniards, Domenech Lafuente, Seco de Lucena, Huici and Romeu 
— who inspired great confidence with regard to the facts supporting the 
Moroccan case.10
The documents relied upon by Morocco show international 
recognition of Moroccan territorial sovereignty over the Western Sahara 
region. Those documents concern bilateral conventions and treaties 
which Morocco held with some states, notably the treaty with Spain of 
1767, and treaties of 1836, 1856 and 1861 with the United States, Great 
Britain and Spain, respectively. Provisions of these deal with the rescue 
and safety of mariners shipwrecked on the Coast of Wad Noun or in its 
vicinity.11 One of these significant international accords is the Franco-
German exchange of letters of 1911 — appended to the Agreement 
between France and Germany of 4 November 1911 — which expressed 
the understanding of the parties that “Morocco comprises all that part of 
northern Africa which is situated between Algeria, French West Africa, 
and the Spanish colony of Rio de Oro”.12 Morocco has presented this 
document as clear recognition by those powers of Moroccan sovereignty 
over the Sakiet El Hamra as an integral part of its territory.
8  ibid. 
9  Ibid., p. 83/93
10  Ibid., pp. 86/78–94/86.
11  For further details about these conventions see the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 16 
October 1975 on the Western Sahara, p. 51.
12  Ibid., p. 124, p. 41.
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Although sovereignty in Islamic history had taken different 
dimensions, it can be generally summarized as “spiritual and temporal 
authority”. Spiritual and religious ties had been its most important 
aspects. Allegiance (beyâa) based on religious elements was expressed 
by tribes and inhabitants of the Sahara region to the Moroccan central 
authority. Religious and spiritual dimensions gave legal force to the 
allegiance, and the population’s belief in its obligation guaranteed the 
people’s respect of its requirements even if the state could not extend its 
material authority to them. This fact explains why an important number 
of provinces remained subordinate to the central Islamic state for a long 
time despite the absence of any tangible administrative or military 
aspect of sovereignty that subjugated them.
Since independence in 1956, Morocco, based on the continued 
subordination of the Western Sahara region to its territory, has spared 
no effort in completing its territorial integrity, which was torn apart 
by progressive multinational colonization from 1884 when Spanish 
colonization began. Before 1956, the Moroccan people used various 
means, including armed struggle, for liberation from colonialism. 
However, the formal declaration of independence in that year made 
Morocco fall back slowly to rely on diplomatic and political means, such 
as direct negotiations and UN instruments, to complete its territorial 
integrity. Due to its exposure to multinational colonization and the 
competing interests of colonial powers, Morocco was unable to recover 
all of its territory at once in 1956. This did not prevent the country 
from declaring independence and gaining international recognition as 
provided in international law.
The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples stipulated in paragraph 3 that “inadequacy of 
political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never 
serve as a pretext for delaying independence”.13 Nevertheless, this did 
not mean that Morocco had given up the territories that remained under 
occupation in the north and south. In fact, the declaration of Morocco’s 
independence in 1956 did not constitute a break with the colonial past 
because of the continued presence of Spanish colonies in important 
parts of Moroccan territory.
13  The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.
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Even though Morocco was able to retrieve some parts of its 
national territory — such as Tarfaya and the Sidi Ifni regions, which it 
regained respectively in 1958 and 1969 by a bilateral agreement with 
Spain — the Sakia El Hamra and Río de Oro regions, or what is known 
internationally as the “Western Sahara”, have been long considered as 
a major obstacle to the normalization of Moroccan-Spanish relations. 
The Spanish government insists on individual initiatives to settle the 
fate of the province and to withdraw from it. This has become the main 
obstacle to achieving the Maghreb integration.
In addition to Spain, Algeria tried with all its strength, during this 
period, to prevent Morocco from achieving complete independence 
and reintegrating the Western Sahara region into Moroccan territory. 
Algeria based its position on the principle of uti possidetis (i.e. the 
principle of inviolability of borders inherited from colonization), 
ignoring the fact that the Western Sahara has never been separated from 
Moroccan territory in the past. The principle of uti possidetis dates back 
to Roman times and takes its name from the Latin phrase “uti possidetis, 
ita possideatis”, which means “as you possess, so may you possess”. 
The modern application of the uti possidetis doctrine emerged after the 
decolonization of Latin America in the early nineteenth century. This 
doctrine was summarized in the 1922 arbitral award by the Swiss 
Federal Council that settled the territorial claim between Colombia and 
Venezuela. It described uti possidetis as “the basis of South American 
public law:
[…] The principle laid down the rule that the boundaries of the newly 
established republics would be the frontiers of the Spanish provinces 
which they were succeeding. This general principle offered the 
advantage of establishing the general rule that in law no territory of Old 
Spanish America was without an owner […]. The principle also had the 
advantage […] of doing away with boundary disputes between the new 
states.14
14  James Brown Scott, “The Swiss Decision in the Boundary Dispute between Colombia 
and Venezuela”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1922), pp. 428–29, 
cited in Paul R. Hensel, Michael E. Allison and Ahmed Khanani, “Territorial Integrity 
Treaties, Uti Possidetis, and Armed Conflict over Territory”, paper presented at the 
2006 Shambaugh Conference on “Building Synergies: Institutions and Cooperation 
in World Politics” [University of Iowa] (October 13, 2006).
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In summary, the uti possidetis principle is a legal principle that provides 
that successor states accept international boundaries set by predecessor 
regimes.
At the beginning of twentieth century, Latin America abandoned 
the uti possidetis principle because “it was found to be too restrictive on 
States there in rectifying obvious errors and injustices” and “there was 
often confusion over the location of provinces and other subdivisions 
of colonial control and thus over which successor State had the right 
to the territories in question”. Furthermore, “the principle could not be 
applied to adjacent territories which had been governed under different 
colonial regimes”.15 This has always been the attitude of the Moroccan 
government — amongst others — towards the principle, particularly if 
it involved the creation of states that, before colonization, had no status 
in international law.16
In the African context, the principle of uti possidetis has been adopted 
implicitly. For example, the resolution adopted by the Summit of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in July 1964 in Cairo stipulated 
that all member states “pledge themselves to respect the borders existing 
on their achievement of national independence”. This statement does 
not mean in any way that the principle of uti possidetis can be applied 
in all cases since it refers only to “national independence” excluding 
the independence of a part of national territory. Algeria is one of the 
African countries that has hugely benefited from the implementation 
of this principle and it has strongly defended it because “it is extremely 
difficult to define a pre-colonial Algerian State with the same territorial 
extent as is the case with modern Algeria”.17 It was very difficult in 
the 1960s to settle Morocco-Algerian disputes over some contiguous 
regions without resorting to the principle of uti possidetis. Although 
the application of this principle was not equitable for Morocco, it had 
demonstrated a great will to make significant territorial concessions 
in order to create a stable Maghreb. In the case of the Western Sahara 
issue, although Algeria was anxious to apply the principle in defining 
15  George Joffe, “The International Court of Justice and the Western Sahara Dispute”, 
in War and Refugees: The Western Sahara Conflict, Richard Lawless and Laila Monahan 
(Eds.). London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1987, p. 17.
16  Ibid.
17  Ibid.
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an entity different from Morocco in the region, Morocco had been most 
unwilling to do so again, if for no other reason than the simple fact that 
the colonial regimes involved were very different and reflected different 
colonial approaches rather than any inherent differences in the nature 
of the contiguous territories involved.18
Fig. 5.1 Location of the Western Sahara. Map by Rei-artur, CC BY-SA 3.0.19
The UN and the Western Sahara Issue
Before Spanish withdrawal from the Western Sahara region in 1975, the 
UN had adopted some resolutions concerning the region. Resolution 
2072 (XX), adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1965, 
called upon Spain to end its colonization of Sidi Ifni and the Sahara; 
and Resolution 2229 (XXI), adopted by the General Assembly on 20 
December 1966, recommended negotiations for the recovery of Sidi Ifni 
and called upon Spain to hold a referendum on the issue of the Western 
Sahara.
The Advisory Opinion given by the International Court of Justice 
on 16 October 1975 was a turning point in the modern history of the 
Western Sahara region. The ICJ concluded that Western Sahara (Rio 
de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain was 
not a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius) and that legal ties 
18  Ibid., p. 18.
19  Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ALocationWesternSahara.svg
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existed between this territory and both the Kingdom of Morocco and 
the Mauritanian entity. Despite disagreement about the interpretation 
of the ICJ Advisory Opinion, it constituted the international legal 
framework for all Moroccan initiatives that seek to find a solution to the 
Western Sahara issue because it confirmed the existence of the political, 
legal and spiritual attachment of the inhabitants of the Western Sahara, 
on the basis of the ties of allegiance (beyâa) shown throughout history.
Although, the United Nations had played a very modest role in the 
question of the Western Sahara during the Cold War era, immediately 
after the end of that period the UN began to play a more active role. 
This was reflected in some important decisions taken by the Security 
Council concerning Western Sahara and other international issues. 
This new interaction can be seen in the action of the UN to give special 
importance to the Western Sahara issue by presenting a set of proposals 
to the parties concerned, as well as by the creation of the United Nations 
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, commonly known as 
MINURSO on 29 April 1991. This new role for the UN was further 
reinforced by the direct sponsorship of negotiations between Morocco 
and the POLISARIO.20
Within the framework of the revival of the role of the UN in the 
Western Sahara issue, the Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 690 of 29 April 1991. With this, it showed approval for 
the report by the Secretary-General relative to the organization of a 
referendum of self-determination in the Western Sahara and formally 
approved the creation of the MINURSO forces.21
The UN noticed the difficulty of putting the 1991 settlement plan into 
practice, and the personal envoy of the Secretary-General, James Baker, 
proposed another project entitled “Framework agreement on the Status 
of Western Sahara”, known as “Baker Plan I” at the beginning of 2001. 
This “Framework Agreement” was characterized by its political nature, 
concluding that the dispute over the Western Sahara was primarily a 
political issue. Although it was immediately accepted by the Moroccan 
government as “a framework for negotiations” because it offered the 
population of the Western Sahara autonomy within the Moroccan 
state, POLISARIO rejected it on the grounds that it did not include 
20  Said Saddiki, “The International Reference of the Moroccan Autonomy Project for 
the Sahara Region”, Southern Morocco News Letter (July 2008), p. 17.
21  Ibid., p. 18.
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the possibility of secession of the territory; therefore, it has never been 
presented formally to the Security Council.
Convinced of the difficulty of applying the first plan, the former UN 
envoy proposed a second initiative, called “Baker Plan II”, in 2003. The 
Security Council approved this plan in its Resolution 1495 of March 2003, 
which bore the title “Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People 
of Western Sahara”. This plan, which suffered from many practical 
difficulties,22 was considered — at least by the Moroccan government — 
as a step backward since it once again proposed the referendum option 
as a solution to the Western Sahara issue. Today, the “Baker Plan II” 
seems largely dead; since early 2005 the UN Secretary-General has not 
referred to the plan in his reports concerning the situation in Western 
Sahara.
This is precisely why Morocco should take the initiative to present 
a daring project that abides by the different resolutions of the United 
Nations, a project called “The Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating 
an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region” (henceforth, Moroccan 
Autonomy Initiative).23 The Moroccan Initiative has been welcomed 
unanimously by the United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 
1754 of 30 April 2007. The UN expressly applauded the efforts deployed 
by Morocco “to move the process forward towards resolution”, and 
describes these efforts as being “serious and credible”. This praise of 
the Moroccan Initiative has since then been reiterated, including in 
subsequent Resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the situation 
concerning Western Sahara; namely, Resolution 1813 of 30 April 2008, 
Resolution 1871 of 30 April 2009, resolution 1920 of 30 April 2010, and 
Resolution 1979 of 27 April 2011.
Status of the Western Sahara Wall
Although the Western Sahara Wall was initially built for defensive 
reasons, since the beginning of the 1990s, its status has undergone 
an important change with the creation of the MINURSO. Military 
agreements signed by the two sides of the conflict have defined the 
status of the Berm and surrounding areas.
22  Ibid.
23  Ibid.
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The Original Function: The Western Sahara Wall as a 
Defensive Military Instrument
Like other military walls in various parts of the world that were erected in 
times of conflict and symbolize the transition from an offensive strategy 
to a defensive one (by which the state or empire protects its population 
and sustains a fait accompli),24 the Western Sahara Wall reflects a shift in 
the Moroccan military doctrine at the beginning of the 1980s. Morocco 
confirmed that the construction of the sand wall was purely for defensive 
purposes. Protection of civilian populations and the vital areas in Western 
Sahara against attacks by the POLISARIO forces was the top priority of 
this defensive policy.25 Moreover, such an incremental strategy allowed 
Morocco to gain and secure more and more territory — a practice 
recommended by counter-insurgency theorists.26
At the time when the wall was finished, POLISARIO leaders — 
according to Mustapha Bouh, a former member of the POLISARIO’s 
political bureau — had to accept that the wall imposed another kind 
of war on them. The Moroccans had adapted their strategy and, in 
turn, POLISARIO had to follow suit.27 Indeed, the construction of 
the Western Sahara Wall extensively affected the margin of maneuver 
of POLISARIO and disrupted its military capabilities, whereas it has 
enhanced the Moroccan military strategy on the ground and strengthened 
its negotiating position. This explains the significant decrease in the 
number of attacks carried out by POLISARIO against Moroccan forces. 
It was a turning point in the course of the conflict that led eventually 
24  Alexandra Novosseloff et Frank Neisse, “La Construction des Murs, ou la 
Mondialisation à Rebours”, Questions internationales, No. 33 (Septembre-Octobre 
2008), p. 101.
25  Zakaria Abouddahab, “Le Mur de Défense du Sahara Occidental à L’épreuve 
du Droit International et de la Réalité”, paper presented at the International 
Conference on “Fences and Walls in International Relations” organized by the 
Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies in the University of 
Quebec, Montreal, Canada (29–30 October 2009).
26  Derek Harvey, “The Reagan Doctrine, Morocco, and the Conflict in the Western 
Sahara: an Appraisal of United States Policy”, PhD Thesis [The University of Utah] 
(1988), p. 29.
27  Cited by Claude Moniquet, “The POLISARIO Front: Credible Negotiations 
Partner or After-Effect of the Cold War and Obstacle to a Political Solution in 
Western Sahara?”, European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center (ESISC) 
(November 2005), p. 31.
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to a cease-fire between the two sides. This situation, which disrupted 
the movement of POLISARIO troops, prompted POLISARIO leaders 
to abandon military options and enter into direct negotiations with 
Morocco. Arguably, the sand wall has played a double role: protection 
and stabilization.28
One of the main strategic reasons for Morocco to build a sand wall 
in the Western Sahara, even though it leaves an important part of the 
territory temporarily out of its direct control in the south and east of 
the Berm, is to avoid being confronted directly by the Algerian army 
and to avoid chasing POLISARIO guerillas into Algerian territory 
or violating Mauritanian sovereignty. By this military doctrine, the 
Moroccan army has voluntarily limited its right of pursuit in the 
event of POLISARIO attacks29 and it has demarcated the battlefield. 
Furthermore, the wall is built in the mostly uninhabited territory in 
the Western Sahara. The defensive purpose of the Western Sahara 
Wall is clearly recognized in the Secretary-General’s Report S/10/1998 
of 20 October 1998 (paragraph 8 of section B, entitled “military 
aspects”), which stated “with its construction work for logistical 
and accommodation purposes nearly completed at Dakhla, the 
engineering support unit from Pakistan is now focusing its efforts 
on the establishment of the forward logistical base at Awsard and on 
the refurbishment of sub-sector commands east of the defensive sand 
wall (Berm)”. Moreover, there is no report of the Secretary-General 
condemning the construction of the wall. In addition, no resolution of 
the Security Council and UN General Assembly mentions or describes 
the wall as “illegal”.
Current Function: The Berm as a Landmark of the Cease-
fire Monitoring Agreement
The current status of the Berm is defined by Military Agreement No. 1 
(henceforth referred to as MA #1), which is considered as the basic legal 
instrument for the UN monitoring of the cease-fire in Western Sahara. 
28  Zakaria Abouddahab, “Le Mur de Défense du Sahara Occidental à L’épreuve du 
Droit International et de la Réalité” (October 29–30, 2009), p. 11.
29  Claude Moniquet, “The POLISARIO Front: Credible Negotiations Partner or After-
Effect of the Cold War and Obstacle to a Political Solution in Western Sahara?”, p. 
31.
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MINURSO developed and signed MA #130 in December 1997 with the 
Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) and, in January 1998, with the Frente 
POLISARIO Military Forces (FPMF). One of the most important clauses 
of MA# 1 emphasizes that it details only activities of the military and 
has no provisions for civilian movements.
MA #1 divides the territory of Western Sahara into five areas. The 
Berm is considered to be a landmark of this demarcation. Each of the 
five parts has specific restrictions for the two parties’ military activities.31
• One 5-kilometer wide Buffer Strip to the south and east 
sides of the Berm: MA #1 prohibits the entry of RMA and 
FPMF personnel and equipment into this area by ground or 
air and the firing of weapons in or over the area. It stresses 
that it is prohibited at all times and any infraction counts as a 
violation of the cease-fire.
• Two 30-kilometer wide Restricted Areas along the Berm: 
The Buffer Strip is included in the Restricted Area on 
the POLISARIO Front side, and the Berm is included in 
the Restricted Area on the RMA side. MA #1 forbids the 
firing of weapons and/or conducting any military training 
exercises, with the exception of physical training activities of 
unarmed personnel. Also, this agreement bans any tactical 
reinforcements, any redeployment or movement of troops, 
headquarters/units, stores, equipment, ammunition, weapons, 
any entry of military aircraft and any improvements of defense 
infrastructures. However, it notes that some exceptions apply 
and some activities are allowed following prior notification to 
or approval by MINURSO.
• Two Areas with Limited Restrictions: These are two 
remaining vast stretches of land of the Western Sahara on both 
sides, respectively. In these areas, all normal military activities 
can be carried out with the exception of the reinforcement of 
30  See the Military Agreement No.1 on the MINURSO website as it appeared on 2 
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existing minefields, the laying of mines, the concentration of 
forces and the construction of new headquarters, barracks 
and ammunition storage facilities. MA #1 states also that 
MINURSO needs to be informed if the parties intend to 
conduct military exercises, including the firing of weapons of 
a calibre above 9 mm.
Fig. 5.2 Map made by the MINURSO based on the Military Agreement 
No. 1. This map drawn on 4 May 2007 shows the Operational Area of 
MINURSO including location of refugee camps in Tindouf.32
32  Source: the MINURSO website, as archived on the Internet Archive Wayback 
Machine, http://web.archive.org/web/20090210055157/http://www.minurso.unlb.
org/monitoring.html
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In addition to MA #1, MINURSO signed two other military agreements 
with the two parties separately. Military Agreement No. 2 was signed 
in April 1999 between the FPMF and the MINURSO with the aim of 
reducing the danger that represents residual mines and Unexploded 
ordnance (UXOs). However, the terms of this agreement do not 
apply to the mines and UXOs in the Buffer Strip. On the other hand, 
Military Agreement No. 3 was conceived within the framework of 
strengthening the cooperation between the RAM and the MINURSO. 
With humanitarian and environmental significance, it aims to reduce 
both the danger of residual mines and unexploded engines. It is further 
understood that this agreement aims to reduce the danger but not to 
perform a mine-cleaning operation or a large-scale research endeavor.
It is worth mentioning that the sand wall does not constitute an 
international border, as was noted in paragraph 56 of the Peace Plan 
(contained in the Report of the Secretary-General No S/2003/565 on 23 
May 2003): “The Moroccan troops remaining in the Territory will […] 
consist only of troops deployed in static or defensive positions along 
the sand wall constructed by Morocco close to the eastern and southern 
frontier of the Territory”. Also, the report of the Secretary-General 
No S/1995/779 on 8 September 1995 distinguished between the Berm 
and the international border of Western Sahara, stating, in paragraph 
25, that “as noted in my last report (S/1995/404), during consultations 
held by the former Special Representative in 1991, the POLISARIO 
Front had objected to the suggestion that its troops be confined outside 
the Territory, while Morocco had refused to agree that the troops be 
confined in the area between the sand wall (Berm) and the international 
border of Western Sahara”.
New Functions of the Western Sahara Wall
Today, the role of the Western Sahara Wall has multiplied as a result 
of new phenomena in the region, especially the increase in operations 
made by some military groups and the growth of irregular sub-Saharan 
migrants crossing the Sahel and Sahara region.
Geographical features of Great Sahara, especially its immense open 
space and porous borders, have made the region a safe haven for some 
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Islamic military groups. In the last decade, they have used these to 
threaten countries of the region. Many attacks and kidnappings have 
been carried out by these groups, especially in Mauritania, South Algeria 
and northern areas of Niger and Mali. So, the Western Sahara Wall can 
be practically considered as an effectively impregnable obstacle to the 
movements of Islamic military groups located and acting in both the 
Sahara and Sahel region. This fact explains why Western Sahara remains 
relatively free from attacks compared with other Saharan regions.
At the same time, the Western Sahara Wall plays an important role in 
preventing or at least reducing the movement of irregular immigrants. 
This is why sub-Saharan migrants generally prefer to enter Morocco 
at the border east of Oujda from Algeria after they have crossed the 
Sahara overland, usually through Agadez in Niger and Tamanrasset in 
Algeria,33 because they are aware of the difficulties of crossing into north 
Morocco from the south because of the Sahara Wall. This explains why 
cases of sub-Saharan irregular immigration mentioned periodically in 
reports of the UN Secretary-General on “the situation in Western Sahara” 
are infrequent and are limited to the south and east sides of the Berm.
The Prospects of the Western Sahara Wall
Today, the Western Sahara Wall finds itself at a crossroads because of 
significant developments in the Western Sahara issue, especially after 
the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative in 2007. This has been the subject 
of negotiations between the Moroccan government and POLISARIO, 
which started in Manhasset (U.S.) in June 2007 and have continued 
intermittently up to the present time. The future of the Sahara Wall 
depends closely on the fate of the Western Sahara issue itself. There are 
three potential scenarios for the future of the Western Sahara Wall, in 
accordance with the positions held by the conflicting parties: separation 
of the Western Sahara region from Morocco, success of the Moroccan 
Autonomy Initiative or continuation of the existing status quo.
33  For more information about the routes of irregular sub-Saharan immigration see 
Hein de Haas, “Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the 
European Union: An Overview of Recent Trends”, Migration Research Series, No. 32 
[Geneva: International Organization for Migration] (2008), pp. 17–49.
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Separation of the Western Sahara Region: An Unrealistic Solution
The dissident thesis, adopted by Algeria and POLISARIO, focuses on 
the separation of the Western Sahara region and the creation of an 
independent state as the ultimate solution to the conflict.
The notion of “Sahrawi people” or “people of Western Sahara” has 
been the subject of a controversial debate which accompanied and 
continues to accompany the different phases of the Western Sahara 
issue. In fact, the populations of Western Sahara have never regarded 
themselves as an independent nation or people. Even if we should 
consider the inhabitants of the Western Sahara to constitute a people 
in themselves, it should be mentioned that the Sahrawi tribes are not 
found exclusively in the Moroccan Sahara. A great number of Sahrawis 
live in the entire south-west region of Algeria, from Bechar all the way 
to the borders between Mauritania and Mali, and in the northwest of 
Mauritanian territory, to the north of Mali between Timbuktu and the 
Algerian borders, through Taoudeni.34
Many international actors interested in the Western Sahara issue have 
been aware that the self-determination option in the Western Sahara 
region is unworkable without a new vision that takes into account the 
inadequacy of the independence option. One of the major obstacles to 
the referendum option is an inability to define who would be entitled to 
vote in such a referendum. Erik Jensen has treated this issue eloquently 
with the following questions: “Who is a Sahrawi, who is a western 
Saharan, and who should be entitled to vote in the referendum? Who 
should be the determining self in the fact of self-determination?”35 The 
core issue, according to Jensen, has been which electorate are deemed 
to be qualified to vote in a referendum. For Moroccans, the right to vote 
must be comprehensively based on the principle of jus sanguinis and, 
thus, extended to all Saharan tribes linked to the former Spanish Sahara. 
For POLISARIO, the electorate should be narrowly defined in terms of 
jus soli: limited to those counted in the Spanish census of 1974.36
34  Said Saddiki, “A Reading of the Constitution ‘Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’”, 
Southern Morocco Newsletter (2008), pp. 81–82.
35  Eric Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of Stalemate. London and Boulder, VQ: Lynne 
Rienner, 2005, p. 13.
36  Ibid.
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The statement made at the Security Council on 21 April 2008 by the 
former Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, Peter 
Van Walsum, certainly reflected international awareness of the reality of 
the Western Sahara issue. Van Walsum considered that an independent 
Western Sahara is not a realistic proposition and not a reachable goal. 
He also urged the parties concerned to resume negotiations based on 
exclusion of the option of a referendum.
Furthermore, the creation of an independent state that lacks the 
basic conditions of viability and continuity is bound to constitute a 
heavy burden for the entire international community, particularly for 
nearby countries of the region. The risk is that such a microstate is 
likely to cast the entire Maghreb region into a period of trouble and 
uncertainty. Significantly, reservations expressed by the international 
community with respect to POLISARIO’s separatist thesis indicate a 
growing awareness of the inappropriateness of creating mini-states. 
Such entities represent yet another heavy burden to be borne by a world 
that is already weighed down by political, economic and security-
related problems. Today, failed states often become breeding grounds 
for groups involved in arms and drug trafficking, social violence and 
human-rights violations. To set up a failed state in the Sahara, bordering 
the Atlantic Ocean, would undoubtedly have a serious impact on 
international peace and security.
In addition, the application of such a narrow and rigid principle 
of self-determination, as claimed by the POLISARIO Front and its 
supporters, especially Algeria, implies some very dangerous political 
and security ramifications. Indeed, it will be at the root of some 
unceasing troubles in the Maghreb region, troubles which will not 
stop at the borders of a given country, particularly when we bear in 
mind the ethnic, linguistic and tribal composition of the countries of the 
region, mainly Algeria.37 The diversity of the population of the Maghreb 
countries can be a source of strength and wealth, if properly employed. 
If manipulated or mismanaged, however, such population diversity 
could generate trouble and tension with unprecedented political and 
security repercussions. Such inflammation will not hold within a 
particular country; rather, it will consume the whole region.
37  Said Saddiki, “A Reading of the Constitution of the Pseudo-Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic”, p. 83.
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Moroccan Autonomy Initiative: A Middle-ground Resolution
In order to break out of the impasse of the Western Sahara issue and 
respond to calls that have been regularly launched by the Security 
Council since 2004 to “the parties and States of the region to continue to 
cooperate fully with the United Nations to end the current impasse and 
to achieve progress towards a political solution”, Morocco submitted a 
proposal for autonomy for the Sahara in 2007, within the framework of 
the kingdom’s sovereignty and national unity. This initiative, according 
to the official document, is part of the endeavors made to build a 
modern, democratic society based on the rule of law, collective and 
individual freedoms and economic and social development. As such, it 
brings hope for a better future for the region’s populations, puts an end 
to separation and exile and promotes reconciliation.38
The Moroccan Autonomy Initiative took great care to conform 
to the principle of self-determination, giving it a special meaning 
compatible with the specificity of the Western Sahara issue. The 
concept of autonomy is related to what is known in international law 
as “internal self-determination”. This refers to the right to exercise 
political, economic and cultural autonomy within an existing state 
and is concretely translated into the establishment of control over the 
political, economic, social and cultural development of the concerned 
region. In Patrick Thornberry’s words, “the external dimension or 
aspect [of self-determination] defines the status of a people in relation 
to another people, State or Empire, whereas the democratic or internal 
dimension should concern the relationship between a people and ‘its 
own’ State or government”.39 Article 5 of the Moroccan Autonomy 
Project falls within the latter perspective in so far as it stipulates that 
“the Sahara populations will themselves run their affairs democratically, 
through legislative, executive and judicial bodies enjoying exclusive 
powers. They will have the financial resources needed for the region’s 
38  Article 3 of the Moroccan Project of Autonomy.
39  Patrick Thornberry, “The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-determination 
With Some Remarks on Federalism”, in Modern Law of Self-Determination, Christian 
Tomuschat (Ed.). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, p. 101.
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development in all fields, and will take an active part in the nation’s 
economic, social and cultural life”.40
Unlike other proposed projects, including the referendum, 
which have encountered tremendous problems in terms of their 
implementation, the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative seems to be a 
concrete project. The Moroccan Initiative has, thanks to its realism, 
garnered wide international support within the Security Council and 
elsewhere because it is considered as a credible and realistic solution to 
the conflict in the Sahara.
Comparative constitutional law has been able to lift the ambiguity 
surrounding the definition of the notion of the autonomy statute, 
given that the right to self-government has resulted, in some cases, 
from the practical experience of autonomy statutes. At this level, three 
categories of autonomy statutes can be distinguished which spring 
from constitutional practice.41 The first category is the one organized 
by the constitution of the state concerned, which gives the autonomous 
authority its own judiciary as well as some exclusive legislative powers. 
For example, this arrangement applies in the Aaland Islands of Finland, 
the region of Gagauzia in Moldova and other instances in Spain, Italy 
and Portugal. The second category is composed of the specific statutes 
of an official constitutional delegation and concerns the power to 
create laws except for its own laws. Here, working examples include 
Greenland and the Faeroe islands in Denmark. In contrast to the first 
category, the second is an example of a “fully autonomous territory”, 
or, as Kristian Myntti described the case of Greenland, an “autonomous 
territory proper”.42 The third category constitutes regimes of autonomy 
that enjoy a specific constitutional statute whereby the attribution of 
ordinary administrative and judicial competence belongs to those of the 
central authorities concerned. The Crimea region in Ukraine falls into 
40  Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Saharan Region, 
10 April, 2007.
41  Markku Suksi, “On the Entrenchment of Autonomy”, in Autonomy: Applications and 
Implications, Markku Suksi (Ed.). The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 
151–71.
42  Kristian Myntti, “The Beneficiaries of Autonomy Arrangements — with Special 
Reference to Indigenous Peoples in General and the Saami in Finland in Particular”, 
in ibid., p. 279.
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this third category. According to the studies conducted by Markku Suksi 
(1998), only the Spanish Constitution provides for the autonomy as a 
claimable constitutional right (Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution),43 
whereas all other constitutions do not recognize the statute of autonomy 
as a constitutional right.
Hence, the Moroccan Initiative appears to be a middle-ground 
solution. It states in Article 29 that “the Moroccan Constitution shall 
be amended and the autonomy Statute incorporated into it, in order to 
guarantee its sustainability and reflect its special place in the country’s 
national juridical architecture”. The integration of the autonomy statute 
of the Western Sahara region in the constitutional text reflects, indeed, 
the importance given by Moroccan decision makers to this project.
As far as the competences attributed to the autonomous region are 
concerned, there are two cases where the exclusive competences of 
the central power are listed when the attributions of the autonomous 
region emanate from the organic or ordinary law. Otherwise, only the 
exclusive competences of the autonomous region are listed, which 
implicitly suggests that all other attributions belong to the central 
authority, be they exclusive to the state or in common bond with the 
autonomous region. In yet a third situation, one which was equally 
adopted by the Moroccan project, the exclusive competences of the 
central power and the autonomous region are laid out in a clear manner 
either in connection with exclusive or conjoined competence. One 
condition, however, is that “powers which are not specifically entrusted 
to a given party shall be exercised by common agreement, on the basis 
of the principle of subsidiarity”.44
In addition to the above, the Moroccan project is also characterized by 
seeking to establish a negotiated autonomy on the basis of compromise 
between the parties concerned and is not imposed unilaterally by 
constitutional, ordinary or organic law. That is why the Moroccan 
government considers it as a ground for negotiations with POLISARIO, 
not a final version of the autonomy statute.
43  Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution states that “The Constitution […] Recognizes 
and Guarantees the Right to Autonomy of the Nationalities and Regions which 
make it up and the solidarity among all of them”.
44  Article 17 of the Moroccan Project of Autonomy.
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Continuation of the status quo
The third possibility is that the Western Sahara Wall will perpetuate for 
many years, consolidating the status quo in the region, since there are no 
indications of a clear willingness from POLISARIO to compromise its 
position on creating an independent state in the region. This status quo 
scenario may take one of two paths:
• Continuation of the current stalemate of the Western Sahara 
issue that has been in place for the previous three decades.
• Implementation of an autonomy statute in the Western Sahara 
region unilaterally by Morocco, as a result of the failure of 
negotiations between the two sides that were initiated in 2007 
under UN auspices.
Aware of the gravity of this scenario, some observers have warned that 
the collapse of negotiations between Morocco and POLISARIO will 
have far-reaching impacts on the future of the Western Sahara dispute 
and will perpetuate the status quo. This conclusion is associated with 
the rise of many voices in Morocco that call for applying the autonomy 
initiative unilaterally in the framework of the new Moroccan policy of 
advanced regionalization, which aims at improving and enhancing the 
competence of local authorities.
Some international and regional powers are satisfied with the 
maintenance of the status quo in the region because they benefit from the 
current situation. The prevailing view in the United Nations is to put 
an end to the problem and overcome the current stalemate. Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon stated, in the UN report on the situation 
concerning Western Sahara on 14 April 2008, that the momentum 
developed in recent years can be maintained only by trying to find a 
way out of the current political impasse through realism and a spirit of 
compromise from both parties. He concluded that “the consolidation 
of the status quo is not an acceptable outcome of the current process of 
negotiations”.
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Conclusion
The Western Sahara issue is one of the heavy legacies of the colonization 
age that left Africa with arbitrary and unreasonable borders which 
were demarcated inequitably. Therefore, the Berm is just one aspect of 
a complex conflict, and it will disappear only once the original issue 
is brought to an ultimate and just resolution. The paradox is that the 
Western Sahara itself is also but one aspect of the regional system that 
has existed in the Maghreb region since the end of French colonialism.
Although granting an autonomy statute for the Western Sahara region 
is currently an equitable and realistic solution for the issue because it aims 
to achieve a middle-ground resolution, it cannot be separated from the 
nature of the current Maghreb system that is marked by competition for 
regional leadership. Currently, there are no indications of establishing 
cooperation between the two countries on border control because of 
three key factors: first, the continuing influence of the “deep state” and 
the enduring political deadlock in Algeria; second, the current structure 
of the Maghreb regional system and the existing balance of power in 
the region; and third, Algeria currently has no interest in settling the 
dispute. So long as the current regional system exists and the concerned 
international and regional powers are satisfied with the maintenance 
of the status quo in the region, there is little hope of resolving the issue.
Conclusions
The functions of international borders, as well as other components and 
symbols of the nation-state, have changed substantially due to the ever-
changing nature of the international environment. At the inception of 
the nation-state, borders were viewed in military terms. Before the end 
of the nineteenth century, most states in Europe and North America 
took a more or less “hands-off” attitude towards the immigration 
movement. Due to the increasing number of people leaving their 
home countries, control over cross-border movement became a central 
concern of the nation-state. According to the Westphalian model of 
sovereignty, migration control had been the “reserved domain” of the 
nation-state and a quintessential act of its sovereignty. Consequently, 
states traditionally enjoy exclusive rights to pass immigration laws that 
regulate the movement of people across their borders and to decide 
which to admit, how many and where from.
The common denominator of new immigration policies taken 
by the host countries in the last two decades is the linking between 
immigration policy and border-control management on one hand, 
and between the immigration policy and security issues on the other 
hand. Additionally, tightening border control and enhancing judicial 
measures related to irregular immigration are the major means 
by which the immigrant-receiving countries try to assert national 
sovereignty. This may be seen as a response to the decline of countries’ 
powers to control the flow of money, ideas, information and all kinds 
of virtual interactions in and out of their territories, which have slipped 
more and more outside their authority.
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Security concerns remain a main determinant of the current border-
control policies which aim at preventing infiltration of members of 
armed groups, irregular migration, goods smuggling, drug trafficking 
and other clandestine cross-border activities. In some cases, border 
fortification reflects the desire to impose unilaterally the de facto border. 
In addition to these declared goals, the current border fortifications, 
especially in the Middle East and South Asia, reflect the nature of 
the existing regional subsystems which are characterized by mutual 
suspicion and mistrust between different neighboring nations. These 
anarchical regional subsystems prompt governments to resort to 
unilateral and preventive solutions.
The nature of the existing regional subsystems — in North America, 
North Africa, Middle East or South Asia — is a key factor that determines 
the current border-control policies led especially by the receiving 
countries and those most threatened by transnational armed groups. 
Additionally, with the exception of the U.S.-Mexico border, the legacy 
of a colonial past and, to a lesser extent, the nation-building process 
have heavily influenced the border-security policies of post-colonial 
countries in Asia and Africa.
One of the paradoxes of “globalization” is that an increasingly 
interconnected and interdependent world is simultaneously marked by 
intensified militarization and fortification of national borders. Today, 
some regions — whether in North America, the Mediterranean or some 
Asian sub-regions — are being pulled in two different directions: one 
toward more complementarity and integration (e.g., NAFTA, Union for 
Mediterranean, ASEAN, SAARC) and another toward the erection of 
further tangible and intangible border barriers.
Despite relentless efforts by receiving countries to prevent 
unauthorized border-crossing by immigrants, drug smugglers 
and dissidents, these groups have not been deterred. Rather, they 
have adapted to the strategies designed to impede their movement, 
developing new ways and means to circumvent such barriers. It is 
argued that illegal immigration and transnational armed groups 
cannot be stopped solely by the erection of more walls and fences, but 
by comprehensive policies based especially on addressing their root 
causes. In some regions, unauthorized immigration has not declined as 
a result of tighter border control but because of the economic crisis that 
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has hit some host countries in the last decade. Although a huge amount 
of money and efforts have been spent on the construction of physical 
barriers along various international borders or fighting lines in the post-
Cold War era, the results achieved have often been less than desired.
Though military walls may reach some short-term goals by 
destabilizing the enemy, armed groups can adapt to the new situation 
by developing missiles that can exceed the height of these barriers, 
by digging tunnels or by penetrating the enemy lines using forged 
documents as has been seen in Palestine and Kashmir.
The construction of physical barriers along many borders all over 
the world may have revived realist conceptions of national security and 
sovereignty, but transitional non-state actors, as the main target of these 
border fortification policies, have seriously questioned whether their 
impact on international affairs has been neglected. Regardless of all the 
internal and external challenges faced by a nation-state, borders remain 
a meaningful symbol of national identity and continue to constitute one 
of the main determinants of foreign policies. Inasmuch as fortifying 
national borders in recent years reflects part of these challenges faced 
by the nation-state, it shows the capabilities of the nation-state to adapt 
to these new challenges.
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